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## Human Security and the Special Autonomy

### The Solution for the Non-traditional Security Issues in Papua?

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**Abstract:** Issues of human rights violations, poverty, unemployment, low HDI, low access to education, and poor health are the most important parts of the concept of human security introduced by the UNDP report 1994. These issues have not been adequately addressed in Papua. The purpose of this study was to review the special autonomy arrangements in responding to security issues in Papua. This review was interesting to study because special autonomy has been considered irrelevant to address the human security issues in the province. Human security and special autonomy should be linearly related to each other. As such, the issues of human security should be addressed before the welfare of Papua can be improved. This study used a qualitative approach with a literature study method. The authors collected data through various works of literature in online media, official publications, and others. Meanwhile, the authors followed the Creswell concept to conduct the stages of the study, which consisted of identification of the problem, literature study, determination of study purposes and objectives, collection of data, analysis and interpretation of data, and reporting of the result. The results of the study showed that the implementation of special autonomy and the disbursement of special autonomy funds have been unable to respond to human security issues in Papua. Efforts to improve the welfare of Papua were marred by a conventional security approach. Therefore, these efforts failed to improve the welfare of Papua, triggering ongoing conflicts. Various human security issues in Papua were not addressed properly, such as issues on human rights, public services, health, HDI, economic inequality, and education, which affect its welfare.

**Keywords:** special autonomy; human security; welfare; development

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## I. Introduction

The year 2021 marked a bleak record for the asymmetric decentralization journey initiated by the Central Government for Papua. After two decades of its implementation, it seems that asymmetrical decentralization, which was later referred to as special autonomy, for Papua has not had a favorable impact on its development of welfare and improvement of security. The special autonomy policy followed by the granting of authority, institutions, and funding, as well as control functions that are different from the majority of other regions, should be a catalyst for rapid change to improve all of its development lags (Dardias, 2012; Hayati & Ifansyah, 2019, p. 137). However, to this day, Papua remains almost the same with its various problems. The birth of Law No. 21 of 2001 on special autonomy for Papua was intended to resolve the fundamental problems in Papua and to manage relations between the central and regional governments. Political security issues in Papua, such as justice, welfare, poverty, unemployment, economy, education, health, human rights, and law enforcement, were the drive for the birth of the Papua special autonomy policy (Malak, 2012). Since the special autonomy for Papua was unable to be implemented smoothly as in other asymmetrical regions, the central government must find an ideal format for resolving political security issues in Papua with an appropriate and fast policy framework.

Law No. 21 of 2001, as the basis for the implementation of special autonomy in Papua, was intended by the central government to be a solution to all of Papua's problems (Tabuni et al., 2016). However, it turned out that this policy did not work as well in Papua as in other regions that received asymmetric decentralization, such as DI Yogyakarta, Aceh, and DKI Jakarta.

Historically, the asymmetric policies in Aceh and Papua were made after a long negotiation process over the control of natural resources in Aceh and Papua (Permatasari, 2014, p. 229). The central government was reluctant to release its control due to the wealth of natural resources in the two regions.

The negotiation process between the central government and the regional governments of Papua and Aceh gave birth to Law No. 21 of 2001 for Papua, as well as Law No. 44 of 1999 on the Implementation of the Privileges of the Province of the Special Region of Aceh and Law No. 11 of

2006 on the Government of Aceh. The regulation works quite well in Aceh but not in Papua.

Why has Papua's special autonomy resulted in an ongoing conflict, and why this conflict seems to be perpetual? Isn't the implementation of special autonomy in Aceh also a step to resolve the problem of national integration between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the central government (Utama, 2019)?

The special autonomy policy initiated by the central government for Papua was not intended as an instrument to improve and fix all forms of political security crisis for Papua. As such, the special autonomy should not be used as a tool to reduce the conflict in Papua (Rubawati, 2018). The most crucial and urgent matter in overcoming the Papua issue should be addressing the security issue.

Before Papua formally became part of the Republic of Indonesia in 1969, it already suffered various bloody conflicts and security crises.

Later, Indonesia was involved in the Papua security crisis and was often cited as the one behind human rights violations in Papua. The special autonomy policy was granted as the result of the negotiations to end the fierce conflicts and as compensation by the central government (Radjab, 2013, p. 229).

A study by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) has stated that four issues are at the root of the conflict in Papua: historical issues, human rights violations, public services, and marginalization. As such, those four issues are inseparable parts of political security issues.

However, the Central Government seems unable to grasp that what is happening in Papua is a human security crisis and that it is clearly a part of the political security issue. Knowing that the main problem in Papua is human security, some questions arise. Has the special autonomy design for Papua accommodated its political security issues? Why is Papua's special autonomy unable to fix its security crisis after two decades of its implementation? Why is the issue of human security not addressed in Papua's special autonomy policy?

Human security is a non-traditional security approach that emerged as a response to traditional security aspects approach. It is an effort to understand security issues from a wider perspective, a shift from mostly state-centric to human-centric. It should be about the security of humans as citizens. After the cold war this shift

became more apparent because issues related to non-traditional security became an interesting topic for researchers to study (Yonatan, 2018, p. 39).

The term human security was coined by UNDP (United Nations Development Program) in 1994.

The UNDP report classified human security into seven basic dimensions. The seven dimensions are known as human security because they are directly related to human safety. Today, issues such as poverty, hunger, health, education, and violence are the new security issues.

