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Author(s)

<sup>1</sup> Corresponding Author  
Muhammad Aqiel  
[aqielneariah@gmail.com](mailto:aqielneariah@gmail.com)  
+62 857-8925-1659  
Ilmu Pemerintahan FISIP Universitas Lampung

<sup>2</sup> Ananda Putri Sujatmiko  
[ananda.putri@menpan.go.id](mailto:ananda.putri@menpan.go.id)  
+62 812-7121-4009  
Ministry of State Apparatus Utilization and  
Bureaucratic Reform of the Republic of Indonesia

## Neopatrimonialism in the 2020 Regional Head Elections in the Power Cube Perspective

Muhammad Aqiel, Ananda Putri Sujatmiko

**Abstract:** The number of candidates who have a kinship with political and/or government entities in the 2020 Pilkada in Indonesia has shot up compared to the previous period, namely originally 59 candidates (2005-2014 period), 86 candidates (2015-2018 period), now 124 candidates (2020-2024 period). The research aims to identify the most dominating dimensions of power in kinship politics by using the power cube theory. In summary, the power cube theory analyzes the interaction of power in 3 (three) dimensions, namely levels, spaces, and forms. The method used is a quantitative method with analytical hierarchy process techniques to determine the criteria for the highest kinship politics and to determine the regions with the highest kinship political relations based on the criteria. Researchers identified the potential impact of kinship politics practice using descriptive qualitative research methods. The results of the study found a visible dimension in the power cube theory, namely that poor regeneration of political parties dominates the causes of kinship politics (73% of the criteria weighted results). The regions with the highest kinship politics based on the criteria for weak party regeneration were South Sulawesi (60.3%), followed by Sumatra (24.88%) and Java (10.07%). There are 5 (five) potential impacts of the practice of kinship politics, namely versatile coalitions, policies originating from elite compromise, marginalized crucial public issues, the birth of regulations that accommodate the interests of actors outside of government, and the declining performance of the bureaucracy in bridging the needs of the people.

**Keywords:** kinship politics; power cube; analytical hierarchy process; neopatrimonialism

### About the Author(s)

**Muhammad Aqiel**, born in Kota Agung, October 4, 1998. Currently pursuing a Bachelor of Governmental Science Education at the University of Lampung, active as research director of the HMI Press Institute, as a Public Policy Consultant at Rumah Inspirasi, and actively writing in the mass media under the pen name Aqiel Neariah.

**Ananda Putri Sujatmiko**, born in Teluk Betung, June 8, 1995, completed her Bachelor of Governmental Science program at the University of Lampung, served as the First Expert Policy Analyst at the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform of the Republic of Indonesia, and wrote a number of articles in the mass media and journals of State Apparatus Empowerment.



## I. Introduction

Regional head elections (Pilkada) in 2020 have been held in around 270 provinces and regencies/cities in Indonesia. This contestation is projected as an arena for power struggles in each administrative region. Regional heads who win the contestation will synergize with bureaucratic elements to move to achieve their vision and mission, either on behalf of individuals, people, political parties, or other actors.


Due to this practice, power indirectly does not belong to someone alone, or in this case the elected regional head. This power is multidimensional and spreads to various actors, from the visible political arena, the long-term bureaucratic institutional infrastructure, to other actors who have the same political agenda (Healey & Hinson, 2018, p. 2).

A number of studies show that power relations in the realm of local politics are empirically distributed to various actors in society. Religious leaders in Malang Regency are local elites who have legitimacy from the people so that they have an important position in local political contestation in the hegemony of the 2018 Pilkada. If the political elite gets voice media from religious community groups in a centralized manner to reduce political costs by using social capital, then the local elite will get recognition from the political elite that they are the people who play an important role in the strategy to win the election. Apart from recognition, financial assistance for organizing religious activities can be another benefit (Pradana, 2020).

The distribution of electoral power also occurs in West Sumatra and Riau Islands Provinces. If the caretaker for the victory of the Governor in Minang land is the "Senior Pamong Group", namely a group of former high-ranking government officials, then in Bubung Melayu land it is held by people close to the Governor and former expert team who have personal ties with the Governor (Hidayat & Gismar, 2010, p. 33). The similarities between the two are actors outside the formal state structure within the regional government but have an influence in voicing various interests both at the local and national levels.

The practice of kinship politics is also inseparable when discussing power relations. Nagara Institute noted that there are 124 regional head candidates who have kinship advancing in Pilkada contestation in 2020. The details consist of 57 candidates for Regent, 30 candidates for Deputy Regent, 20 candidates for Mayor, 8

candidates for Vice Mayor, 5 candidates for Governor, and 4 candidates for Deputy Governor (Nagara Institute, 2020, p. 1) is presented in Figure 1.



