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Kinship Politics in Indonesia

Developments and Implications

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Abstract: Kinship politics has become an old topic of discussion in all countries that adhere to democracy, even for a democratic example country like America. The phenomenon of kinship politics is also inseparable from democracy in Indonesia. The rise of kinship politics is reflected in the implementation of the 2020 Regional Head Elections. This has caused concern from various groups, from the general public to democracy experts. They assume that the practice of kinship politics will harm political developments in Indonesia. Based on this phenomenon, this article aims to review kinship politics in the 2020 Regional Head Elections. The review covers implementing kinship politics, the reasons for the widespread practice of kinship politics in Indonesia, and its implications for governance practices in Indonesia. The methodology used is the method of literature study or literature review. Based on the findings, kinship politics in Indonesia occurs in almost all regions in Indonesia and strengthens in the 2020 Regional Head Elections. This happens because of the pattern of patron-client. Furthermore, negative implications are found in a patronage network that leads to cases of KKN-the Indonesian acronym for corruption, collusion, and nepotism, the destruction of local democracy, and moral hazard problems. The alternative used is political party reform, where the party applies a transparent and merit-based mechanism for regeneration.

Keywords: kinship politics; patron-client; 2020 regional head elections; implications

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I. Introduction

Kinship politics was commonly known during the New Order era or the reign of President Suharto. It functioned as a strategy for the power of the New Order to make people obey (Heychael, 2014). Ironically, in the reform era until now, dynastic politics still thrives in Indonesia, for example, in local leadership political dynasties in Banten (Alhumami, 2013). The reform era itself should be known as a more democratic general election system, where the public has the right to choose a leader candidate according to their wishes (Kaloh, 2008, p. 1). Regulations on the prohibition of kinship politics in Indonesia are considered relatively weak and instead support the proliferation of kinship politics practices (Susanti, 2017, p. 112).

In the constitution or practice regulations, kinship politics in Indonesia is not legally prohibited. This is based on the decision of the Constitutional Court (MK) to issue Decision Number 33/PUU-XIII/2015, and this is related to the review of Law Number 8 of 2015 concerning Amendments to Law Number 1 of 2015 concerning Government Regulations in Lieu of Law on the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors (Regional Head Elections Law) against the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD NRI 1945), where this decision led to a polemic that the practice of kinship in politics became a legal practice under the constitution (Kartika, 2015, p. 1). Law Number 1 of 2015 has a function to limit kinship politics, wherein Article 7 point q "Indonesian citizens who can become Candidates for Governor and Candidates for Deputy Governor, Candidates for Regents and Candidates for Deputy Regents, as well as Candidates for Mayor and Candidates for Vice Mayor, are that meet the following requirements (q). Has no conflict of interest with the incumbent".

The Constitutional Court's decision makes the public and many political observers worried about the proliferation of kinship politics in Indonesia. However, this is following various data on the widespread practice of kinship politics that occurred during the implementation of the Regional Head Elections in Indonesia. According to a survey from the Nagara Institute, they explained that from the classification of parties, they found 198 cases of electing members of The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia from political dynasties in 2009, 2014, and 2019 General Elections. Furthermore, in the executive realm, it is known that almost 80 regions throughout Indonesia are the result of kinship

politics. This is based on discovering three Simultaneous Regional Head Elections (Pilkada) in 541 regions (33 provinces, 419 regencies, and 89 cities). East Java is the area that carries out the most kinship politics, namely 14 regions (Taher, 2020).

On December 9, 2020, Indonesia held a democratic party, namely Regional Head Elections, carried out simultaneously by 270 regions with details of 9 provinces, 224 regencies, and 37 cities (Antara, 2020). The latest data in the 2020 Regional Head Elections 124 regional head candidates have a kinship politics background, from the results of the quick calculation of the General Election Commission (KPU) regional head candidates who have kinship relations with political figures both regional and national scope managed to excel in the 2020 Regional Head Elections (Bayu, 2020). Several regional heads candidates affiliated with kinship politics include (1) Gibran Rakabuming, son of President Joko Widodo. (2) Benyamin Davnie and Pilar Saga, son of Ratu Tatu, the Regent of Serang. (3) Rezita Melyani, wife of the Regent of Indragiri Hulu. (4) Hanindhito Himawan Pramana, son of Cabinet Secretary Pramono Anung. (5) Kustini Sri Pramono, wife of Sri Purnomo, the Regent of Sleman. (6) Ansar Ahmad and Marlin Agustina, Marlin is the wife of Muhammad Rudi, the Mayor of Batam (Bayu, 2020).