It is clear that the central government's design of the special autonomy policy should address the human security in Papua.

Critical security studies assert that security will not be achieved by the accumulation of power, but instead, it will be achieved if the security foundation is in place. The security foundations in question include social justice and economic welfare. Economic prosperity and social justice can be attained through the provision of education, poverty reduction, and freedom from political pressure (Setiawan, 2010). BPS data as of September 2020 shows that nationally Papua has the highest poverty rate at 26.8%, followed by West Papua at 21.7%.

Meanwhile, BPS data also confirms that Papua and West Papua also have the lowest Human Development Index (HDI) nationally in 2019, 2020, and 2021, with Papua's HDI of 60.84, 60.44, and 60.62, respectively, and West Papua's HDI of 64.70, 65.09, and 65.26, respectively.

So how do these facts relate to human security issues? The poverty level and the low Human Development Index are forms of human security issues since they indicate that there is a problem in the economic security aspect.

The 1994 UNDP Report confirms that economic security is one of the seven dimensions of human security, and each is interrelated. A problem with economic security also indicates problems with other security dimensions. For example, when poverty escalates, it will affect their access to food, health, politics, and others. It means that food security, health security, and political security will also be affected.

Security is present when people are liberated from the shackles of poverty, not through the power of pressure and coercion that threatens their security. This is the chance for the special autonomy policy to play its role in solving the problems in Papua.

As mandated by Law No. 21 of 2001, the central government has attempted to address some of the human security issues. Although it does not mention the term "human security," a study by Pugu et al. (2019) explains how the central government builds infrastructure on Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border, which can reduce the level of poverty and illegal activities on the Papuan border. It means that the special autonomy policy has started to address human security issues as a root cause of the conflict in Papua (Prabowo et al., 2020). However, in Papua, the asymmetrical decentralization creates distortions in the public decision-making process, which triggers conflict (Fiorillo et al., 2021, p. 645).

A similar study was also conducted by Jalal and Lembang, who found that the Merauke Regency Government had used the special autonomy policy to allocate special autonomy funds to build good quality education. In Merauke, education was considered an important aspect of developing the quality of human resources since it could improve community welfare, make it easier for them to find work, and increase their dignity. However, the result was not encouraging as there were many obstacles to using the special autonomy fund to address the education issue (Jalal & Lembang, 2017, p. 60).

The use of special autonomy funds in addressing the issue of education makes it clear that the asymmetric decentralization policy was used to resolve the issue of human security. Although it has not been successful, it has at least strengthened the narrative that the purpose of asymmetric decentralization in Papua is to repair, restore, and build human security which has been in a critical stage.

The latest study conducted by Cahyaningsih and Fitradly found that asymmetric fiscal decentralization, with the enactment of Law No. 21 of 2001 on Papua's special autonomy, negatively impacts education and health issues in Papua. As such, the lag in the education and health sectors will continue to grow over time. This study also emphasizes that asymmetric fiscal decentralization in Papua is unable to increase the provision of education and health in Papua (Cahyaningsih & Fitradly, 2019, p. 48).

At the time of this study, other studies on the issue of asymmetric decentralization have been limited to the aspects of institutionalism, bureaucracy, good governance, public policy, collaborative governance, and conflict resolution. Not many studies have reviewed the issue of Papua's special autonomy as a strategy for

resolving the political security crisis. Some of the literature does not directly mention human security terminology, which is part of the political security issue in the implementation of special autonomy.

A study in 2008 by Rees et al. on health and human security in West Papua showed an understanding that security threats can give birth to a new security dimension. In West Papua, the threat of security issues in the health sector was triggered by cases of violence, human rights violations, poverty, and the extraction of natural resources. Data collected by the Médecins du Monde, which is based in Australia, showed the threat of human security issues in the health aspect from the high maternal and infant mortality and the high rate of HIV/AIDS (Rees et al., 2008, p. 641). This study confirms that every threat to one dimension of human security indirectly correlates with the other dimensions.

The latest study in 2022 by Prameswari and Husna, entitled *Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Human Security: A Case Study of Armed Violence in Papua during the COVID-19 Pandemic*, found that there were vulnerabilities to human security in Papua. The vulnerability during the COVID-19 pandemic spread to almost all sectors. The insurgency and counter-insurgency have endangered human security and added to the suffering of the Papuan people, especially those living in conflict-prone areas, such as Intan Jaya Regency, Mimika Regency, Puncak Regency, and Nduga Regency (Prameswari & Husna, 2022, p. 19). This study found that threats to human security emerge as the result of traditional threats.

Simply put, non-traditional threats were born because they were triggered by traditional threats.

This is certainly a dilemma because security issues are still associated with traditional security issues, while welfare issues, including poverty, unemployment, and the economy, have become part of the security issue. There is a shift from state-centric to human-centric. Security is no longer fixated on how the state must be secured but on how the state protects its citizens.

Therefore, this study highlighted the relationship between the special autonomy and the human security dimension in Papua. There is a tendency to view that special autonomy arrangements are not related to the aspect of human security. This tendency is contradictory and not in line with the spirit of Law No. 21 of 2001,

which directly mentions that the special autonomy policy in Papua is a strategy in resolving the ongoing conflict, thus the essence of the problem to be resolved is the issue of human security.