Source: Nagara Institute (2020)

**Figure 1.** Distribution of Regional Head Candidates with Kinship in the 2020 Pilkada

This number shot high compared to the Pilkada held during 2005-2014, which only amounted to 59 candidates, and increased in the 2015-2018 Pilkada, namely as many as 86 candidates who had kinship. These candidates for regional head come from current and non-current state figures, such as President, Vice President, Ministers, former Governors, Mayors, and Regents. For example, the President brought forward his son, namely Gibran Rakabuming and his son-in-law, namely Bobby Nasution. Then in the 2020 Pilkada, there were also competitions between political dynasties. In South Tangerang, there was a contest between the relatives of the Minister of Defence Prabowo, the Vice President, and Ratu Atut. Dynastic battles are not only between dynasties but there are 'internal' dynasties such as what happened in Pangkajene and Islands Regency, namely in the Syamsuddin A. Hamid dynasty (Nagara Institute, 2020).

Meanwhile, from the aspect of regional distribution, Sumatra and Sulawesi dominate the nominations for regional heads with kinship, namely 33 candidates for regional heads. This figure is followed by 32 candidates in Java, 12 candidates in Kalimantan, Bali, NTB and NTT with

10 candidates, and at least 4 candidates in Maluku Islands.



Source: Nagara Institute (2020)

**Figure 2.** Distribution of Kinship Politics in the 2020 Pilkada

So, how does the legal aspect view the practice of kinship politics? On juridical basis, kinship politics in the Pilkada is not clearly against the law but following the applicable mechanism from the registration of a candidate for regional head to the announcement of the results of the Pilkada. However, if in practice it clearly violates the existing provisions, then this is another discussion. In fact, the Constitutional Court through its decision Number 33/PUU-XIII/2015 granted the judicial review lawsuit and deleted Article 7 letter r Law (UU) No.8 of 2015 concerning Amendments to Law No.1 of 2015 concerning Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law (Perpu) No. 1/2014 on the Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors become a law, which prohibits prospective regional head candidates from having a blood/marital relationship with the incumbent. The constitutional judge assessed that this article was contrary to Article 28 letter i paragraph 2 of the 1945 Constitution regarding the prohibition of discriminatory treatment.

However, kinship politics has a chronic tendency and impact on democracy and strengthening participation. Some of the excesses of kinship politics, namely: [1] the desire within oneself or in the family to perpetuate power; [2] there is a collaboration between the rulers and entrepreneurs to combine the power of capital with the power of politicians; and [3] the division of duties between political power and capital power resulting in corruption and abuse of authority both financially and environmentally (Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, 2015). This is because political kinship has resulted in political dynasties having a tendency to be closer


to policy access and access to budget allocations than other parties (Calleja, 2020, p. 21).

Various studies have also shown the existence of dynastic political closeness to state resources, ranging from bureaucrats to policies. For example, the victory of the Governor, Regent and Mayor in Riau Province who appointed family members, namely children, wives, brothers, and sisters to fill strategic positions in regional government circles, such as Provincial Secretary, Agency Secretary, and others (Darmansyah et al., 2020, p. 41). In addition, the victory of the Mayor of South Tangerang, namely Airin Rachmi Diany, who is also the sister-in-law of the former Banten Governor Ratu Atut Chosiyah, also took advantage of the political power and influence of the Ratu Atut dynasty, which has been well cared for since Atut's victory (Zeliana et al., 2021).

Talking about power relations in Pilkada contestation, it is also inseparable from the extent to which the dimensions of the roles taken by actors outside the scope of the government institutional structure, and what impacts are caused by the practice of power relations.

The power cube theory analysis knife can be used to answer the above phenomena (Pantazidou, 2012, p. 6). In general, this theory is a complement to the previous theory of power produced by Luke (1974). Power cube projects power in the metaphor of a Rubik's cube to analyze the interaction between 3 (three) dimensions of power, namely levels, spaces, and forms (Irwan & Wardani, 2021).

First, the level dimension refers to the current layer/level of power. This dimension consists of [1] global, namely policymakers in formal and informal



**Figure 3.** "Power cube" by John Gaventa

institutions outside the administrative area of a country; [2] national, namely in the form of the executive, legislative, political parties, coalitions, and other authorities that run the existing government system in a country; [3] local, namely the level of local government such as Regional House of Representatives (DPRD), or other associations.

Second, the space dimension refers to the potential arena/space for interaction to occur. This dimension consists of [1] closed space, namely interactions resulting in decisions made behind the door without extensive public participation or consultation; [2] invited or allowed space, namely decisions made by involving public participation but with a certain set of limitations; [3] claimed or created space, namely that certain decisions or agendas are made by groups of people who do not have access to power.

Third, the shape dimension refers to how power manifests itself in the public sphere. This dimension consists of [1] Visible form, namely power focusing on who participates and dominates in the decision-making process; [2] Hidden form, namely the power to hide certain issues, interests, and voices from the decision-making process or public agenda; [3] Invisible form, namely the power to internalize certain values and norms so that other voices are held back so that injustice appears.

Furthermore, the author will use this power cube theory approach as a criterion, which then will determine which criteria contribute the most to support the practice of kinship politics.