Some literature has reviewed the problems of kinship politics that occur in Indonesia. However, there is a lot of literature that takes a case of kinship politics, for example in the research of Effendi (2018, p. 240), which places Banten Province as a case study, which finds that local democratization in regional autonomy has resulted in the reorganization of traditional power and the revitalization of political power so that elite groups have the opportunity to strengthen their influence. Another research that discusses kinship politics belongs to Purwaningsih (2015, p. 97), which takes a case study of South Sulawesi to examine the quality of candidates who are members of kinship politics. Another research that discusses kinship politics belongs to Setyaningrum and Saragih (2019, p. 135), which discusses the correlation of kinship politics with the role of realizing good public services. Then, research from Mariana and Husin discusses the reasons for the emergence of kinship politics and the impact on local democracy (Solihah et al., 2018). The research above has not discussed the latest developments in kinship politics in Indonesia and alternative policies that can be done, so this

research is intended to accommodate the limitations of the previous research above.

The practice of Kinship Politics does not only occur in Indonesia. Several studies, for example, concluded that the presence of kinship politics in democracy occurs in several countries, such as the United States (Feinstein, 2010, p. 571), Japan (Asako et al., 2014, p. 1), Ireland (Smith & Martin, 2017, p. 131), India (Chandra, 2016), and the Philippines (David & San Pascual, 2016, p. 82). The literature on the discussion of kinship politics does not provide many definitions. This is possible because the concept of the family itself becomes a natural unit of social analysis, so it is not necessary to provide a further explanation (Purdey et al., 2016). Furthermore, it is explained that kinship politics itself will turn into dynastic politics when the person concerned can expand his power so that the founder of the dynasty does not lose his position but is replaced by his family members.

The phenomenon of kinship politics cannot be considered unimportant, considering the implications that arise from its practice. For example, in the concept of the labor market, kinship relations can lead to something positive and negative. The favorable condition is that informal social networks such as family relationships can increase work and develop careers more quickly (Bayer et al., 2008, p. 1150), but this also causes negative things, namely misallocation of essential resources, such as lack of skills and talents, owned by the person (Geys, 2017, p. F474). Kinship politics in the context of the bureaucracy itself is often interpreted negatively. Family politics can lead to political ethics, which will hinder political work, and it is feared that public interests will be more focused on the interests of particular groups (Taher, 2020).

Some literature states that kinship politics appears related to the term of office of the incumbent, where the incumbent, during his time of office, forms a dynasty centered on candidacy (Fiva & Smith, 2018, p. 707). This happened in South Tangerang City, where the Regional Head used a term of office to continue power. This started with Airin Rachmi Diany, the Mayor of South Tangerang 2011, and her husband, Tubagus Chaeri Wardana. They placed their children in the position of Governor and Mayor in Banten and South Tangerang (Prabowo, 2020). The above case brings problems as described in the literature. Leadership that uses the concept of kinship politics leads to corruption, as is the point in the Banten case (Prabowo, 2020). Based on the

explanation above, this article discusses the practice of implementing kinship politics in the 2020 Regional Head Elections, the origin of how the background of kinship politics arises, its implications for government, and alternative solutions that can be offered.

II. Methods

This study uses literature review as a method. The first process carried out by the researcher is to raise three research questions or research questions, including:

1. How is the practice of kinship politics in the 2020 Regional Head Elections, and why can kinship politics emerge?
2. What are the implications?
3. What alternative solutions can be used to suppress the increase in the practice of kinship politics.

