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## The Study of Policy Implementation

Does Special Autonomy Represent the Papuans Aspiration?

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**Abstract:** Special autonomy is a political consensus on the desire of the Papuans to live in prosperity by considering their indigenous rights. Two decades of the implementation of Special Autonomy for Papua, it is still considered ineffective to answer the crucial demands, such as political rights, material welfare, and indigenous participation in the development. Political participation of Papuan indigenous (OAP) is expected as the main issue of which has crucially affected the mandatory aspects, such as political conductivity, development objectivity, social welfare, and security. This research aims to figure out the importance of political participation of the OAP and how it can affect the special autonomy enforcement in Papua. The results show that political participation of Papua considerably contributes to the local institutional involvement, addressing political conductivity, directing the development target, and realizing the deliberative policy. In other findings, political supervision is highly required to be evaluated in ensuring the optimizing of political participation for OAP.

**Keywords:** Papua Special Autonomy; political participation; Special Autonomy Fund, noken; Papuan conflict; deliberative policy

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## I. Introduction

Special autonomy or Otonomi Khusus is a special authority for Papuan Provincial Government to govern and to accommodate indigenous interests based on the aspirations and rights of Papuans. Otonomi Khusus is a Papuan political choice that indicates a willingness to cooperate with the central government. It is envisioned as a necessary step towards justice for the indigenous of Papua or OAP (Maniagasi, 2001). Basically, Otonomi Khusus is aimed to accommodate basic minority rights in law as an important evolution not only in central/regional relations but also in Indonesian jurisprudence. According to Rodd McGibbon, special autonomy is meant to accommodate a demand of the people in West Papua that they have a broader opportunity to rule their own region (Halmin, 2006). As a normative basis of law in Indonesia, Otonomi Khusus is regulated by the Law No. 21/2001 encompassing entire mandatory affairs, local governance, and customary rights for the indigenous in seven basic values, including: (1) protection of the rights of indigenous Papuans; (2) democracy and democratic maturity; (3) respect for ethics and morals; (4) rule of law; (5) enforcement of human rights; (6) appreciation for pluralism; (7) equality, rights and obligations as citizens (Sumule, 2002).

In contrast, two decades of the implementation of Otonomi Khusus in Papua still is questionable, even in the accomplishment for Papua's well-being and sovereignty. This condition has become a long-held problematic issue that is always fascinating to discuss in multidimensional perspectives against politics in Indonesia. As of the recent debate, the ratification of new special autonomy law appeared causing pro and contra. In detail, on 15 July 2021, the Indonesian Parliament revised and ratified 20 articles from a pre-existing the Law No. 21/2001 to boost a special autonomy fund, to ensure the affirmative action in local politics and to accelerate the infrastructure development, particularly in education and healthcare facilities (Da Costa & Lamb, 2021). In a positive way, the Provincial Government of Papua gives appreciation to the Central Government because of their commitment in integrating special autonomy as the unilateral concession between Papua and National Government (Suwandi, 2021).

On the other side, there were many protesters from different organizations and activists representing the Papuans. Amnesty International of Indonesia assumed the new special autonomy law would potentially weaken

the indigenous right of OAP. This is originated by the new chapter stated that the area expansion of district processing without the preparation stage (according to chapter 77) will restrict the OAP participating in decision making in territorial solutions as the crucial part of conflict regulation (Weller & Wolff, 2005). The Indonesian Human Rights Monitor or Imparsial.org criticized the ratification of the new special autonomy law as just a rush decision and merely repressive. As a result, the central government was impressed by their omissions for all aspirations from Papuans without facilitating public discussion to conclude the mutual consensus in decision-making (Aditya, 2021). Therefore, this issue fueled mass protests from Papuan colleges from Cendrawasih University confronting those disproportional conditions through rallies and demonstrations in several cities.