Through this paper, the authors approached the issue of special autonomy or asymmetric decentralization in Papua using the human security concept. This approach is urgently needed because the problems in Papua are related to security issues related to non-traditional threats, in this case, human security. As such, approaches to solving problems in Papua must also be in line with the concept of human security. The approach taken should be in line with the problem to be solved. Traditional security problems should be addressed with the traditional approach, while non-traditional security threats should be addressed with the non-traditional approach. An inappropriate approach will lead to a new form of security problem.

There are two questions formulated for this study. The main question is how the two decades of implementation of the special autonomy in Papua have responded to the issue of human security. The second question is how compatible the special autonomy in Papua is with human security issues. Through these two questions, it is hoped that the study can provide a way to end the ongoing conflict in Papua, based on the view that human security is the focus that must be resolved immediately. The authors will use the human security theory as an approach to political security issues in analyzing the special autonomy in Papua. The framework of human security theory will provide an overview of the implementation of special autonomy in Papua in the future.

## II. Methods

This study used a qualitative approach with a literature study method. The authors believe that there can be more than one truth and the qualitative approach can seek them out through in-depth understanding of the object of the study. The use of the literature study method in this research has at least two advantages. First, through this method, the authors will collect data from various sources such as publications issued by the authorities and media, books, journals, or other relevant and factual sources on the topic being studied. The availability of various data is important in literature study because researchers can select and sort data according to research needs, especially in answering the research problem. Second, through this method, the



authors have the freedom to interpret the data by comparing it to the reality of the research object.

The data collection was conducted from August 1, 2021, to September 10, 2021. The object chosen as the locus in this research was the implementation of special autonomy in responding to the issue of human security in Papua. The locus was chosen since, at the time of the study, most studies used general approaches, such as institutionalism, bureaucracy, conflict resolution, good governance, and public policy, to understand the special autonomy policy. As a novelty element of the study, the authors used a new approach: human security. This approach was chosen due to its relevancy to the conflict in Papua, namely the issue of "human security" politics.

Other than the approach used by the authors, the novelty of this study lies in the issues being raised in the study. This year has been a very dilemmatic year for the implementation of special autonomy in Papua. This study is important because the availability of literature that links special autonomy as a tool to solve human security issues was still limited.

The special autonomy has been implemented for two decades. Some considered it a total failure in Papua because it is unable to respond to its various problems. On the other hand, the government considers that the special autonomy policy in Papua has been successfully implemented.

This study served as a middle ground to examine the extent to which the implementation of Papua's special autonomy is said to have failed and to what extent this special autonomy is said to be successful. In conducting the study, the authors followed Creswell's concept of the stages of qualitative research, which consisted of problem identification, literature search, determination of aims and objectives, data collection, data analysis and interpretation, and reporting (Raco, 2018, p. 37).

### III. Results and Discussion

The recent popularity of the idea of human security is a reaction to a state-centric focus on security. It is necessary to rethink the concept that security is about securing the state or how the country mobilizes its resources through traditional approaches. Today, security issues have shifted and moved from state-centric to human-centric. Security issues such as poverty, unemployment, health, environment, economy,

politics, conflict, terrorism, welfare, inequality, human rights, freedom of expression, and others have given birth to prominent security figures (e.g., Barry Buzan) to fill the gaps. Although the security issue has a wide scope and is often seen as Western propaganda, this approach remains interesting to analyze since this approach seems to be capable and in line with the main issue of security (Fitrah, 2015).

Human security as a more comprehensive concept of security was introduced by UNDP in its 1994 report, in which UNDP stated the seven dimensions of human security. In which UNDP stated the seven dimensions of human security. These are economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (Gómez & Gasper, 2013). These dimensions show the essential shift where today's security is no longer concentrated on providing security for the state but more on how to provide security for the human as its citizen.

A 1997 article by Barry Buzan entitled "Rethinking Security after the Cold War" illustrated this shift in the security concept and range (Buzan, 1997). It shifted from a militaristic security concept toward human security. At the same time, Barry Buzan classified the security dimensions into five: political, military, economic, societal, and environmental. The five dimensions of security are interrelated. For example, societal security in the form of their use of their political rights, human rights, and freedom of opinion and expression might be interrelated with the economic security dimension. People will use their political rights to hold demonstrations if the state cannot guarantee their economic security.

Barry Buzan describes the essence of each security dimension to ease the search for the root cause of a security problem. Military security is about the two-level interplay between the actual armed offensive and defensive capability of a state and the state's perception of each other's capabilities and intentions. Political security focused on the stability of state organization, ideological system, and ideology that provide legitimacy to the government. Economic security includes access to resources, finance, and markets to support an acceptable level of welfare and state power. Societal security includes the continuity of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, national identity, and customs, including acceptable evolutionary conditions. Environmental security is concerned with maintaining the environment both locally and

globally as an important support for the system on which human life depends. Each element does not stand alone but has a strong connection with the others (Al Araf, 2015).

Barry Buzan's security approach was chosen compared to the welfare of the state approach for several reasons. This approach tries to shift the traditional security concept, which focuses on how the country must be secured (state-centric). Therefore, through this study, the authors used Barry Buzan's approach to explain a shift from state-centric to human-centric. Security is no longer narrowly focused on securing the state but more broadly on how the state provides security or wider protection to individuals, groups, or citizens (human-centric), be it economic, social, political, health, or food security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).