The second process is the data collection process. This process involves the search process as the first step. The search process is carried out using a search engine (google chrome) with the address lib.ugm.ac.id and google scholar for primary data; for secondary data, researchers use news data and official government data online via google.com.

The second stage is data collection, where the researcher uses several considerations, namely:

1. The data used was published in 2015-2021, but there are some exceptions if the articles before 2015 are reference articles or ground theory that is very much needed in writing this article.
2. The data obtained follow the keywords set by the key, namely kinship politics, dynastic politics, and general elections.

The third stage is a quality assessment, where we conduct an independent review by considering the suitability of the article's theme with the author's desired theme. The author also looks at the theoretical construction and the appropriateness of the findings of the report itself. The author also looks at whether the results of the articles are frequently cited and how much the journal ranks.

The following process is data collection, where researchers collect primary and secondary data from the results of data searches that match the criteria. The primary data category is articles that discuss kinship politics in Indonesia, as well as those that have a similar construction to

Indonesia, such as the case of kinship politics that occurred in Asia. Meanwhile, the secondary data category is used to complete the primary data. The last step is data analysis. At this stage, the researcher adopted Creswell's qualitative data analysis, where the researcher took several steps, namely (Creswell, 2009):

1. Processing and preparing the results of data acquisition.
2. Read all data
3. Coding and implementing the coding process according to the analyzed categories and themes.
4. Describe the data by presenting it through a narrative approach (complete with sub-themes, illustrations, perspectives, and quotes)

This research was conducted in 2021 with a research time of approximately two months, namely in January–February. Researchers use literature studies as a method with several considerations, including: (1) a literature study is needed to review the development of studies on the pattern of formation of kinship politics in the country and cases in various countries that have experienced the same thing. (2) through literature study, it can be known in general how kinship politics debates have implications for the democratic system. (3) literature study is also helpful for researchers to generally review the phenomenon of kinship politics in Indonesia and compare it with theories that have been formed to find alternative solutions to problems.

III. Results and Discussion

A. The Practice of Kinship Politics and Background to the Emergence of Kinship Politics

Democracy in Indonesia has undergone many transitions, starting from the old order government to post-reformation as it is today. This transition can be said to be experiencing a positive trend when looking at the implementation of decentralization, regional autonomy, and the emergence and ability of political parties to develop (Peou, 2014, p. 39). However, this seemingly positive trend is also offset by the development of pathology in the implementation of democracy, namely the emergence and widespread kinship politics in local government in Indonesia. The emergence of kinship politics is indeed commonplace, where this does not happen only in Indonesia. Still, countries such as

America, which are many examples of the implementation of democracy, also experience the same thing (Querubin, 2016, p. 152).

The cause of kinship politics in the democratic system itself in some literature is said to be due to the weakness of liberal democratic institutions; this is noted by modernist theory. Then, development experts argue that the emergence of democracy is caused by the low economic growth of the community. Furthermore, in the latest research on kinship politics in Indonesia itself, it is said that a paradigm error causes kinship politics in the practice of implementing liberal democracy (Mariana & Husin, 2017, p. 90). The phenomenon of kinship politics and kinship itself has several records, (1) there is an intense desire for the incumbent to maintain power by forming a political family at the local level. (2) the formation of kinship politics has the support from major parties or political elites (Purwaningsih, 2015, p. 112).

Another opinion states that the phenomenon of kinship politics in Indonesia itself is built on paternalistic relationships through populist program retribution. This encourages increased popularity and closeness between leaders and the people (Effendi, 2018, p. 240). This is also supported by the development of literature on patron-client that occurred. For example, Roback and Vinzant (1994) describe the phenomenon as a "personnel cult", in which managers and executives develop patronage networks within the bureaucracy to build or increase their own power within the organization. The use of patronage in the initial formation of the nation is indeed an important part. For example, in the case in America, where a lot of pressure at the beginning caused restrictions on political activity to occur in prominent families (Bearfield, 2009, p. 65).