A number of studies related to the relationship between local government administrations by other actors outside of government based on kinship have indeed been carried out, especially in the context of Pilkada. These studies include:

- (1) The Woman Candidates without Political Kinship Support: What Capitals Should You Utilize to Win the Election (Fadli et al., 2018).

This research explains that behind the high participation of women in the 2019 Pilkada in South Sulawesi, more than half of them have political kinship relations. This study uses qualitative methods through in-depth interviews with political party leaders and uses Robert Putnam's social capital theory as a tool of analysis.

- (2) Victory of the Incumbent in the 2018 Simultaneous Regional Head Election Contest: Viewed from a Power Cube Perspective (Mu & Pereyra-Rojas, 2017, p. 8).

This study uses a qualitative method with the perspective of the power cube theory, by conducting a literature review of the simultaneous regional head elections in 2015, 2017, and 2018.

When viewed from this research, it can be concluded that all studies used qualitative methods to elaborate a realistic picture of the situation under study in the context of kinship politics. Meanwhile, in this study, researchers did not only use qualitative but also quantitative methods (mixed method). Based on the background of this research, two problem formulations will be raised in this study, namely:

- (1) What is the highest level of kinship politics in the 2020 Pilkada based on the Power cube perspective using the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) analysis technique?
- (2) What is the impact of the practice of kinship politics during the 2020 Pilkada?

Based on the problem formulation above, this study aims to elaborate on the shape of the power cube dimensions such as what is the most determining factor for the occurrence of kinship politics in Pilkada in several regions, as well as identifying the potential impact of kinship politics on Pilkada.

## II. Methods

This research uses quantitative and qualitative approaches or better known as the mixed method. The mixed method in this research is the use of a quantitative method to answer the highest level of kinship politics in the 2020 Pilkada, and a qualitative method is used to identify the potential impact of kinship politics practices on the 2020 Pilkada.

In quantitative research, it is carried out by utilizing secondary data through the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) analysis technique. A quantitative approach using AHP analysis techniques is research used to solve complex problems by structuring a hierarchy of criteria, interested parties, results and by drawing various considerations in order to develop weights or priorities (Akbar et al., 2020, p. 32).

Through AHP, kinship politics in the 2020 Regional Head Election can be seen using a measurement scale consisting of several criteria, namely: Visible, Hidden, and Invisible based on the power cube theory as previously mentioned. Furthermore, the data processing based on AHP analysis techniques is carried out based on the

results of newspaper reviews and review of statistical documents to determine the criteria, which are then processed to become quantitative data scores. That way, the authors will find priorities among a number of existing criteria, which will then be analyzed using literature studies.

Regarding data collection, the authors adapted secondary data obtained from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) regarding the Indonesian Democracy Index in determining the criteria for kinship politics based on the power cube theory, and secondary data obtained by Nagara Institute is to determine the distribution of regions in Indonesia where Pilkada participants have kinship relations with officials and/or former public officials. Both of these data have relevance to the research subject, making it easier for the author to determine the assessment criteria.

In principle, there are many indicators that support the occurrence of kinship politics. However, if it is based on the power cube theory along with the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) data related to the Indonesian Democracy Index, the indicators can be grouped into 3 (three) groups of indicators, namely [1] regeneration activities carried out by parties participating in the elections; [2] fraud in vote counting; and [3] the partiality of the Regional General Election Commission (KPU) in organizing the Pilkada. In summary, the dimensions and indicators referred to in Table 1.

**Table 1.**  
Dimensions and Indicators

Power Cube Dimensions	Indicator
Visible	The lack of regeneration activities carried out by parties participating in the elections
Hidden	Fraud in vote counting
Invisible	The partiality of the Regional General Election Commission (KPU) in organizing the Pilkada

Source: Statistics Indonesia (2019)

Furthermore, regarding the distribution of kinship politics in the 2020 Pilkada, Nagara Institute (2020) notes that Sumatra and Sulawesi are the regions that have the largest population of kinship politics, followed by Java, and the lowest, namely the Maluku Islands. The distribution is presented in Table 2.

Based on the data in Table 2, the researchers took samples from the regions of Sumatra,

**Table 2.**  
The Distribution of Kinship Politics in the 2020 Pilkada

Island	Number of Candidate Pairs
Sumatera	33
Sulawesi	33
Jawa	32
Kalimantan	12
Bali, NTB, and NTT	10
Maluku Islands	4


Source: Nagara Institute (2020)

Sulawesi, and Java, considering that the population of kinship politics in these areas is the largest to be studied so that it is sufficient to represent the size of the population in this study.

### A. Stages of the AHP Method in Determining the Level of Kinship Politics in Indonesia

The stages in the quantitative method using AHP analysis techniques are briefly used to determine the level of kinship politics in Indonesia through several criteria based on the power cube theory and the Indonesian Democracy Index as secondary data, as well as alternatives/areas that are the object of research. Methodologically, there are three steps in measuring the level of kinship politics using AHP analysis techniques, as follows:

The first step is to arrange a hierarchy by determining the research objectives that are placed at the top level. Next, the level is followed by the predefined criteria to be assessed against the available alternatives.