This concept is relatively new, as such Barry Buzan's concept is often failed to be understood properly. The non-traditional security approach no longer focuses on interstate relations, instead it focuses on individual security (Azizah, 2020). This is the reason that the authors chose this approach, for its novelty in the governmental political studies.

The two decades of the Special Autonomy in Papua have been focusing on military security. As such, Barry Buzan's concept is relevant to be used to show that the limited view of the traditional security concept must be ended to see the actual issues and problems in its Special Autonomy implementation.

Through the security theory approach presented by Barry Buzan, the authors will elaborate on the two decades of special autonomy implementation in Papua by combining the concepts presented by Barry Buzan and UNDP 1994. This is very interesting to explore and further explore how the journey of special autonomy in Papua responds to security issues. Through this approach, it is possible to produce new findings in organizing and redesigning Papua's asymmetric decentralization policy towards a more equitable, quality, and sustainable Papua development.

The implementation of special autonomy in Papua was unable to distribute welfare issues compared to other regions in Indonesia (Prabowo et al., 2020). The implementation of special autonomy for Papua, better known as asymmetric decentralization, cannot change the reality in Papua. Papua's asymmetrical decentralization is a form of the government's intention to give Papua

more attention to enable it to transform into an independent region. However, despite the increasing special autonomy funds every year, the achievements were not encouraging.

There are two possibilities of the cause of the failure. First, the special autonomy of Papua was not designed properly and did not have a sense of crisis regarding real security issues in Papua. It means that special autonomy is a product of policies that are not ideal for both historical and actual issues in Papua. In the two decades of special autonomy, there has been no meaningful progress in Papua, and it suffered some setbacks.

Second, the special autonomy is a state-centric alternative solution to the problems in Papua. The central government thought that it was good, but it was unable to answer all the existing problems in Papua. The policy might be designed to solve the problems in Papua, but the ideals thought by the state were probably not in line with the real needs and demands of the Papuan people.

With the two decades of implementation of the special autonomy in Papua that still showed a high inequality, these two possibilities are interesting to be discussed further.

### **A. Economic Development in the Special Autonomy in Papua**

The asymmetrical decentralization, which is often stated as the granting of special autonomy to regions in Indonesia, has not resulted in satisfactory efficiency of the local government in Papua. In reality, the granting of special autonomy has triggered various problems, such as increasing conflicts (both vertically and horizontally) and a decline in the level of community welfare. Papua has always been vulnerable in economic and health aspects, and has socio-cultural, political, and security problems (Perkasa, 2020, p. 3).

This situation raises the question, in the case of Papua, for example, how serious is the central government in granting special autonomy to regions that suit various local needs? (Tryatmoko, 2012). How does the central government accommodate this diversity?

The Papua people already have economic problems before the special autonomy implementation. Unfortunately, the implementation of the special autonomy and the increasing special autonomy funds did not change Papua's economic security significantly. In the

context of Papua, economic development is a serious macroeconomic problem.

Table 1 shows the increase in the amount of special autonomy funds in Papua Province from 2002–2019.

**Table 1.** Special Autonomy Fund for Papua Province 2002–2019

| Year         | Special Autonomy Funds (Rp) | Infrastructure Funds      | Total (Rp)                |
|--------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 2002         | 1,382,300,000,000           | -                         | 1,382,300,000,000         |
| 2003         | 1,539,560,000,000           | -                         | 1,539,560,000,000         |
| 2004         | 1,642,617,943,000           | -                         | 1,642,617,943,000         |
| 2005         | 1,775,312,000,000           | -                         | 1,775,312,000,000         |
| 2006         | 2,913,284,000,000           | 536,374,689,000           | 3,449,658,689,000         |
| 2007         | 3,295,748,000,000           | 750,000,000,000           | 4,045,748,000,000         |
| 2008         | 3,590,142,897,000           | 330,000,000,000           | 3,920,142,897,000         |
| 2009         | 2,609,796,098,000           | 1,470,000,000,000         | 4,079,796,098,000         |
| 2010         | 2,694,864,788,000           | 800,000,000,000           | 3,494,864,788,000         |
| 2011         | 3,157,459,547,550           | 800,000,000,000           | 3,957,459,547,550         |
| 2012         | 3,833,402,135,000           | 571,428,571,000           | 4,404,830,706,000         |
| 2013         | 4,335,950,048,000           | 571,428,572,000           | 6,777,070,975,000         |
| 2014         | 4,777,070,975,000           | 2,000,000,000,000         | 7,190,429,880,000         |
| 2015         | 4,940,429,880,000           | 2,250,000,000,000         | 5,595,051,859,400         |
| 2016         | 5,395,051,859,400           | 1,200,000,000,000         | 8,240,816,931,000         |
| 2017         | 5,615,816,931,000           | 2,625,000,000,000         | 8,240,816,931,000         |
| 2018         | 5,580,152,407,000           | 2,400,000,000,000         | 7,980,152,407,000         |
| 2019         | 5,808,230,158,000           | 2,824,446,537,000         | 8,632,676,695,000         |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>67,029,220,952,400</b>   | <b>17,163,732,252,000</b> | <b>84,192,950,205,400</b> |

Source: *bpkad.papua.go.id*

The increase in special autonomy funds showed that the central government continues to provide a stimulus for Papua to develop its economy. In 2020, the realization of special autonomy funds in Papua decreased due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with only 7.56 trillion or a decrease of 9.6%. However, the decrease was not significant, especially since the state's finances are focused on dealing with this pandemic.