The kinship and dynastic politics emerged as described above because of the patron-client problem where according to Berenschot (2018), it is possible for kinship politics actors to be able to gain public participation through mobilizing campaign funds and distributing state profits based on their relationship to electoral support (Hicken, 2011, p. 290). Furthermore, the patron-client is also caused by volition, which refers to the possibility of the emergence of a patron-client, namely power, coercion, need and demand, or voluntarily based on certain obligations (Muno, 2010). Furthermore, in Berenschot's research (2018), the pattern of patron-client is formed due to the concentration of control over economic activity where it hinders public space and hinders

adequate supervision and discipline of the political business elite.

The rise of kinship politics relations is also based on the perspective of the costs incurred by the patron-client, where voters or people who have the right to vote are poor, so they are more risk-averse and more tempted by the benefits of kinship politics itself (Brusco et al., 2004). This often happens in the case of the incumbent, where the incumbent has several advantages that can be used to build patron-client relationships that lead to kinship politics. Several studies have found some of the advantages of incumbency, wherein candidate-centered electoral systems such as the one in states in America; it was found that incumbents have a greater chance of winning (Fowler & Hall, 2014). Furthermore, concerning the creation of political kinship, the incumbent can be defined as the owner of the house or office, increasing connection, political intimacy, and name recognition that the incumbent's successor can utilize.

Table 1. List of Names of Candidates for Regional Heads in the 2020 Regional Head Elections Pilkada and Their Kinship Affiliations

No.	Name of Regional Head Candidate	Family Affiliation
1	Gibran Rakabuming (Surakarta)	Son of President Joko Widodo
2	Bobby Afif Nasution (Medan)	Son-in-law of President Joko Widodo
3	Pilar Saga Ichsan (South Tangerang)	Son of Ratu Tatu Chasanah (Regent of Serang)
4	Rezita Melyani (Indagiri Hulu)	Wife of Yopi Arianto (Regent of Indragiri Hulu)
5	Hanindhito Himawan Pramana (Kediri)	Son of Cabinet Secretary, Pramono Agung
6	Eva Dwiana (Lampung)	Wife of Herman Hasanusi (Mayor of Bandar Lampung)
7	Kustini Sri Purnomo (Sleman)	Wife of Sri Purnomo (Regent of Sleman)
8	Marlin Agustina (Riau Islands)	Wife of Muhammad Rudi (Mayor of Batam)
9	Ipuk Fiestiandani (Banyuwangi)	Wife of Azwar Anas (Regent of Banyuwangi)
10	Ratu Tatu Chasanah (Serang)	Sister of Ratu Atut (Governor of Banten)
11	Titik Masudah (Mojokerto)	Sister of the Minister of Manpower, Ida Fauziyah
12	Ikfina (Mojokerto)	Wife of Mustofa Kamal (Regent of Mojokerto)
13	Omy Anwar (Ngawi)	Son of Budi Sulistiyono (Regent of Ngawi)
14	Sri Mulyani (Klaten)	Wife of Sunarna (Regent of Klaten)

Source: Bayu (2020) and Antara (2020)

The above phenomenon is similar to the party label relationship, family names can function as their brand or reputation to voters (Fiva & Smith, 2018). Table 1 is the data that shows the pattern above, which occurred in the 2020 Regional Head Elections.

In general, according to a survey from the Nagara Institute, during the 2020 Regional Head Elections, there were 124 candidates with kinship politics spread evenly in 270 electoral regions. In terms of distribution, South Sulawesi Province became the area with the highest number of candidates for political kinship with 12 people, followed by North Sulawesi with 11 people. The following position was Central Java with ten candidates and finally East Java with nine candidates (Pakpahan, 2020a).

The case of the 2020 Regional Head Elections, related to kinship politics that the media have highlighted in President Joko Widodo. This spotlight was caused by the inclusion of the President's son and son-in-law as Mayors. The President's family is a new figure in the political world. Still, they have the support of a major political party in which President Joko Widodo is involved, namely the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) (Sicca, 2020). Furthermore, another interesting case in the phenomenon of kinship politics in Indonesia is the political kinship that occurred in Klaten Regency, Central Java Province. Started by Haryanto Wibawa who was the Regent of Klaten for the 2000-2005 period, after Haryanto stepped down and was replaced by Sunarna with Sri Hartini who was Haryanto's wife, the end of the regent's term made Sri Hartini run with Sri Mulyani, who is Sunarna's wife. Then in the 2020 Regional Head Election, Sri Mulyani ran for office and won (Irfani, 2020).