The intention in involving public participation of Papuan in completely substantial sectors for developing Papua obviously underlined those phenomena. This circumstance indicates a discrepancy of Papuans complicity during the political process, which is contradictory with the purpose of special autonomy in accommodating basic minority rights in law. As the reason, the demands of political participation to express their aspirations are precisely discriminated against by the higher authorities that just eroded the essence of special autonomy in accommodating Papuans rights in law. Jaap Timmer through his paper about "Decentralization and Elite Politics in Papua" resulted that the aspirations of legislators were all too often detached from the reasons for demands for more sovereignty cherished among the majority of Papuans whose frustrations about ineffective governance were ever increasing (Timmer, 2005). Likewise, learning from the previous tragedy, the controversial Act of Free Choice in 1969 necessarily taught a valuable lesson about the importance of fulfilling aspirations, even if they were just from the minority, could affect the sovereign stability of the nation. Consequently, when the indigenous became more expressive because of their inability to participate in politics, rebellion and secessionism proved their effort to get the national government attention to provide Papuan rights in socio-cultural and customary rights, humanity, politics, and economic opportunity. This condition is in accordance with the statement of Charles Andrian and James Smith, which argues that "public participation basically consists of passive participation, and participation that looks more expressive as seen in protest activities,

boycotts and petition signing” (Gintara, 2020). As the implication, it makes an interesting discourse on the ineffectiveness of special autonomy for 20 years, particularly in improving political stability, advancing regional development, and promoting economic growth in Papua.

In considering that discourse, much research has appealed for special autonomy in Papua becoming a notable concern of study, not only for domestic, but also for international researchers. In Indonesia, Muhammad Iqbal is one who has a concern to conduct research about the management of Papua’s Special Autonomy Funds (Suswanta & Iqbal, 2019). He considers that the provincial order and the Papua provincial Regional People’s Representative Assembly (or officially called DPRD) have not set a special local regulation or Perdasus which is the basis of management and accountability. The implications of the low accountability in horizontal and vertical institutions make almost all regional governments unable to be involved in planning, implementation, and supervision. Consequently, this pathology merely restricts the local necessities through the government development planning (normatively referred to as Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah) which have been disproportionate by that condition.

Furthermore, another Indonesian researcher, Aninam Johny, has a concern to study about “The Effect of Fund Allocation of Special Autonomy of Economic Growth in West Papua Province” (Johny et al., 2018). Based on his research, the special autonomy fund is oriented to support five areas considered important to indigenous West Papua people, including education, health, infrastructure, people’s economy, and affirmation or other areas. The research shows that fund allocation does not have any significant effect on economic growth in West Papua. That is a crucial contradiction where special autonomy is duly proposed to attain the several outcomes in increasing economic growth, decreasing poverty and unemployment rates, and developing infrastructure.

In the international context, Johnny Blades through his paper about “West Papua: The Issue That Won’t Go Away for Melanesia” states the special autonomy failure in addressing the plight of West Papuan communities (Blades, 2020). He states that special autonomy is aimed to provide a framework for addressing long-held grievances, recognizing customary land rights, providing a measure of self-government, setting up mechanisms for human rights courts and giving better access to revenue streams. The controversy

on both sides between Papuans’ rejection of the prospect of self-determination and Indonesian perspective that the implementation of law is poor. All of these implications make Johnny Blades conclude that the special autonomy has failed to address the plight of Papuan.

According to these issues, the author concludes that Papuans participation in politics might considerably become the factor, which could not be optimized in the policy implementation. McGibbon concludes Otonomi Khusus has given more space for Papuan to participate in policymaking; however, it still cannot solve conflicts and other crucial conditions in Papua (Katharina, 2017). According to this urgency, Verba and Nie explains that political participation has an indispensable feature of public decision itself (van Deth, 2016). Political participation is also defined as the whole activities that can affect the political decision (Mufti & Syamsir, 2016). Ramlan Surbakti indicates public participation in politics can be measured from two aspects, including the access of public involvement in policy making and how the “grass root” citizens might be involved (Sastrawati, 2019). Almond distinguishes political participation into conventional and non-conventional. Conventional is meant as a legal form of political participation, such as general election, public discussion, involving in political party, and lobbying. On the other side, non-conventional can be referred as an illegal activity that may harm the political conductivity, for instance terrorism, rebellion, petition, confrontation, and demonstration.