**Figure 4.** Hierarchy of AHP Analysis Techniques

The second step is to create a pairwise comparison matrix, which describes the relative contribution or influence of each element to the

goals or criteria that are a level above it (Prayitno & Yanuar, 2020, p. 132).

**Table 3.**  
Pairwise Comparison Matrix

	Criterion-1	Criterion-2	Criterion-3	Criterion-N
Criterion-1	C1/C1	C1/C2	C1/C3	C1/CN
Criterion-2	C2/C1	C2/C2	C2/C3	C2/CN
Criterion-3	C3/C1	C3/C2	C3/C3	C3/CN
Criterion-N	CN/C1	CN/C2	CN/C3	CN/CN

So that the comparison results of each element will be a number from 1 to 9 which shows the comparison of the level of importance of an element. When an element in the matrix is compared with itself, the comparison result is given a value of 1. A scale of 9 proves to be acceptable and can be a difference in intensity between elements. The results of the comparison are filled in the cells corresponding to the elements being compared. The pairwise comparison scale and its meaning can be seen in Table 4.

**Table 4.**  
Pairwise Comparison Rating Scale

Intensity of Importance	Definition	Explanation
1	Both elements are equally important	Two elements have the same effect on goals
3	A little more important than the other elements	It supports one element a little more than other elements
5	More important than any other elements	Strong supports on one element over other elements
7	One element is clearly more absolute than the other elements	One element is very strongly supported and looks dominant
9	One element is absolutely more important than any other elements	One element with another element has the highest degree of affirmation
2,4,6,8	The values between two adjacent consideration values	This value is given when there are two compromises between the two options

The important notes in the second step in normalizing the matrix are as follows:

- (1) Perform matrix normalization in which each column is multiplied by the matrix, calculates the eigenvalues, and tests its consistency. If it is not consistent then data retrieval is repeated
- (2) Repeats steps 3, 4, and 5 for the entire hierarchy level.

- (3) Calculates the eigenvector of each pairwise comparison matrix, which is the weight of each element for prioritizing the elements at the lowest hierarchical level until they reach the goal.

The third step is to test for consistency. The calculation is done by adding the values of each column concerned to obtain a normalized matrix and adding the values of each row and dividing by the number of elements to get the average (Neuman, 1997, p. 524).

- (1) If A is a pairwise comparison matrix, then the weight vector of the form:  $(A)(W^T) = (n)$  ( $W^T$ ) can be approached by normalizing each column j in matrix A, such that:  $\sum_i a_{ij}=1$  referred to as A'.
- (2) Calculate the average value for each row in  $A^0$ :  $w_i = 1/n \sum_i a_{ij}$  where  $w_i$  is the i-th objective weight of the weight vector.
- (3) Check hierarchy consistency. For example, A is the pairwise comparison matrix and w is a weight vector, then the consistency of the weight vector w can be tested as follows:

Calculate:  $(A)(Wt)$

$$t = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left( \frac{\text{the } i\text{-th element in } (A)(W^t)}{\text{the } i\text{-th element in } W^t} \right)$$

**Equation 1.** Consistency of the weight vector

- (4) Calculate the consistency index:

$$CI = \frac{t-n}{n-1}$$

**Equation 2.** Consistency Index

Where CI is the ratio of the deviation of consistency (consistency index), Max is the maximum eigenvalue, and n is the size of the matrix. The random index (IR Table) is the average CI value randomly selected in A and given as follows:

1	2	3	4	5	6
0,0	0,00	0,58	0,90	1,12	1,24

- (5) Calculate the consistency ratio

$$CR = \frac{CI}{RI_n}$$

If  $CI = 0$ , then the hierarchy is consistent.  
 If  $CR < 0.1$ , then the hierarchy is fairly consistent.  
 If  $CR > 0.1$ , the hierarchy is very inconsistent.

Furthermore, after getting a score of quantitative data in the form of a kinship political index in the 2020 Regional Head Election, the next step is to combine it with qualitative data from the results of a literature study. The literature study is defined as a linear development built on scientific constructions with a more positivist orientation (Nagara Institute, 2020, p. 1). Through this study, the authors produce a more in-depth analysis of the criteria that mostly dominate the practice of kinship politics in Indonesia, as well as identify the potential impacts that will be caused.

### III. Results and Discussion

In this discussion, the researcher tries to measure the highest level of kinship politics in Indonesia in 2020 based on the political theory of power cubes using the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). The secondary data used in determining the criteria, namely using indicators that adapt the research conducted by the Central Statistics Agency related to the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI).

#### A. Calculation of Criteria to Determine the Level of the Highest Political Kinship

First, the researcher calculates the criteria to determine the level of kinship politics. The following is the preparation of a hierarchy of criteria to determine the level of kinship politics in Indonesia in the 2020 Pilkada as shown in Figure 5.

