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## Public Perception

### Kinship Politics in the 2020 Solo Regional Head Election

Muhammad Iqbal, Helen Dian Fridayani

**Abstract:** This paper aims to study the development the dynasty politics phenomenon in Solo, especially from the public perspective after the 2020 regional head election. Gibran, the son of the President of the Republic of Indonesia ran as a candidate for mayor of Solo. Gibran involvement during the regional head election raised pros and cons in Indonesia. The practice of kinship politics in Indonesia is increasingly worrying. The reason is that most of the regulations tend to preserve the oligarchy. The flourishing of kinship politics, especially in the regions, cannot be separated from the role of political parties and regulations on regional head election. The study used quantitative approach with questionnaires and literature review. The results were processed using SmartPLS 3.0 software with four independent variable: network strength, position in the party, unequal democracy, and capital. The study showed that only two independent variables influenced the occurrence of kinship politics: network strength and capital. This led to talks about the community on political issues, President Jokowi, and changed his leadership image, from previously seen as a president that does not involve families in political matters.

**Keywords:** kinship politics; public perception; regional head election; political party

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## I. Introduction

The issue of political leadership has always been an interesting discussion among the public. One interesting issue is kinship politics. Due to the widespread kinship politics that spanned from regional to the national level, it is difficult to implement democracy. The phenomenon of leaders from the circle of close families is a never-ending polemic.

Kinship politics are a form of control over the government. Kinship politics in the traditional sense occurs when the rulers try to place their families and relatives in strategic positions to build a political empire in the government (Akbar & Purnomo, 2019).

This is carried out with the purpose that the members of the kinship politics support each other to gain executive, legislative, and judicial power. Placing family or relatives in strategic positions will make it easier for the ruler to control everything they need (Sembiring & Simanihuruk, 2018). One of the ways is to have a member of kinship politics at the legislative bodies, namely National Legislative Branch, Provincial Legislative Branch, Local Legislative Branch, and Senate.

As a representative institution of the people, the member of the legislative bodies are elected by the people through general elections. Representing issues to be fought in parliament has always been a weapon for politicians to get votes from their supporters. In every election, it is not uncommon for the same politicians to nominate and even bring their families to vote for them (Fiva & Smith, 2018).

Discussing the issue of democracy in Indonesia is inextricably linked to kinship politics, which appears to run counter to the spirit of democracy. How is it possible that Kinship politics has become such a heated subject in Indonesian politics today? Democracy in Indonesia has its ups and downs. The main problem faced by the Indonesian people is how to improve economic life and build a democratic, social, and political life in a society with a variety of cultures and customs. This problem revolves around the formulation of a political system that produces strong enough leadership to carry out economic development and national character building with the people's participation and avoiding individual, party, or military dictatorships. In a democratic country like Indonesia, we highly respect the issue of freedom and human rights (Bimantara, 2018). However, freedom is not without limits. The rules made by the government still binds this freedom (Fitri,

2019). Unlimited freedom can harm democracy; in the end, it can have a negative impact, such as the rise of kinship politics that is increasingly widespread in Indonesia.

In principle, this kinship politics practices are incompatible with the democratic system. The democratic system has several characteristics, such as limited government power, the rule of law, and the prohibition of acting arbitrarily against its citizens (Sikarwar, 2021). Kinship politics in Indonesia is synonymous with the consolidation of power in particular political families. If a region is governed by a few political elites, kinship politics will flourish. This is an inescapable phenomenon under Indonesia's democratic and regional autonomy systems, which demand significant political expenses and strong political networks. Only a few people have access to power under these circumstances.

The presence of kinship politics at the regional to national levels makes it difficult to implement democracy (Purwaningsih, 2015b). The flourishing of kinship politics, especially in the regions, cannot be separated from the role of political parties and regulations on regional election. The political parties' candidacy and nomination mechanisms fail to work properly due to the oligarchy within the party. There has been a tendency that the political parties nominate their candidates based on the wishes of the party elites, not through a democratic mechanism that considers the ability and integrity of the candidates (Labonne et al., 2019). At the same time, kinship politics continues to build strong networks of power to maintain their influence within the party, both at the regional and national levels. It can be said that kinship politics can control and kill democracy in political parties. In the community itself, there are also signs of efforts to maintain the status quo in the region by encouraging families or people close to the regional head to replace the incumbent (Susanti, 2017).

In an ideal democracy, the people should have a greater chance of being involved in the political process. This means that there is an opportunity for all to compete for political positions, ranging from regional to national levels, following the applicable laws and regulations. Due to kinship politics, people's participation is hindered by their status or social rights (Barkov et al., 2020). Democracy originally means political power or government-run from the people, by the people, and for the people. In Indonesia's democracy, kinship politics has created political pragmatism

by nominating the incumbent's families as public officials (Guritno et al., 2018).