As a perspective, the authors assume that political participation is a fundamental source in directing political conductivity in Papua. It refers to Van Matter and Van Horn theory that political condition is the one of three fundamental sources which can affect the achievement of policy implementation (Nugroho, 2020). In addition, political participation is a political basis of democratic country, especially in Papua. As a democratic country, Indonesia has adopted democracy as the political system by recognizing equal rights in politics to take a part in achieving the country’s goals. Verba and Nie agree that political participation is an important criteria in assessing the quality of democracy to take part in a decision (van Deth, 2016). It can be concluded that Papuan political condition indeed depends on the people participation in political activities. By considering this background, the authors decide to do research in describing the Papuan participation in politics during the special autonomy. This research is aimed to figure out how the mechanism of political

participation affects the implementation of Papuan government policy.

## II. Methods

The various issues in political participation trigger authors to establish a case study to elucidate the relevant evidence. This research uses the literature review as a research method in describing a more or less systematic way of collecting and synthesizing previous research (Snyder, 2019). This methodology allows researchers to do an interdisciplinary comparison from different research findings to comprehend the uncover evidence. The authors apply narrative review approach which is designed for topics that have been conceptualized differently and studied by various groups of researchers within diverse disciplines and that hinder a full systematic review process. It is considered that to understand the political phenomenon of Papuan special autonomy, it needs to be viewed widely from different perspectives.

The secondary data, including statistical and textual data, were collected from media, universities, and official government agencies from Central Statistics Agency (BPS) and the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK). The authors ensured literature relevancy with several provisions: 1) the published articles from official institution; 2) research findings from thesis or dissertation; 3) published between 2010 and 2022. Data analysis is inductively conducted into several following steps, including collecting data, filtering the relevant data, synthesizing data, and theoretical development (Hardani et al., 2020).


To provide the research evidence deeper, the authors also interviewed several informants at gaining various empirical information, for instance the officials of Papuan Provincial Government, Ministry of Home Affairs, and local organization. Interview is aimed in gaining primary data, completing and examining the secondary data (Hardani et al., 2020). The questions provided specific classifications, according to Guba and Lincoln, including hypothesis question, reasoning question, interpretative question, and argumentation. In supporting government decision to decrease Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) distribution, interviews were possible to be conducted by utilizing supporting devices to communicate with informants, such as WhatsApp, cellular phone, and zoom meeting application.

## III. Results and Discussion

### A. Does “Money” Specialty Fulfill the Needs of Papuan?

Researchers agree that financial supply is an important resource in affecting the succession of policy implementation. Van Horn and Van Matter state in the new town study that the supply of federal incentive is a major contributor. On the other hand, Edwards III also argues that adequate budgetary can affect the quality the public services which policy implementers provide to the public (J. Widodo, 2021). According to these statements, there is no sequence why “money” becomes a crucial dimension that must be viewed in how to receive and how to utilize it.

Normatively, budgetary structure is based on the needs of people, as the bottom-up approach in policymaking, through a political consensus in the development plan, including short term, medium term, and long-term plans. This provision allows the multisector stakeholders, including public and private sector, to interfere the budgetary proportion in national or regional level. In the subnational context, the government has ratified the Regulation of Ministry of Home Affairs No. 86/2017 regulating the whole mechanisms in planning which will underlie the form of budgetary structure in Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah



Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2021


Figure 1. The Allocation of Dana Otonomi Khusus and Dana Tambahan Infrastruktur Papua in 2013–2019

or APBD). APBD is a fiscal utilization guidance that represents the supply and demand in term of fiscal capacity and the program target. To maintain the fiscal balance between regions, government provides General Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum or DAU) and Special Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus or DAK) to the several regions, which have a substantial fiscal gap in local revenue and fiscal needs.

As a notable specialty in Papua, according to the Special Autonomy Law No. 21/2001, the government provides special autonomy fund or Dana Otonomi Khusus to enhance the public mandates in education and health as through a transfer mechanism. It is 2% national general allocation fund for Papuan special autonomy fund in order to enhance the public mandates, especially in education and health. It is called special autonomy fund or Dana Otonomi Khusus. Furthermore, the government decides to provide infrastructure fund or Dana Tambahan Infrastruktur in addressing the cause of infrastructure deficiency in Papua. Based on the tabulations above, the government was consistent in increasing the fund transfer allocation year to year. The Ministry of Finance clarifies this surge as accelerative effort in advancing infrastructure development and improving performance in planning and budgeting management (Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021).