Of course, logically, the increased funds should provide a stimulus for economic growth in Papua. As such, ideally, Papua's economic security, which has been lagging compared to that of other regions in Indonesia, can at least be on par with other regions. However, it did not happen in reality. In contrast to its wealth of natural resources, Papua is still struggling with the problem of economic growth.

How can the economic condition be so bad in a place with so much wealth?

In the economic security dimension, the special autonomy for Papua is ineffective. In general, the result of development can be observed and measured using two benchmarks: economic and social. Economic development is measured from the level of economic growth, regional economic structure, and income distribution. These are the economic security issues that should be resolved by the special autonomy policy in Papua. The granting of special autonomy for Papua is intended to realize justice, uphold the rule of law, respect human rights, accelerate economic development, and improve the welfare and progress of its people, to enable it to catch up with the progress of other provinces (La Achmady, 2020, pp. 83–84; Tamberan et al., 2020, pp. 1–2).

However, in the context of economic development, has the implementation of the special autonomy solved the problem? Looking at various inequality in Papua, this special autonomy seemed to be unable to address the economic security in Papua. Table 2 shows the Williamson Index in Papua to see the level of economic inequality, especially after the implementation of special autonomy.

**Table 2.** Williamson Index of Papua Province 2010–2018

| Year | Williamson Index |
|------|------------------|
| 2010 | 0.81             |
| 2011 | 0.86             |
| 2012 | 0.73             |
| 2013 | 0.87             |
| 2014 | 0.93             |
| 2015 | 1.02             |
| 2016 | 0.76             |
| 2017 | 0.70             |
| 2018 | 0.77             |

Source: Tamberan et al. (2020)

The Williamson Index shows the level of inequality in income distribution between districts/cities in Papua Province from 2010 to 2018.

If the Williamson Index is close to 0, then the inequality of income distribution between districts/cities in Papua Province is low, or in other words, economic growth between regions is evenly distributed.

On the other hand, if the Williamson Index is close to 1, then the inequality in income distribution between districts/cities in Papua Province is high, or economic growth between regions is uneven.

The Williamson inequality data in Papua from 2010 to 2018 is close to 1. In 2015, the Williamson inequality even reached 1.02. It means that based on the Williamson Index, despite the implementation of the special autonomy policy during this period, Papua consistently had a very high inequality. From this data, a wide gap can be seen between urban area and rural area, between the rich and the poor, and between the cities and the districts. As such, it can be said that the special autonomy was not pro-poor.

It can be seen from the failure of the special autonomy policy to induce economic growth in Papua. The economic growth variables are not strong. The people do not have proper access to increase their income per capita. People of Papua live in an area with abundant natural resources, but unable to tap into the rich natural resources to increase the people's economy. This is what is lacking in the current arrangement of the special autonomy. Despite trillions of rupiah of funds channeled to the special autonomy, Papua still experienced lagging economy.

Why is the demand for free Papua still there (McGibbon, 2004, pp. 1–2)?

Table 3 shows the formulation of Papua's balancing fund according to the special autonomy law.

**Table 3.** Balancing Funds of the Province of Papua Based on the Special Autonomy Law Article 34

| Share of Taxes                          | Share of Natural Resources (DBH SDA)                         | General Allocation Funds (DAU)   |
|---|--|--|
| 90% from Land and Building Tax          | 80% from the forestry, fisheries, and general mining sectors | Special Allocation Funds (DAK) based on the priority in the Province of Papua                                  |
| 80% of duty on land and building rights | 70% of petroleum and natural gas                             | 2% of the DAU is intended for education and health financing   |
| 20% from personal income tax            |  | Additional Funds for infrastructure determined by the government and the DPR based on the province's proposal. |

Source: Article 34 of the Law on the Special Autonomy in Papua

Through this formulation, Papua greatly benefited from the income it derived from the wealth of its natural resources.

Not all regions in Indonesia receive a large amount of natural resource share as in Papua.

**Table 4.** Amount of DBH SDA Funds in Papua in 2018

| Area               | DBH SDA funds  |
|--------------------|----------------|
| Mimika             | 1,2 trillion   |
| Papua Province     | 670.4 billion. |
| Merauke            | 54.6 billion.  |
| Puncak Jaya        | 54.6 billion.  |
| Nabire             | 52.9 billion.  |
| Memberamo Raya     | 50.8 billion.  |
| Keerom             | 50.8 billion.  |
| Sarmi              | 48.5 billion.  |
| Paniai             | 48.3 billion.  |
| Yahukimo           | 48.2 billion.  |
| Boven Digoel       | 48.1 billion.  |
| Pegunungan Bintang | 47.3 billion.  |
| Intan Jaya         | 47 billion.    |
| Waropen            | 46.3 billion.  |
| Jayapura           | 45.6 billion.  |
| Tolikara           | 45.5 billion.  |
| Asmat              | 44.9 billion.  |
| Mappi              | 44.7 billion.  |
| Jayawijaya         | 44.7 billion.  |
| Supiori            | 44.6 billion.  |
| Yalimo             | 44.5 billion.  |
| Lanny Jaya         | 44.5 billion.  |
| Mamberamo tengah   | 44.5 billion.  |
| Nduga              | 44.5 billion.  |
| Dogiyai            | 44.5 billion.  |
| Puncak             | 44.5 billion.  |
| Delyai             | 44.5 billion.  |
| Kota Jayapura      | 44.5 billion.  |
| Kepulauan Yapen    | 44.5 billion.  |
| Biak Numfor        | 43.7 billion.  |

Source: Ministry of Finance (2019)

Based on data from the Ministry of Finance released in 2019, the share of Natural Resources in Papua in 2018 in various districts/cities is always more than 40 billion.