An interesting phenomenon related to kinship politics in the 2020 Regional Head Elections occurred in Ngawi Regency, East Java Province. The two-term regent Budi Sulistiyono, in the 2020 Regional Head Election, still wanted to stretch his power even if he had to step down as deputy regent by accompanying his son, Ony Anwar (Antara, 2020). Ironically, kinship politics in Indonesia can be recognized as having high popularity among the voting public. Based on the preliminary vote count results by the General Elections Commission, several regional head candidates who have kinship relations with national and regional political figures succeeded in winning the 2020 Regional Head Elections (Bayu, 2020). Further data also confirms the same thing. Through the recapitulation of the 2020

Regional Head Elections, the number of regional head candidates who have kinship relations with the rulers or incumbents turns out to be superior (Pakpahan, 2020b).

President Joko Widodo indirectly already has a name or brand label in the voting public. Previously, he served as Mayor of Solo, Governor of DKI Jakarta, and currently President of Indonesia. This made the people of Solo and Medan interpret it as a positive thing related to the Joko Widodo brand and subsequently caused President Joko Widodo's son and son-in-law to become mayors. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former President of Indonesia, also has a brand of "name" which is quite popular to appoint Indrata Nur Bayuaji as the Regent of Pacitan in the 2020 Regional Head Election. Then, in the Klaten case, it was also evident about the benefits of incumbency, where it seemed that before the general election, she was exposed to a sharp spotlight by placing a photo of herself on hand sanitizer aid from the Ministry of Social Affairs (Bramasta, 2020). This is an advantage because she is an incumbent, so she has authority over the organization's ownership. Another example is the case of Banyuwangi Regency, where Azwar Anas, who has high popularity, raised public trust to support his wife in winning the 2020 Regional Head Election.

The popularity of candidates who have kinship politics affiliations is not only based on the "good name" label from the family. Many candidates with kinship politics affiliations still won the 2020 Regional Head Election, despite the family affiliation scandal, namely cases of abuse of authority. For example, in the case of Ratu Tatu, who still won the Regional Head Election despite the corruption case of her sister, Ratu Atut (Putsanra, 2017). Another case occurred in Mojokerto Regency where Ikfina still won the 2020 Regional Head Election despite her husband, Mustofa Kamal, who was involved in a corruption case (Faizal, 2019).

Based on cases of kinship politics in Indonesia and some literature related to kinship politics in many countries, it can be concluded that the implementation of kinship politics as described above both from families affiliated with national political figures and regional political figures, including on democratic issues that lead to patrons-clients, and the popularity gained by kinship politics is related to the benefits of incumbency. The benefits of family names are also an essential part of the popularity of kinship politics itself. The explanation above is

fundamental by paying attention to the debate about how the pathology of the democratic system emerges, such as dynastic politics; it is necessary to know that if kinship politics and dynastic politics are not resolved, it will cause many problems. Political kinship itself will cause power to be controlled by only one group, which can have great potential in terms of abuse of power, for example, corruption in local governments (Pakpahan, 2020a).

B. Implications of Kinship Politics and Alternative Solutions

Through the decision of the Constitutional Court (MK) Number 33/PUU-XIII/2015, regarding the review of Law Number 8 of 2015 concerning Amendments to Law Number 1 of 2015 concerning Government Regulations in Lieu of Law on the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors (Regional Head Elections Law) against the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD NRI 1945), the public considers that the Constitutional Court has declared the practice of kinship to be a legal practice following the constitution of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Kartika, 2015, p. 1). This, in turn, has sparked concern among political researchers as well as the general public. This concern does not become a mere issue considering that data from the Ministry of Home Affairs also shows that since the implementation of the direct Regional Head Elections of 2005-2014, there have been 59 elected regional heads and deputy regional heads who have blood ties (Kementerian Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia, 2013). In 2015, there were 61 regional heads (Nugroho, 2016). Furthermore, the data in the previous discussion also confirms that there is an increase in dynastic politics or kinship politics in the implementation of Regional Head Elections in Indonesia.