As the basis consequences, the difference between special autonomy and other autonomy, according to Van Houten, lies in the special authority given to local governments to regulate their regions according to the public aspiration and fundamental right (Rochendi S. & Saleh, 2017). The special autonomy law has mandated that the essence of Papua's Special Autonomy is based on three main goals, including: 1) The regulatory adjustment of authority between the Central Government and the Papua Provincial Government and the implementation of this authority in the Papua Province which is carried out with specialty; 2) Recognition and being respectful for the basic rights of indigenous Papuans as well as strategic and fundamental empowerment; and 3) realizing good governance.

However, these additional fund transfers only have minor impact in Papua development. The Central Bureau of Statistic noted that the Human Development Index (HDI) of Papua slightly increases around 2,57% from 2016 (58,05%) to 2021 (60,62%) (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, 2022a). HDI is the explanatory result measured by the accessibility of public health, education, and




Source: BPS (2022)

**Figure 2.** Human Development Index of Papua 2021

public income. As a crucial implication, HDI also holds an important indicator in measuring social conductivity. Gadjah Mada University (Pahlevi, 2022), through the study of violence cases in Papua from 2010-2022, claims six regions that have the highest number of violence, including Intan Jaya, Puncak Jaya, Puncak, Mimika, Nduga, and Yahukimo which are dominantly the lowest HDI's regions in Papua. Furthermore, violence cases in Papua gradually increase from 2016 to 2021, which were possibly implicated by their dissatisfaction in discrimination, and injustice to the community who has been marginalized (Hadi, 2021).

In another concern, the large amount of fund transfer has made Papua becoming not productive. The dominance of regional dependence on transfer funds sourced from the Central Government indicates that regional capacities are still unable to meet their fiscal needs. Mahfud explains that the low fiscal capacity can be caused by two main factors, including: 1) the low role of taxes in regional financing; and 2) the large differences in population, geographical conditions, and community capacities (Kartika, 2015).

Based on Figure 3, it can be seen that the proportion of locally generated revenue (PAD) in Papua Province depends on the amount



Source: LKPD BPK RI (2021)

**Figure 3.** Fiscal Independence of Papua in 2014–2019

of the special autonomy fund. Papua Fiscal Independence Index (IKF) shows a result of 0.1330 or is classified as “dependent region”. In addition, the results of the Regional Government Fiscal Independence Report for Fiscal Years 2014 to 2019 shows that there has been no significant change in the increase of independence status every year (BPK RI, 2021). These results indicate that these transfer funds have not significantly contributed to special autonomy goals.


It is boldly indicated that the political process in policymaking can be the crucial problem in Papuan budgetary structure, especially in determining public needs into the program and target of APBD. Maulana and Tryatmoko find in their research that the political supra-structure was not formally organized and merely focused on institutionalization which not optimally conducted (Aziz et al., 2018). This condition directly implicates the organizational activities running not optimally well, especially in organizing Papuan indigenous (OAP) into the governmental activities through MRP or DPRD as the political representative. In the context of planning and budgeting, these representatives are precisely the core in determining the objectivity of the program and the target outcome in the developmental plan and budgetary realization. It is because of their important function in accommodating and protecting the basis right of OAP as the principal paradigm of Papua development, which can interfere the rate of the program and the

budgeting priority. Moreover, DPRD and MRP have a crucial function in supervising and considering the budgeting utilization of Papuan government. This authority allows them to approve or refuse the budgetary proposal, formulated by the executive. In legislative perspective, Saputra and Yuwanto state that those budgetary functions give the regional representative assembly (refers to DPRD) an authority in formulating regional policy underlying the APBD (Saputri et al., 2020).