Logically, the large funds should be able to fix various problems in Papua. It means that the key to solving all these problems is how the Papuan Government and the Central Government share tasks and ensure that the funds are distributed evenly in various districts/cities in Papua.



However, looking at the reality in education, health, human development index, poverty, freedom of opinion, human rights, and other elements, a question arises on the government's commitment to the special autonomy.

Is the distribution of such large funds fixing the problems faced by the Papuan people?

Table 4 shows the amount of DBH SDA funds obtained by districts/cities in Papua in 2018.

DBH SDA, as part of the balancing fund scheme, should be an alternative solution for Papua. However, the balancing fund has made the local government more dependent on the central government (Susanti & Fahlevi, 2016).

Then, what will happen to Papua without the balancing funds? The most important priority is through this balancing fund scheme, the government must work together to solve problems in Papua. When the balancing fund has brought Papua into an equal and better region, the balancing fund policy should be evaluated further to see whether it needs to be continued or stopped. Therefore, the focus of this balancing fund is to boost the welfare of Papua.

## B. The Welfare of the Papuan People and the Future of Special Autonomy

Welfare for Papua is often the dominant narrative when discussing the special autonomy policy. This is inseparable from the fact that there has been no significant change in Papua to be proud of. In the context of welfare, Papua has not yet found the ideal format for building the security for Papua. Issues of food security, personal security, community security, health security, and political security are the five dimensions of human security in Papua that continue to persist. Welfare cannot be built using only a single indicator. Welfare has many dimensions that is interrelated to one another. If the economy is bad, then the social dimension will also be chaotic.

The question is then how the special Autonomy can bridge the gap created by the social, economic, and political issues in Papua to bring welfare to Papuan. Did the special funding brought by the special autonomy able to lessen the gap?

In this context it is important that the special autonomy policy is made to develop Papua to be a just and prosperous region.

The two decades of the implementation of the special autonomy did not significantly change the problem in Papua. It is no wonder that the

government is concerned with the failure of the special autonomy to increase the welfare of Papua.

Who is the beneficiary of the special autonomy?

Can the government guarantee that the people of Papua enjoy the benefit brought by the special autonomy? Why is the progress in Papua so slow, and some situations even worsened?

Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistic/BPS) data for 2020 confirms that Papua's poverty rate was 26.64%.

Table 5 shows the poverty rate from the start of the special autonomy to 2020.

**Table 5.** Poverty Rate in Papua Province 2002–2019

| Year | Poverty Rate |
|------|--------------|
| 2020 | 26.64%       |
| 2019 | 26.55%       |
| 2018 | 27.74%       |
| 2017 | 27.76%       |
| 2016 | 28.54%       |
| 2015 | 28.17%       |
| 2014 | 27.80%       |
| 2013 | 31.52%       |
| 2012 | 30.66%       |
| 2011 | 34.11%       |
| 2010 | 34.10%       |
| 2009 | 34.77%       |
| 2008 | 35.53%       |
| 2007 | 40.78%       |
| 2006 | 41.52%       |
| 2005 | 40.83%       |
| 2004 | 38.69%       |
| 2003 | 39.02%       |
| 2002 | 41.80%       |

Source: BPS

Table 5 shows a decline in the poverty level in Papua throughout the implementation of special autonomy from 2002 to 2020. However, it does not mean that Papua is free from the problem of poverty. BPS data for 2020 confirms that Papua still has the highest poverty rate in Indonesia, followed by West Papua (Perkasa, 2020, pp. 1–2). The high level of poverty is inversely proportional to the level of welfare in Papua. This means that as

long as poverty is still high, the issue of welfare in Papua will always be there.

As previously stated, welfare cannot be achieved by developing just one element. This means that when one element has a problem, the other elements also have problems. Thus, it emphasizes that there is a link between various elements in realizing prosperity.

The high percentage of poverty in Papua also contributes to the low achievement of the Human Development Index (HDI) in Papua. Papua's HDI level is the lowest in Indonesia.

Table 6 shows Papua's HDI compared to other regions in Indonesia in 2018 to 2020.

The two tables show a strong correlation between poverty levels and HDI achievements in Papua.

Papua's HDI will not be good if the problem of the poverty level is still high. Therefore, it is important to understand how the implementation of special autonomy in Papua can improve people's welfare.

Welfare issues are security issues. As stated by Barry Buzan, this issue is relevant since the five elements of the human security dimension are interrelated. The government need to design the special autonomy in such a way as to reach the existing security issues in Papua. The central government seems to be in the dark about the characteristics and culture of Papua. The welfare problems experienced by Papua are security issues. If this security issue (known as human security) can be addressed using special autonomy policies, then the welfare in Papua can be achieved.