The trend of dynastic or kinship politics is indeed following Mosca's concerns. Each class displays a tendency to become hereditary; even when political positions are open to the public, the role of the ruling family will still have many advantages (Susanti, 2017, p. 112). The practice of dynastic or kinship politics in Indonesia has negative implications for the development of democracy, bureaucracy, and the people itself. In the literature on political practice in Indonesia, it is said that the implications, if kinship politics continue to occur in the context of local government, will destroy local democracy. For example, it can be seen in the number of regional head candidates who have kinship politics

affiliations against the empty boxes in the 2020 Regional Head Elections. In East Java, two candidates have a kinship background against the empty box, namely Kediri Regency and Ngawi Regency ([Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2021](#)).

The following case related to the incumbent advantage occurred in North Sumatra Province, where Ir. Lakhomizaro Zebua, Mayor of Gunungsitoli for the 2010-2011 and 2016-2021 period, fought an empty box in the 2020 Regional Head Election. Still, in the same province, North Sumatra Province, Dosmar Banjarnahor is the incumbent Regent of Humbang Hasundutan; he fought the empty box and won the 2020 Regional Head Election ([Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2021](#)). Another implication caused by kinship politics is the failure of public services and the ease with which the rule of law can be violated; this is related to not capable and incompetent politicians who have strategic positions in determining policies and public interests ([Mariana & Husin, 2017, p. 94](#)).

Other research on the practice of kinship politics leads to the spread of violence due to patronage networks. This is related to state officials, businesspeople, and police officers using political networks or connections as opportunities (business) which result in local actors providing incentives in any form to raise their names ([Berenschot, 2018](#)). This case can be seen in the violation of the neutrality of the State Civil Apparatus in the implementation of the 2020 Regional Head Elections. Referring to the data from the State Civil Apparatus Commission (KASN), as of July 31, 2020, there were reports of 456 violations, of which 27.6% were committed by high leadership positions, 25.4% by functional positions, and 14.3% by administrator positions ([Komisi Aparatur Sipil Negara, 2020](#)). Based on the report, the ten regional agencies that committed the most violations were Wakatobi Regency, Sukoharjo Regency, West Nusa Tenggara Province, Dompu Regency, Bulukumba Regency, Banggai Regency, Ministry of Education and Culture, Makassar City, Supiori Regency, and Muna Regency ([Purnawan, 2020](#)).

Furthermore, other research on the practice of kinship politics is said to have implications for moral hazard problems, which will harm candidates who have no family affiliation with the previous leader. The practice of kinship politics will also have repercussions for dynastic individuals who have low levels of education to suppress the quality of the service itself ([Geys, 2017, p. F474](#)). According to Dwipayana (as cited

in [Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, 2015](#)), the rampant practice of kinship politics in Indonesia will result in the recruitment and regeneration process of political parties being stalled, so that massive kinship politics will occur in various regions and cause corruption both in natural and regional resources as well as sources of state revenue. Concerning the phenomenon of kinship politics in Indonesia, there are several names of regents or mayors, as well as governors who have a kinship politics background committing corruption crimes, including (1) Ratu Atut Chosiyah (Governor of Banten 2007-2017), (2) Atty Suharti (Mayor of Cimahi 2012-2017), (3) Sri Hartini (Regent of Klaten 2016-2021), (4) Yan Anton Ferdian (Regent of Banyuasin 2013-2018), (5) Syaukani Hasan Rais (Regent of Kutai Kertanegara 1999-2010), (6) Fuad Amin (Regent of Bangkalan 2003-2012) ([Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2017](#)).

Based on reports from various cases in Indonesia, kinship or dynastic politics in practice follows the implications described by the literature. The practice of kinship politics through research conducted by [Setyaningrum and Saragih \(2019\)](#) also shows that it harms the performance of local governments. This can be seen from the sample of local governments in Indonesia during 2010-2015 who have a family political background. The negative implications arising from the phenomenon of kinship politics, as described above, have a high urgency to find solutions to them.