## B. Will Noken System Demolish Political Ethnocentrism in Papua?

UNESCO on December 4, 2012 has determined Noken as one of the traditional works and world cultural heritage. This culture is also a new democratic paradigm that was used in 2009, the election of the Regent of Yahukimo Regency, this is what is called the “Noken Democracy.” Since the election, Noken has been used as a substitute as a local election system for ballot boxes, even in some areas tribal members have trusted their tribal chiefs or elders to elect candidates for legislative members as well as regional heads and heads of state. This has become a contradiction, which was protested by the National Commission on Human Right (Komnas HAM) and the General Election Supervisory Agency (BAWASLU). Natalius Pigai, as a commissioner of Komnas HAM from Papua, said the Noken system was against the principle of one man, one vote, and one value system.

On the other hand, Noken democracy is actually indicated as the cause of the outbreak of conflict in various districts in Papua. The results of the observations of the Association for Elections and Democracy or Perludem stated that several regions that implemented the Noken system were areas where violent conflicts frequently happened (Paat, 2018). The Research Institute for Economic and Social Information Education or LP3ES also stated that the use of Noken in general elections was ineffective and contained weaknesses because there was no control mechanism to manage the number of voters (Wijaya, 2017). After the issuance of the Constitutional Court Decision No. 47/81/PHPU.A/VII/2009 on the legalization of the Noken system to be used in elections and regional elections in Papua, it can only be implemented in 16 districts in the area of Pegunungan Tengah. There are two patterns of the Noken system which are considered to override the principle of free and confidential in the implementation of elections and local elections, namely 1) the big man pattern, where voting is handed over or represented to the



Source: Papua Task Force UGM (2022)

**Figure 4.** The Violence Cases in Papua 2016–2021

traditional leader as an expression of obedience; and 2) the pattern of Noken gantung, where the public can see the votes entering the pockets of parties and regional head candidates.

Learning from the regional elections in 2017 that were conducted in 11 regencies in Papua, there were 8 disputed areas, namely Sarmi, Mappi, Jayapura City, Lanny Jaya, Tolikara, Dogiyai, Puncak Jaya, and Intan Jaya. It does not only have an impact on lawsuits in court, security threats and prolonged conflicts. According to the records of the Papuan Regional Chief of Police (Kapolda), Paulus Waterpauw, the 2017 the conflicts that were caused by regional election resulted in the emergence of 6 cases, namely 1) conflict-triggering provocateurs; 2) anger-inflammation intellectual actors who cause conflict; 3) killing of citizens; 4) house burning; 5) persecution of citizens; and 6) the use of air rifles (Katharina, 2017). Because of these emergencies, there have been calculated that the surge of violence cases in Papua is gradually significant between 2011 and 2021. This phenomenon frequently exists when the election of the governor or regent is carried out through general elections (PEMILUKADA) and the abolition of the duties and authority of the Regional People's Representative Council of Papua (DPRP) in selecting the Governor and Deputy Governor which is described in Perdasus No. 6 of 2011. Finally, it is not uncommon for competition between supporters that should only be political

rivals turned into conflicts between supporters of the candidates or political parties.

Moreover, the dissatisfaction of the Papuan people over the ineffectiveness of the performance of the Central Government and Regional Governments in resolving conflicts is indicated to be the cause of the decline in Papuan people's trust in the Government. Inaccurate policy targets and the objectivity in realizing public values often lead to acts of resistance that lead to prolonged conflicts (Nugroho, 2020). This has an impact on the level of conduciveness and security of an area where political threats can lead to conflict from the meeting of two or more groups with different thoughts. UNDP also states that political security is one of the dimensions of the human insecurity factor as a result of people's distrust of the government (Sugandi, 2008). In this case, the results of interviews from several government officials within Papua Province mentioned that most government officials from several districts were unable to run the wheels of service in their respective districts and ultimately preferred to carry out official activities in the provincial capital due to several conflicts and security issues in their workplaces. Of course, this will have a significant impact on the quality of public services and the distribution flow of Papua's development in the long term if the conflict is unable to be solved immediately.