Second, compiling the criteria for the highest kinship politics with a pairwise comparison matrix. The pairwise comparison calculation of the scale value is taken based on the political theory of power cubes and data from the Central Statistics




Figure 5. Determining the Highest Kinship Politics

Agency related to the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI). The pairwise comparison matrix is presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Criteria Pairwise Comparison Matrix

Criterion	Party Regeneration	Fraud in Vote Counting	The Partiality of the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD)
Party regeneration	1,00	5,00	7,00
Fraud in vote counting	0,20	1,00	3,00
The partiality of the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD)	0,14	0,33	1,00
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,34</b>	<b>6,33</b>	<b>11</b>

Furthermore, the researcher carried out a normalization in which each column was multiplied by a matrix, the number of criteria multiplied the value of each criterion or the number of columns (3x3) multiplied each row. So that the normalized criteria matrix weight value is obtained. Furthermore, after obtaining the number of normalized eigenvectors for each criterion, the priority value of the criteria is calculated by dividing each number of elements or the number of criteria ( $n = 3$ ), so that the priority value of each criterion can be calculated as shown in Table 6.

Table 6. EVN Matrix: Normalized Eigenvectors

Criterion	Party Regeneration	Fraud in Vote Counting	The Partiality of the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD)	Total	EVN
Party regeneration	2,98	12,31	29	44,29	0,73
Fraud in vote counting	0,82	2,99	7,4	11,21	0,18
The partiality of the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD)	0,346	1,36	2,97	4,676	0,077
<b>Total</b>			<b>60,176</b>		

Furthermore, the researcher conducts a competency test to prove that the priority value of these criteria can be used or not depending on the test results, consistent or not.

The third step is the consistency test.

(a) Determines the maximum eigen value.  

$$= (1.34 \times 0.73) + (6.33 \times 0.18) + (11 \times 0.077)$$

$$= 0.97 + 1.13 + 0.84$$

$$= 2.94$$
 Maximum Eigen = 2.94

(b) Calculating the Consistency Index (CI)  

$$CI = 2.94 - 3/3 - 1$$

$$= -0.06/2$$

$$= -0.03$$

(c) Calculating the Consistency Ratio (RI)  
 IR is Index Random with a value of 0.58 because in this case it has a 3x3 matrix size.  

$$CR = CI/IR$$

$$= -0.03/0.58 = -0.05$$

Because the consistency ratio value of 0.07 is less than 0.1, the above matrix is consistent so that the weight of the criterion is consistent and appropriate to be used for the highest kinship political criteria weight, as in [Table 7](#).

**Table 7.**  
The Weight of the Criterion for the Highest Kinship Politics

Criterion	Weight	Percentage
Party regeneration	0,73	73%
Fraud in vote counting	0,18	18%
The partiality of the Regional General Election Commission (KPU)	0,077	7,7%

**B. Evaluation of Criteria for Alternatives**

In this study, an alternative to the AHP method is the distribution area of kinship politics in the 2020 Pilkada. [Nagara Institute \(2020\)](#) notes that Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Java are the regions that have the largest population of kinship politics practices. Of the three regions, a pairwise comparison matrix was carried out using the previous criteria. The calculation of the pairwise comparison of the criteria refers to the data from the Central Statistics Agency related to the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI). Then the matrix normalization is carried out to obtain the

priority value of the area against the criteria and a consistency test is carried out to determine whether the priority value is consistent or not.

**Table 8.**  
EVN Value Related to Party Regeneration

Alternative	Sumatra	Sulawesi	Java	Total	EVN
Sumatra	2,98	1,26	7,65	11,89	0,256865
Sulawesi	7,65	2,99	18	28,64	0,618723
Java	1,26	0,5089	2,99	4,7589	0,102809
<b>TOTALITY</b>				<b>46,289</b>	

After knowing the Eigenvector Normalization value related to party regeneration, the next step is the consistency test.

(a) Determines the maximum eigenvalue.  

$$(4.33 \times 0.256865) + (1.53 \times 0.618723) + (9 \times 0.102809) = 2.98415$$
 Maximum Eigen = 2.98415

(b) Calculating the Consistency Index (CI)  

$$CI = 2.98415 - 3/3 - 1$$

$$= -0.01585 / 2$$

$$= -0.007925$$

(c) Calculating the Consistency Ratio (RI)  
 IR is Index Random with a value of 0.58 because in this case it has a 3x3 matrix size.  

$$CR = CI/IR$$

$$= -0.007925/0.58$$

$$= -0.01366$$

**Table 9.**  
EVN Value Related to Voting Count Fraud

Alternative	Sumatra	Sulawesi	Java	Total	EVN
Sumatra	2,98	1,65	6,99	11,62	0,27674
Sulawesi	6,99	2,98	15	24,97	0,594681
Java	1,65	0,7689	2,98	5,3989	0,128579
<b>TOTALITY</b>				<b>41,989</b>	

After knowing the Eigenvalues of the Normalization Vector related to voting count fraud, the next step is to test the consistency.