The practice of kinship politics illustrates that political parties' recruitment process for regional heads and deputy regional heads is not carried out democratically and transparently (van Coppenolle, 2017). Literature studies show that most political parties are pragmatic by placing candidates who have popularity (voter recognition of candidates) and electability (voters' desire to vote) based on the results of public opinion surveys and who have their own capital (Skoda & Bag, 2018).

Nagara Institute (Chaniago, 2017) noted that 124 regional heads candidates had kinship ties. They consist of wives, children, or close families of the current or previous regional heads. This figure is much higher compared to the 2015–2018 regional elections, where only 86 candidates were related to kinship politics. Regarding the 2020 election, many perspectives emerged with Gibran's candidacy as a Mayor of Solo during Jokowi's second term. Although participating in politics does not violate human rights, there are political ethics that could be violated by the presence of President Jokowi's close family (Nurkhalis, 2012). Ideally, political power in a democratic country should be oriented from the people to the people. Unfortunately, abuse of power and the emergence of political policies that only benefit certain oligarchs or maintain the power of a party or a person are rife, especially by officials with kinship politics (Thalhah, 2009). A survey by Kompas noted that 60.8 percent of respondents considered kinship politics as bad. Young respondents (17–30 years) have a greater resistance to kinship politics (67.9 percent) (Kustiasih & Pattisina, 2020).

Kinship politics is the antithesis of the thought that democracy is the way out of monarchy and oligarchy. Monarchy is a type of government led by a ruler (Muraoka, 2018). The monarchy passes on its power to the heirs, in this case, the family. In this context, leaders, with all their power, pass on or give the power to their children or family. Like the Atut Chosiyah family in Banten and Yasin Limpo family in South Sulawesi, which show a tendency that political players transfer their political power to their family members to build, inherit, and strengthen the family's power and monopolize the electoral system (Chaniago, 2017).

Of course, this kinship politics is incompatible with the democratic system. A democratic system has limited government power, a legal state that is

subject to the rule of law and is more careful about treating its citizens. Kinship politics emerged naturally. The families of the incumbent elites are encouraged to continue to hold power in the government that their predecessors have (Geys & Smith, 2017).

Viewed from the normative constitution, it confirms that every citizen has the same rights before the law, including in participating in or running for regional head candidates or higher public offices (Geys & Smith, 2017).

However, the practice of kinship politics is increasingly unsettling and, of course, can harm democracy. Kinship politics produces premature leaders who are not yet ready. They became leaders just because they were born in political families. This happens, of course, because there is no prohibition in the laws (Muraoka, 2018). A good leader is a leader who rises from the bottom and shows that he has the ability and track record. Kinship politics contradicts the above understanding because it is based on personal interests. Furthermore, the concept of democracy that we accept emphasizes legitimacy and the reproduction of power that involves the people (Fiva & Smith, 2018).

Robert A Dahl, in *Dilemma of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control*, states that one of the seven criteria for a consolidated democracy is that every adult citizen has the right to run in elections, and every voter has the right to receive alternative information protected by law (Dahl, 1983). Marcus Mietzner, in his study entitled *Indonesia's 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of the Party System*, states that the practice of kinship politics in Indonesia is not healthy for democracy since it caused control over the government to weaken. Potentially, abuse of power may occur (Mietzner, 2009).

Some of the problems that resulted in kinship politics were difficult to stem. First, the loss of mass political support for political parties. The political power of the masses that are supposed to strengthen political parties does not exist (Anggariani, 2013). Mass politics in Indonesia is only seasonal, used as a tool to build the voters' interests ahead of the regional head, legislative, and presidential elections (Purwaningsih, 2015a). After the election, the political power of the masses is no longer exists.

With the rife kinship politics, people will likely presented with political actors from the same family. Kinship politics takes various forms, such as encouraging families to continue to hold power

using democratic system. Factors that led to the emergence of kinship politics are position in the party, strength of its network, strength of its capital, unequal democracy (Susanti, 2017). Candidate selection is also determined centrally by the party's Central Executive Board.

The Law on Regional Head Election regulates the general requirements for regional head and deputy regional head candidates and ensures every citizen's constitutional rights to run as a candidate. The Constitutional Court Decision has removed requirements limiting the citizen constitutional rights, such as regulations limiting the political rights of candidates with kinship backgrounds (Susanti, 2017).

After the publication of the Constitutional Court Decision No. 33/PUU-XIII/2015, several candidates from incumbent families advanced in the 2015 regional head election. Afterward, it continued to be practiced on the pretext of guaranteeing every citizen's freedom in political participation and candidacy, resulting in kinship politics practices in the political system and government that were increasingly widespread (Prabowo & Hartati, 2019).