### C. Special Autonomy: Deliberative Policy or Political Legacy

It is obvious that politics is one of the crucial factors in implementing policies. Van Meter and Van Horn specify the relation between public policy and politics that political condition is a component in achieving the objectivity of policy decision (Nugroho, 2020). Hogwood and Gunn argue that the idea of a policy is essentially a set of actions or plans that contain political goals (McConnell, 2015). Policy is also understood as a collection of decisions taken by an actor or by a political group in an effort to choose goals and ways to achieve these goals (J. Widodo, 2021). Ideally, in the political aspect, public policies are established with the aim of: 1) distributing and allocating values, in the form of goods and services to all members of society; and 2) in terms of power, public policies are made so that the government can maintain its monopoly on the community and the power of the government or state can be accepted and recognized by the community (Handoyo, 2012).

Based on these definitions, the authors conclude that special autonomy has to be a collective decision, not only from the elite perspective, but also the Papuan communities. This paradigm is basically stated by Dyzerk about deliberative policy-making that opposes the domination of the political elite in policy making (Katharina, 2017). Normatively, special autonomy law has given the space of political participation for OAP to be directly involved in decision making with representative mechanisms in the People's Assembly. This provision gives a strategic role to each representative to take into policy consideration and ratification, including local development and proposing head candidates.

In the public participation context, the participatory approach is an inseparable part of regional development planning. The involvement of OAP in planning indicates the rights and aspirations of the Papuan people to be accommodated in every stage of the inclusive and comprehensive development planning process. Goto Kuswanto states that as a form of good state administration, there must be community involvement at every level of the decision-making process (Muis et al., 2014). Normatively, the government has accommodated this assertion with mechanism Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan or Musrenbang. Musrenbang is a multi-sectoral forum which involves whole stakeholders in formulating regional development plans, including long-term, middle-term, and annual work plan. Musrenbang encompasses four different levels of local government including village, sub-district, regency/municipality, and province. This scope is expected the comprehensive planning materials which accommodate aspirations from whole stratum.

Regarding local development, special autonomy law gives specialty in involving OAP representatives, DPRD and DPRD, in determining each material of regional plan documents that will be allocated in the regional budget and ratified into Perdasus or Perdasi. Perdasus is a regional regulation of Papua in the context of implementing certain articles that have been regulated in the Special Autonomy Law. Whereas Perdasi is a regional regulation of the Papua Province in the context of implementing the authority. This is considered ideal because the essence of special autonomy is to engage the interests and aspirations of OAP in every decision.

However, several problems in the regional development plan in Papua dominantly occur in the internal and external factors. John Agustinus

mentions that the lack of effective coordination between the central and regional governments is an obstacle in the implementation of special autonomy in Papua (Agustinus, 2014). In his research, he found problems with the non-synchronization of the Special Autonomy Law with local regulation, especially in the delivery of the authorities for each concern, both at the central, provincial and regional levels toward the special autonomy provision based on special autonomy law. This complexity became an obstacle for the Papua Provincial Government in assigning lower authority levels. Consequently, this phenomenon causes crucial problems in most regencies in determining the development goals. This is justified by the results of annual evaluation Papua Special Autonomy by several Ministries and Institutions that explains that several articles in special autonomy law have not been defined regarding the regency government authority in the Perdasus and Perdasi, especially in delivering mandatory service for OPD. Article 4 paragraph (3) related to the Implementation of the Authority of the Papua Province and paragraph (5) related to the Regional Authority of the regency are the points that until now have not been discussed/defined in the Perdasus and/or Perdasi. This tends to be contradictory to the principle of autonomy that has been given to each region to be able to organize their own governance. Furthermore, this is also stated in the opinion of the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK RI) on the Management of the Autonomy Fund for the Special Autonomy Fund in the Provinces of Papua and West Papua in Appendix 5 explaining that the Provincial Government of Papua has not yet established a Perdasus regarding the authority of the regency government.