(a) Determines the maximum eigenvalue.  

$$(4.33 \times 0.27674) + (1.66 \times 0.594681) + (7 \times 0.128579) = 3.085508$$
 Maximum Eigen = 3.085508



(b) Calculating the Consistency Index (CI)

$$CI = 3.085508 - 3/3 - 1$$

$$= -0.085508/2$$

$$= 0.042754$$

(c) Calculating the Consistency Ratio (RI)

IR is Index Random with a value of 0.58 because in this case, it has a 3×3 matrix size.

$$CR = CI/IR$$

$$= 0.042754/0.58$$

$$= -0.073714$$

**Table 10.** EVN Value Related to the Partiality of the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD)

Alternative	Sumatra	Sulawesi	Java	Total	EVN
Sumatra	2,98	0,99	8,31	11,89	0,235778
Sulawesi	8,31	2,76	23	34,07	0,675605
Java	0,99	0,3289	2,99	4,3089	0,085445
<b>TOTALITY</b>				<b>50,429</b>	

After knowing the Eigenvector Normalization value related to the partiality of the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD), the next step is to test the consistency.

(a) Determines the maximum eigenvalue.

$$(4.33 \times 0.235778) + (1.44 \times 0.675605) + (11 \times 0.085445) = 2.933683$$

Maximum Eigen = 2.933683

(b) Calculating the Consistency Index (CI)

$$CI = 2.933683 - 3/3 - 1$$

$$= -0.066317/2$$

$$= -0.03316$$

(c) Calculating the Consistency Ratio (RI)

IR is Index Random with a value of 0.58 because in this case, it has a 3×3 matrix size.

$$CR = CI/IR$$

$$= -0.03316/0.58$$

$$= -0.05717$$

Because the consistency ratio value of 0.07 is less than 0.1, the three criteria assessment matrices for the alternatives above are consistent so that the alternative weights are consistent and feasible to be used for further calculations.


Furthermore, the overall or total value of the ranking of each alternative area is searched by multiplying the eigenvalues of each alternative

with the eigenvalues of the criteria or priority criteria, namely the results of each row on each alternative eigenvalues multiplied by the criteria eigen column.

- (1) For the Sumatra region with the calculation  $(0.256865 \times 0.73) + (0.27674 \times 0.18) + (0.235778 \times 0.077)$  to produce 0.2555
- (2) For the Sulawesi region with the calculation  $(0.618723 \times 0.73) + (0.594681 \times 0.18) + (0.675605 \times 0.077)$  to produce 0.6107  
0.45166779 0.10704258 0.052021585
- (3) For the Java region with the calculation  $(0.102809 \times 0.73) + (0.128579 \times 0.18) + (0.085445 \times 0.077)$  to produce 0.1048

So that the order of the percentage for the name of the region in the 2020 Pilkada, namely:

1. Sulawesi: 61.07%
2. Sumatra: 25.55%
3. Java: 10.48%



**Figure 6.** Total Priority Weight of Regions with the Highest Kinship Politics

From the results of the AHP calculations carried out above, the results show that the Sulawesi region gets a weighted score of 61.07% so that the Sulawesi region can be said to be an area with a high level of kinship politics. In contrast to the Sulawesi region, Sumatra gets a weighted score of 25.55% so that the Sumatra region can be said to be an area with less high kinship politics. For Java, the region received a score weight of 10.48%, so that the Java region can be said to be an area with not so high kinship politics.

**Table 11.**  
Candidates Suspected of Having Kinship Political Power in South Sulawesi

No	The Name of the Candidate Pair	Kinship Relations
<b>Candidates for Mayor and Deputy Mayor</b>		
1	a. Irman Yasin Limpo	a. The younger brother of the Minister of Agriculture (Syahrul Yasin Limpo)
	b. Andi Zunnun	b. Son of a Golkar politician (Nurdin Halid)
2	a. Danny Pomanto	a. Mayor of Makassar 2014-2019
	b. Fatmawati	b. Wife of former 2 periods Regent of Sidrap (Rusdi Masse)
3	a. Munafri	a. The son-in-law of the owner of the Bosowa Group (Aksa Mahmud), a relative of Jusuf Kalla
	b. Rahman Bando	b. The younger brother of the Regent of Enrekang (Muslimin Bando)
<b>Candidates for Regent and Deputy Regent</b>		
1	a. Andi Harmil Mattotorang	a. Deputy Regent of Maros 2010-2015
	b. Andi Ilham Nadjamuddin	b. Son of the Regent of Maros 1999-2000
2	a. Andi Nirwati	a. The wife of a member of the 2019-2024 House of Representatives (DPR) RI, and she is a member of the 2019-2024 South Sulawesi Province Regional House of Representatives (DPRD)
	b. Lutfi Hanafi	b. -
3	a. Yusran Lalogau	a. The nephew of the 2 periods Regent of Pangkajene and the Islands (Syamsuddin A Hamid)
	b. Syahban Sammana	b. -
4	a. -	a. -
	b. Etha Rimba Tandil Payung	b. Wife of Member of East Kalimantan Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) 2019-2024, and she is a member of North Toraja Regency Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) 2019-2024
5	a. Kaswadi Razak	a. -
	b. Lutfi Halide	b. In-law of the Minister of Agriculture (Syahrul Yasin Limpo)
6	a. Adnan Purichta Ichsan	a. Son of the Regent of Gowa 2005-2015 (Ichsan Yasin Limpo) and he is a former 2 periods member of the South Sulawesi Regional House of Representatives (DPRD)
	b. Abdul Rauf Malaganni	b. -
7	a. Andi Ilham	a. The brother-in-law of the 2 periods Regent of Pangkajene and Islands (Syamsuddin A Hamid), and he is the Deputy Chairman of the Pangkajene and Islands Regency Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) (2019-2024)
	b. Rismayani	b. Wife of the 2 periods Regent of Pangkajene and Islands (Syamsuddin A Hamid)