Welfare is not just a matter of issuing regulation and disbursing funding. The regulation and funds need to be used in such a way to protect and guarantee economic rights, political rights, social rights, food, health, environment, education, and other issues.

To make matter worst, combined with the lack of understanding of the central government on security issues in Papua in designing the special autonomy, the regional government is also unable to manage this special autonomy fund properly. The multidimensional adversity that the Papuan people must face cannot be separated from the poor performance of the bureaucracy in the regional government. The large special autonomy funds disbursed to Papua do not guarantee that Papua will be better than other provinces in Indonesia.

**Table 6.** Indonesia HDI 2000

| Province                | Human Development Index |       |       |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------|-------|
|                         | 2018                    | 2019  | 2020  |
| Aceh                    | 71.19                   | 71.90 | 71.99 |
| West Sumatera           | 71.18                   | 71.74 | 71.77 |
| North Sumatera          | 71.73                   | 72.39 | 72.38 |
| Riau                    | 72.44                   | 73.00 | 72.71 |
| Jambi                   | 70.65                   | 71.26 | 71.29 |
| South Sumatera          | 69.39                   | 70.02 | 70.01 |
| Bengkulu                | 70.64                   | 71.21 | 71.40 |
| Lampung                 | 69.02                   | 69.57 | 69.69 |
| Bangka Belitung Islands | 70.67                   | 71.30 | 71.47 |
| Riau Islands            | 74.84                   | 75.48 | 75.59 |
| DKI Jakarta             | 80.47                   | 80.76 | 80.77 |
| Banten                  | 71.95                   | 72.44 | 72.45 |
| West Java               | 71.30                   | 72.03 | 72.09 |
| Central Java            | 71.12                   | 71.73 | 71.87 |
| DI Yogyakarta           | 79.53                   | 79.99 | 79.97 |
| East Java               | 70.77                   | 71.50 | 71.71 |
| Bali                    | 74.77                   | 75.38 | 75.50 |
| West Nusa Tenggara      | 67.30                   | 68.14 | 68.25 |
| East Nusa Tenggara      | 64.39                   | 65.23 | 65.19 |
| West Kalimantan         | 66.98                   | 67.65 | 67.66 |
| Central Kalimantan      | 70.42                   | 70.91 | 71.05 |
| South Kalimantan        | 70.17                   | 70.72 | 70.91 |
| East Kalimantan         | 75.83                   | 76.61 | 76.24 |
| North Kalimantan        | 70.56                   | 71.15 | 70.63 |
| North Sulawesi          | 72.20                   | 72.99 | 72.93 |
| Central Sulawesi        | 68.88                   | 69.50 | 69.55 |
| South Sulawesi          | 70.90                   | 71.66 | 71.93 |
| Southeast Sulawesi      | 70.61                   | 71.20 | 71.45 |
| Gorontalo               | 67.71                   | 68.49 | 68.68 |
| West Sulawesi           | 65.10                   | 65.73 | 66.11 |
| Maluku                  | 68.87                   | 69.45 | 69.49 |
| North Maluku            | 67.76                   | 68.70 | 68.49 |
| West Papua              | 63.74                   | 64.70 | 65.09 |
| Papua                   | 60.06                   | 60.84 | 60.44 |

Source: BPS (2020)

In 2020, the Human Development Index in Papua was the lowest in Indonesia, with a value of 60.44. The index is low when compared to the provincial average in Indonesia.

Indirectly, the low Human Development Index shows the weak government performance in Papua, which causes the low level of welfare of Papua people. This situation is inseparable from the less-than-optimal performance of the government bureaucracy as a provider of public services for the community.

The asymmetrical autonomy in Papua is not accompanied by strong governance institutions. As a result, the welfare of the people is still lagging compared to the other provinces, even though the central government has provided large funds to catch up.

The ineffectiveness of Papua's special autonomy funds is also due to the lack of transparency in the budget. Budget supervision should be carried out by the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP), which is a representation of the Papuan people. The weak supervision of the budget resulted in improper distribution of the special autonomy funds. Under the law, the MRP has the authority to oversee the implementation of Papua's special autonomy. However, this is not happening in reality.

As such, unsurprisingly, the Papuan regional government was involved in indications of misuse of the special autonomy budget from 2002 to 2010. One of the cases that the BPK found is the spending of Rp556 billion of the special autonomy fund without any receipt ([detikNews, 2011](#)).

It seems that the failure of special autonomy was due to the delegation of affairs from the central government to the regional government without increasing the capacity and capability of the regional government's human resources. Therefore, the special autonomy was sub-optimal and even a failure.

Several studies have shown that the failure of Papua's special autonomy was due to the failure of the central government to understand the Papuan problem, but also the role of the regional government in Papua, as shown in [Table 7](#).

The reasons presented by the evaluators have shown that the special autonomy in Papua has many problems. The UGM team clearly stated that the delegation authority was not complemented by an increase in the capacity of human resources in the region, and there was a disconnect between policy and community needs. This disconnection gives rise to differences between the design and the reality. The design of the special autonomy policy may be very relevant to the Central Government, but it might be irrelevant to the needs of the region.