In other concern, the issue of human resource capacity is still a serious problem if participatory efforts are carried out in Papua. The results of a study from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) related to the evaluation of the implementation of Papua special autonomy in 2017 and the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK-RI) in 2021 stated that the human resource aspect is still the main problem in the implementation of special autonomy. The lack of information and quantity deficiency of the apparatus who are constitutionally involved in the planning process makes the implementation of special autonomy often have trouble in determining technocratic targets and objectives, which ultimately affects the objectivity of program targets and the level of efficiency in the completion of regional planning



**Table 1.** The Number of Apparatus in Papua from 2017 to 2019

Regency/ Municipality	Apparatus Allocation		
	2017	2018	2019
Merauke	5,972	12,780	5,138
Jayawijaya	4,021	5,258	3,534
Jayapura	4,476	3,671	3,845
Nabire	5,143	3,945	4,423
Kepulauan Yapen	4,271	4,561	3,648
Biak Numfor	5,005	3,811	4,216
Paniai	2,029	4,382	2,292
Puncak Jaya	2,504	2,386	2,287
Mimika	4,836	2,062	4,394
Boven Digoel	2,199	4,465	1,991
Mappi	2,960	2,027	2,755
Asmat	2,587	2,803	2,278
Yahukimo	2,523	2,409	2,410
Pegunungan Bintang	2,435	2,426	2,334
Tolikara	2,410	2,340	2,404
Sarmi	1,999	2,325	1,826
Keerom	3,091	1,864	2,794
Waropen	2,184	2,845	2,009
Supiori	2,439	2,049	2,292
Mamberamo Raya	1,481	2,300	1,450
Nduga	1,037	1,464	1,005
Lanny Jaya	2,295	1,010	2,244
Mamberamo Tengah	1,712	2,254	1,677
Yalimo	1,670	1,679	1,506
Puncak	1,939	1,513	1,919
Dogiyai	1,784	1,916	1,839
Intan Jaya	1,282	1,842	1,275
Deiyai	1,339	1,273	1,324
Kota Jayapura	5,384	1,312	4,183
Provinsi Papua	7,366	4,269	12,696

Source: BPS (2022)

designs. Furthermore, the security issue has affected the apparatus distribution in several regions, which have a high risk of conflict. Based on empirics, the local governments prefer to allocate their apparatus at the safe regions in order to avoid more victims and establishing the social conductivity. Because of this issue, much apparatus has decided to move to the other regions or province and get a better living condition. This trend is in accordance with BPS data about the number of apparatuses in Papua between 2017 and 2019 that shows the significant decrease in several regencies with high risk of conflict (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, 2022b).

#### D. Political Supervision Against Advancing Political Conductivity in Papua

Made Suwandi emphasizes that the element of control in supervision is needed to produce a 'clean government', where the power of authority tends to be corrupted and misused (Aziz et al., 2018). It is undeniable that supervision is a key to good governance. Supervision in the government itself has an important role in carrying out the management of control so that it runs in accordance with the principles of good governance. Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) Number 12 of 2017 concerning the Guidance and Supervision of Regional Government Administration explains that the Supervision of Regional Government Administration is an effort, action, and activity aimed in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of government activity in accordance with the provisions of the regulations.

Special autonomy law has mandated that supervision is a mandatory component. Special autonomy has regulated the rights and authority for supervising the administrative context of Papuan government autonomously. Special autonomy law of Papua mandated the implementation of supervision into several elements of government. The supervision consists of supervision of regional apparatus, regional policies, functional supervision, and supervision of the administration of regency/municipal governments.

The National Government and Papua Provincial Government have implemented the provisions in enacting regulation and organizing routine administrative activities in reporting and evaluating government programs regularly. Exercising supervision is delivered vertically by the Central Government, and horizontally by the Regional Government and non-governmental institutions. In terms of supervising government policies, DPRD has officially been assigned to supervise all Papuan regional policies, government affairs, APBD implementation, and international cooperation in the provincial scope of Papua. The Governor, as the representative of the Central Government, is assigned to supervise the administration of regency/municipal government and personnel administration. The Central Government has the authority to carry out repressive supervision of Perdasus, Perdasi, and Governor Decrees (Pergub) as well as functional supervision of the governance. As an instrument in supervising the implementation of special autonomy, the Papuan Provincial Government has

also established several guidelines through the issuance of regional policies, such as Perdasus, Perdasi and Pergub for a technical implementation, such as Perdasus Number 2 of 2019 concerning Guidelines for the Implementation, Receipt and Distribution of Special Autonomy Funds for Papua Province, Perdasus Number 9 of 2019 concerning Guidelines for Recognition, Protection, Empowerment of Indigenous Law Communities and Customary Territories, and Perdasus Number 4 of 2019 concerning Revenue Sharing and Financial Management of the Special Autonomy Fund.