Source: BBC News Indonesia (2020)

### C. Identification of Findings

The results of these calculations are in principle consistent with the findings (BBC News Indonesia, 2020). In its release, it was noted that South Sulawesi Province was the region with the highest number of kinship candidates with 12 (twelve) people in 1 election city. In summary, there are 10 (ten) pairs of candidates suspected of having kinship political power in the South Sulawesi region (Goodfellow, 2020).

When viewed theoretically, the terminology of kinship politics has not yet received a standard position even though it is an old concept in political science. Several studies have linked the term kinship politics with nepotistic behaviour because there is a tendency to benefit the interests of his family. However, this position needs to be reinstated because as previously explained, kinship politics is not necessarily an explicit act against the law as the definition of Nepotism is regulated in the provisions of Article 1 of Law Number 28 of 1999 concerning State Administrators who are clean and free from Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism.

### D. Neopatrimonialism in the Power Cube Perspective in the 2020 Pilkada and its Potential Impacts

In political science, there is the term neopatrimonialism, which describes the phenomenon of kinship politics. Neopatrimonialism (Bonga, 2021, p. 17) is defined as:

"A mixture of two co-existing, partly interwoven, types of domination: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination."

There is a mixture of two instruments in this concept, namely a political regeneration mechanism based on genealogy and through procedural channels protected by law (Goodfellow, 2020). If the traditional patrimonial mechanism is carried out through direct appointees, the new (neo) patrimonialism places kinship into the applicable procedural path.

In addition, there are also 3 (three) fundamental elements that characterize neopatrimonialism (Lederer & Höhne, 2021, p. 133), namely:

- (1) institutional hybridity, namely the conditions in which in a government system there are informal institutions with patrimonial norms

that run side by side with formal state institutions.

- (2) Existence of both patrimonial and legal-rational institutions, namely the patrimonial practice being a free rider over the existing formal legal institutions;
- (3) Personalism, namely there is a concentration of power in an individual who dominates the state apparatus and stands above the law. This concentration is used to obtain legitimacy and winner-takes-all benefits in terms of controlling state resources (Cassani, 2020).

Based on the above conception, in the context of this study, political parties are categorized as non-formal institutions that support the perpetuation of the practice of neopatrimonialism.

Thus, if it is based on the power cube perspective, it can be reflected that the power won by the elected regional head is a multidimensional power. In terms of the level dimension, the current layer of power is in the local scope, considering that the contestation being studied is the election of regional heads that is within the scope of regional government.

From the aspects of the space dimension, if using the concept of neopatrimonialism as mentioned above, the relevant dimension is invited, namely a condition in which there is a contestation of a regional head election that is legal and protected by law. However, in practice, political figures who have kinship are already familiar and have a concentration on certain resources in order to maximize the potential for victory. However, the authors realize that this dimension needs to be deepened in the next research in order to sharpen and develop research results.

Meanwhile, from shape dimension, visible dimension can manifest weak party regeneration (as identified in Table 7) in creating future leaders in the public sphere. In other words, political parties currently only focus on figures rather than a strong system of regeneration and political education (Hedström & Stern, 2017).

In political science, rational choice theory is known, which is part of the analysis tools of political scientists. The essence of this perspective is, when faced with various types of action, humans will usually do what they believe will bring the greatest benefit (Sujatmiko, 2016, p. 242).

When drawn from the weak practice of regeneration within political parties, political


parties can be said to be organizations full of rational considerations. The strengthening of power-oriented and transitional politics among political parties has increasingly neglected the function of political regeneration.