**Table 7.** Evaluation From Various Parties on the Failure of Special Autonomy in Papua

| No. | Evaluator   | Cause of Failure  |
|-----|---|---|
| 1   | Papuan People Assembly (MRP/Majelis Rakyat Papua) | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Lack of regulations on delegation of authority</li> <li>2. Limitation of the authority of the MRP</li> <li>3. Strategic functions are not operating properly (management functions, OAP object, limitation of scope of work, lack of transparency, accountability, and social control)</li> <li>4. Vague and uncertain allocation of the special autonomy fund</li> <li>5. Papua Provincial Government as the main implementor of the special autonomy</li> </ol> |
| 2   | Ministry of Home Affairs                          | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Lack of synergy within the governments' management functions</li> <li>2. Lack of harmony between regional agencies</li> <li>3. Lack of horizontal coordination between regional agencies</li> </ol>   |
| 3   | UGM   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Delegation of authority and resources are not in line with the capability of the government.</li> <li>2. Asymmetric design is not accompanied by institutional development.</li> <li>3. Limited deliberation process during the policy development</li> <li>4. Disconnection between the policy and the people's needs.</li> </ol>  |
| 4   | LIPi  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Loss of trust from the Papuan people</li> <li>2. Weak political and moral legitimacy</li> </ol>   |

Source: [Katharina \(2020, p. 149\)](#)

### C. The Essence of Papua's Security and Special Autonomy Issues

The enactment of the Papua Special Autonomy Law is intended to improve public services, accelerate the development process, empower Papuans and especially indigenous people, protect the rights of indigenous Papuans, and improve the quality of life of the Papuan people ([Martanto, 2007](#)).

This is the implication of the post-cold war security discourse, which has expanded the meaning of security.

Contemplative and critical questions have challenged the narrow (traditional) definition of security, such as: What are the objects of security? Who should be protected? What are the forms of threats? Who should provide security and how? ([Buzan, 1997, pp. 9–12](#); [Martanto, 2007, p. 179](#)). If security is needed to achieve prosperity in Papua, then the special autonomy in Papua must be viewed through at least two elements: public services and the protection of the rights of the Papuan people.

Concerning public services, it is impossible to achieve prosperity in Papua without increasing the quantity and quality of public service.

During the implementation of the special autonomy, many reports in the media stated that

public services in Papua did not improve. Many Papuans have low-quality education and low literacy rates because they do not have sufficient access to education. Many Papuans are sick because of limited access to hospitals or health centers, both in terms of the number of infrastructures and medical personnel. Papua's economy also lagging since it is not supported by adequate infrastructure. Furthermore, there are also many deprivations of the rights of the Papuan people, such as human rights violations committed by the state. Isn't that all a matter of public service? As long as public services in Papua have not been improved, welfare is only an illusion. For example, how is the state of the health sector in Papua? Is the Papuan enjoying better access to health services? This question is relevant since the health sector is the most visible on public service issues, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Table 8 illustrates the healthcare service in Papua, which has been built through the special autonomy policy.


**Table 8.** Healthcare Achievement in Papua (2019)

| Healthcare Professionals | Number | Healthcare Facilities             | Number |
|--------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|
| General Practitioner     | 251    | Hospital                          | 41     |
| Dentist                  | 774    | Community Health Center           | 422    |
| Midwife                  | 101    | Secondary Community Health Center | 1,146  |
| Midwife                  | 5,744  | Pharmacy                          | 125    |
| Nurse                    | 1,794  | Polyclinic                        | 115    |

Source: BPS - Papua (2019)

Table 8 shows that the public services in the health sector were not proportional to the population of Papua. Therefore, it is necessary to design a special autonomy in Papua that can build the quality of public services in the health sector and other public sectors. The quality of public services must be improved so that it will indirectly produce security improvement that leads to prosperity and welfare for Papua.

Public services, security, and welfare issues are linear issues that should be able to be addressed by special autonomy. However, as of the time of the study, the government did not see the security issue in Papua as part of the welfare issue. Therefore, based on the result of the study, the authors propose a framework to achieve prosperity in Papua. Special autonomy and the large special autonomy fund must maximize their role in addressing security issues in Papua. Refer



Source: Processed based on study result

**Figure 1.** Special Autonomy Framework for the Welfare in Papua

to Figure 1 to identify how this special autonomy should address the problems in Papua.

The picture clearly shows how the special autonomy policy in Papua has not yet addressed the root of security issues in Papua. As a result, the government often resorts to traditional security approaches, which triggers bigger conflicts and neglects to address the non-traditional security, which is the element of welfare in Papua. Therefore, the framework must be used as the basis for the future implementation of special autonomy in Papua.

#### IV. Conclusion

Two decades of asymmetric decentralization or special autonomy in Papua failed to bring significant changes to Papua. The special autonomy design had not accommodated the security issues in Papua. Instead, it was marred by conventional security measures, which made Papua more volatile.

Papua cannot improve its welfare, and the government failed to realize that the fundamental issue is its security. The government should realize that issuance of regulations and disbursement of funds alone are not enough to bring prosperity to Papua. Instead, the government must provide better security in Papua to improve its welfare. Papua will not be able to prosper until the security issues are resolved.

There is a very strong correlation between security and welfare issues.

The government has an important task in designing and constructing a flexible special autonomy policy to address the existing security issues. Security approach must be a relevant issue in the special autonomy to resolve conflict and build a more dynamic and progressive Papua.

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