In the political context, special autonomy specifies political supervision as the crucial area in directing government performance becoming efficient and effective. Political supervision is designed as a control mechanism that ensures political conductivity in administrative and institutional activities. Hofmann argues that political supervision holds a crucial role in maintaining the institutional balance between horizontal and vertical institutions of governmental enforcement (Hofmann et al., 2011). John Pieris also states that political supervision is a control form in measuring policy outcome to the beneficiaries (H. Widodo, 2019). From these definitions, the importance of political supervision is not only focused on controlling the institutional practices, but also the impact of government policy on society.

However, supervision clauses that have been stated in regional regulations have not been implemented optimally. Supervision tends to be passive and is carried out only based on routine activities, both vertically and horizontally. Precisely, the National Government allocates the additional transfer funds in advancing good governance in Papua and supervision is indeed included. The logical implication is, should not making the additional special autonomy fund as a source of revenue for Papua Province increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its supervision as well?

Related to this problem, there are several factors indicated as the cause, including: 1) disintegration of supervision; 2) political intervention; and 3) the lack of commitment from the Central and Regional Governments. The Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) also states that the much practice on government supervision is still insufficient, where the functions of the Audit Board and Inspectorate are only to conduct their routine inspections (Katharina, 2017).

In terms of the disintegration of supervision, Aziz in the research entitled "Supervision Patterns for the Management of Specialty and Special Autonomy Funds: Political Perspective" states that there is a lack of supervision in terms of synergy, coordination, guidance and supervision between levels of government, including province, regency, and municipality (Aziz et al., 2018). Consequently, this pathology results in a negative impact in the management of a special autonomy fund that is not having a significant impact on improving governance performance and welfare distribution. In addition, the implementation of supervision is still difficult for several stages of regional government administration in Papua, especially in budget allocation and control areas. This is because regulations related to the guidelines for the preparation of special autonomy funds are still fully regulated by the Central Government through the mechanism for the preparation of the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD) which applies to all provinces, so that it is not in line with the special powers granted through the Special Autonomy Law. In fact, the Special Autonomy Fund should have a special mechanism as an elaboration of the policies determined by the Central Government for Papua Province as a Special Autonomy Region. Nur Rohim in his research stated that the difficulty of DPRD in carrying out the function of supervising the implementation of regional policies, especially in funding policies, where the special autonomy fund is one of the sources of revenue for the province, regency, and municipality (Rohim, 2014).

#### **IV. Conclusion**

Two decades of implementing special autonomy have actually become a hope in transforming Papua to a better future. Special autonomy as a consensus of Papuan that might be the concrete answer in solving empirical challenges in fulfilling the sense of justice, welfare, law enforcement, and respect for human rights. As a specialty, the National Government has gradually increased the transfer funds to optimize special autonomy achievements; however, they are still minor. As the concern, political participation of OAP still becomes a crucial issue that considerably affects special autonomy conductivity.

As the most common challenge, the ethnocentrism of leadership and local politics has a significant role in maintaining the conductivity and security of local politics in most areas in Papua Province, especially in areas that have a high risk

of conflict and are isolated. Political security is a crucial dimension because it can determine the level of public trust in government performance that has direct implications for the level of risk of conflict. In this case, Papua special autonomy is deemed not optimal enough in terms of monitoring local politics, especially in areas that have a high risk of conflict.

In the development context, Papuan participation in policymaking is notably obstructed by the structural authority in the government bodies. This obstacle adversely inflicts the multi-sector coordination of development materials, which is considered necessarily based on the public interest. Furthermore, the issue of human resource in quality and quantity has been a long-drawn complexity in Papua. As an implication, the program allocation and target are not objectively synchronized with the basic needs of Papuan which has been discussed in Musrenbang.

Political supervision is expected as a mandatory in controlling the political participation of Papuan in the government realm. Normatively, political supervision has been mandated in the special autonomy law as a part of the government function in supervision. However, supervision still conducts as a routine activity without considering the outcome that might be useful in evaluation and further improvement.

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