C. Alternative Solutions for Suppressing the Development of Kinship Politics

The previous explanation explains the causes of the rise of kinship politics, one of which is the pattern of patron-client who then forms a patronage network. This pattern of patronage networks causes candidates for regional heads who have kinship relations with incumbents or with other regional heads, to have the advantage of both social capitals, namely human networks that have been connected by relatives who previously became incumbents, as well as material capital that must be owned by candidates who have a kinship with incumbents or other regional heads. Based on this, the steps that can be taken to stop the widespread practice of kinship politics in Indonesia is to break the patronage network itself.

Termination of patronage networks can be done through political party reform or

institutionalization of political parties. Political parties in a democratic party are important actors, before the participation of the public as voters are used. Political parties have a role in the selection of candidates for regional heads. So that the termination of the patronage network of prospective regional head candidates can be done through improving the regeneration of political parties, structuring members of party organizations that need to be carried out in a transparent and accountable manner. Several cases of failure to regenerate political parties, for example, occurred in the Democrat Party, where the son of the chairman of the party, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, where he had no background in joining a political party, then he was appointed as the new party chairman to replace his father.

Some literature does explain that kinship politics in the implementation of democracy is a natural thing. Kinship politics itself occurs in the United States, but the implications arising from the practice of kinship politics can be a consideration for taking immediate action so that this practice can be stopped. Political party reform through a transparent and merit-based recruitment and selection mechanism can be used to stop patronage networks. The structure of political parties needs to be improved first so that the bad pattern of the party's internal patronage network can be resolved. The implication of this internal handling will be to facilitate the control of political parties to choose prospective candidates who do have the ability to lead.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the explanation above, it can be seen that the current political condition in Indonesia is not doing well. The process of the regional head elections as one way to realize democracy in Indonesia is in fact still dominated by the practice of kinship politics. Kinship politics in its implementation has succeeded in forming local political dynasties in various regions and this has increased throughout the Regional Head Elections implementation period in Indonesia. Based on a literature review, in fact, the practice of kinship politics has not only struck Indonesia, but many other democracies have also experienced the same thing, for example in America.

The cause of the emergence of kinship politics is still a matter of debate. However, in general, it can be concluded that kinship politics in Indonesia occurs as a result of the pattern of patron-client

relationships that are still inherent in democratic culture since the New Order era. The pattern of patron-client relationships can be seen from the advantages of incumbent regional head candidates who often implement patron-client-based policy programs to increase popularity. Also, the emergence of supporting networks by incumbent candidates in the bureaucracy so as to further facilitate the practice of kinship politics.

The widespread practice of kinship politics in Indonesia is considered quite worrying and has a high urgency to resolve it immediately. This is considering the implications that arise when there is omission. According to the literature, there are two implications for the implementation of kinship politics, namely positive and negative, but negative implications dominate when compared to positive implications. The political kinship that occurs has positive implications when it comes to the recruitment time process, where this will save time in the selection of candidates. However, this has negative implications for the problem of moral hazard, where other candidates do not have the same opportunity when compared to candidates who are affiliated with kinship politics.

Other negative implications are also found in the many violations of bureaucratic governance and abuse of authority. This is found in the number of corruption cases that tend to be carried out by regions affiliated with kinship politics. Furthermore, the good governance index also experienced a decline in regions affiliated with kinship politics. Based on the above explanation, both regarding the pattern of the formation of kinship politics in Indonesia, as well as its implications, the government as the main controller in the bureaucratic process will be right if it immediately finds a way out of this problem. The emergence of the Constitutional Court's decision has implications for the ease with which kinship politics in Indonesia is implemented, it should begin to be re-evaluated.

An alternative solution suggestion based on the explanation above is the reform of political parties, where political parties are important actors to be able to break the established patronage network. Political parties are expected to be able to implement the arrangement of their party members through the mechanism of recruitment and selection of members in a transparent manner and based on a merit system. The public also needs to carry out socialization and political education, so that they can determine the choice of regional heads who do have the ability to lead the community.

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