In addition, the pragmatism of political parties, which is supported by the reluctance of parties to take risks but want to maximize the potential for victory, has made the parties strive to join forces with large coalitions. The same thing has been researched by (Sujatmiko, 2016, p. 243) in identifying the pragmatism of political parties which led to the practice of party cartelization in the regional head elections of Bandar Lampung City in 2015. The results showed that 8 (eight) political parties have flocked to nominate incumbents by setting aside the party's ideology and policy guidelines. Thus, no matter how small the contribution of the parties in the coalition, each political party will still get the same distribution of benefits.

The strong influence of kinship politics means that political parties do not need to work hard to win candidates (A. Hidayat, 2020). The reason is that Pilkada participants who come from relatives of political elites and the government already understand the potential of regional resources that can be used to win themselves and perpetuate the power of their family. Not to mention the big name of the family behind them, making it easier for candidates for regional heads who have a kinship with the elite to "steal" popularity from the people.

The diagram below depicts political parties that carry candidate pairs as shown in Figure 7.

Based on the diagram, it can be seen that Nasdem and Golkar are the supporting parties



**Figure 7.** Supporting Parties for Couples with Kinship Political relations in South Sulawesi

that dominate candidate pairs who have kinship in the 2020 Pilkada in the South Sulawesi region. This can be understood because one of the forces of neopatrimonialism in Makassar is those who have a kinship with Syahrul Yasin Limpo (Minister of Agriculture) affiliated with the Nasdem Party and the Golkar Party (Izquierdo-Brichs, 2021, p. 15).

Based on the explanation above, it can be understood that neopatrimonialism can define the practice of kinship politics that occurs in Indonesia. Even in an implementation manner, neopatrimonialism is a manifestation of power relations that are not only owned by formal state institutions, but also by other actors outside the state system (Sheingate, 2020).

If this practice continues to take root due to weak party regeneration, the potential impacts that will be generated are:

1. Degradation of the essence of democracy. Political parties are no longer political institutions as program bearers, but only charter boats that can easily change policy directions. The pattern of party coalitions that are built is multi-faceted and full of interests (Bustos, 2021);
2. The resulting policies come from compromises by elites who already understand the regulations and existing resource gaps, not from compromises between government and public as evaluators of bureaucratic performance;
3. Crucial public issues are marginalized;
4. The drafting of regulations that have the potential to accommodate the interests of various actors outside the government; and
5. The decline in bureaucratic performance, due to loss of trust in their leaders (regional heads) and the influence of bureaucratic politicization. This is because the state civil apparatus is a bridge between the needs of civil society being served and the political needs which are an inseparable environment from the state administration relations system (Bjurstrøm, 2020, p. 1055).

In simple terms, if the elite has networked in family ties in an area, it will certainly further strengthen the emergence of asymmetrical information in agency theory. In governance, the government acts as an agent, while the people act as a principal. The problem between principal and agent arises in a context when the principal (people) does not know exactly what the agent

(government) is doing, whether it is in accordance with the principal's wishes or not (Bjurstrøm, 2020, p. 1055).

#### IV. Conclusion

The results of research using the mixed method can be drawn two conclusions both through quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative results using the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) analysis technique show that "poor party regeneration by the party participating in the election" with a percentage of 73% is the determining criterion for the occurrence of kinship politics in Indonesia in 2020 Pilkada. These results can be interpreted if the party regeneration process running improperly, then some of the reasons behind the occurrence of kinship politics such as transactional politics become increasingly unavoidable. In this regard, through the calculation of the AHP method, the region with the highest kinship politics was obtained based on poor party regeneration as the highest criterion, namely Sulawesi with a percentage of 61.07%.

Meanwhile, the qualitative results in this study are a versatile coalition full of interests, policies originating from elite compromise, crucial public issues being marginalized, the birth of regulations that accommodate the interests of actors outside the government, and the declining performance of the bureaucracy in bridging the needs of people.

In other words, the bad practice of party regeneration as a determining criterion for the occurrence of kinship politics in Indonesia in the 2020 Pilkada has strengthened the various studies that have been previously presented. Therefore, apart from the discourse of kinship politics practice or neopatrimonialism in various dimensions of the Pilkada, the competence and professionalism of elected regional heads in their work needs to be improved. Regional heads also need to build trust both in the public and in the bureaucrats who are their partners. If the professionalism of both political parties and elected regional heads remains solid in accordance with their portions, the existence of neopatrimonialism will no longer be questioned both material and immaterial.

Furthermore, alternative solutions to the results of this study as well as the implications described above are:

1. Information disclosure is required regarding the practice of party regeneration and political party education carried out within the body of political parties. This is to build trust for the

public that political parties do indeed practice professional regeneration, so as to produce qualified candidates for regional head regardless of their kinship ties.

2. It is necessary to institutionalize political parties in a sustainable manner in the development of democracy by making elements of civil society the driving force through reforms in party-related regulations in order to stimulate internal improvement of political parties.
3. These regulatory improvements need to be supported holistically from ministries/institutions that have the function of fostering and facilitating political party institutions, as well as legislative elements as the closest entity to political parties in the government system. This is necessary in order to "force" political parties to correct weaknesses, either mechanically or processes or structurally.

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