Referring to the decision of Constitutional Court No. 33/PUU-XIII/2015, it seems that kinship politics cannot be avoided in Indonesia's democracy. There are two views on kinship politics (Sembinging & Simanihuruk, 2018). First, those who are optimistic that kinship politics will not damage the foundations of democracy feel that all citizens have the right to be involved in the political process. There is nothing wrong if some family members of officials who wish to enter politics, and it is not their fault that they are elected and hold political positions. After all, those who win are those who can take advantage of political resources and capital, as well as the candidates' abilities. Besides, a candidates' victory is not because their family members are incumbent officials but because of the party's good electoral performance.

Second, those who are not optimistic feel that based on reality, kinship politics is a threat. There were 124 candidates for regional heads supported by kinship politics in the 2020 elections. It showed an increase from 86 candidates in 2015, 2017, and 2018. Of the 124 candidates, 67 were males, and 57 were females. Of the 57 female candidates, 29 were the wives of the previous regional head or incumbent. If there is no limitation, Indonesia will see more and more kinship politics in the regions. Kinship politics negatively impact the opportunity for people outside the kinship relations to

compete in regional head elections since it wanted to distribute the political power based on lineage and kinship instead of leadership qualities, common goals, decisions, and track records. The preservation and institutionalization of kinship politics were made possible by money-politics (Suryatwan, 2020). Democracy is affected in such a way that there is no longer a space for contesting ideas, programs, and ideologies. It merely acts as a market for buying and selling transactions of individual and kinship interests.


The pseudo-democracy serves as a market for transactions of private interests by using the tools of democracy such as political parties, state institutions, and the mass media. Instead of supporting the democratic system, the tools are manipulated to support the oligarchy system (Thalhah, 2009).

Kinship politics occur in political practices in various countries. President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) started his political career as Mayor of Solo in the 2005 regional election and was re-elected for the second term. President Jokowi's victory could not be separated from the support of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). Gibran had used the same path that Jokowi had taken at the start of his political career by becoming a candidate for the Mayor of Solo in the December 2020 regional head election. Gibran's candidacy during Jokowi's 2nd term generated many opinions. However, Gibran's candidacy did not violate human rights, although his close relation to the current president might cause political ethics to be infringed.


The desire to hold a political office is undeniably aimed at gaining legitimacy of power and authority. In a democratic country, ideally, political power should be from the people and for the people. Unfortunately, abuse of power and the emergence of political policies that only benefit certain oligarchs or maintain the party/personal gain are rife, especially by officials with kinship politics. The desire for political power made kinship politics one of the most widely used strategies, although the candidates' political talents also needed to win an election. Kinship politics made the political influence, in the form of the accumulated power and political networks, possessed by incumbent political officials (in this case, Jokowi, the current president) to be used by his kin (Gibran) with his candidacy.

Jokowi's eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, and Teguh Prakosa led significantly over the Bagyo-Supardjo pair in the Solo regional head election (Febriyanti & Karina, 2021). The Gibran-

Teguh pair won 87.15% of the votes based on the quick count of Charta Politika. Jokowi's son-in-law, Bobby Nasution, paired with Aulia Rachman, beat the Akhyar Nasution-Salman Al Farisi pair in the Medan regional head election. The Bobby-Aulia pair gained 55.29% of the votes based on the quick count of Charta Politika. Gibran's victory has made Jokowi the first president in Indonesia who has children as regional heads. Jokowi made this new historical record in just six years of his leadership.



**Figure 1.** The Results of the 2020 Local Election for the City of Solo



**Figure 2.** The Results of the 2020 Local Elections for the City of Medan

Other winners of the 2020 regional head election supported by kinship politics are Hanindhito Himawan Permana and Pilar Saga Ichsan. Hanindhito Himawan Permana is the son of Cabinet Secretary Pramono Anung. Based on the KPU Sirekap Apps results, he and his partner Dewi Mariya had a landslide lead over the empty box with 76.8% in the Kediri regional elections. Benyamin Davnie, the incumbent Vice Mayor of Tangerang, was paired with Pilar Saga Ichsan as a candidate for Mayor and Vice Mayor of Tangerang during the 2020 regional head election. Pilar is the nephew of the Mayor of South Tangerang, Airin Rachmi Diany, whose term will end this in 2021, and the son of the Regent of Serang Ratu Tatu Chasanah. The Benyamin-Pilar pair won 41.86% of the votes. They are superior to the other two candidates, Muhammad-Saraswati Djojohadikusumo (34.42%) and Azizah Ma'ruf-Ruhmaben (23.72%). The 2020 South Tangerang regional election is a battle between national and local kinship politics (Darmansyah et al., 2020), since Saraswati is the nephew of the Minister of Defense Prabowo Subianto and Azizah, Vice President Ma'ruf Amin's son.

Pilar's mother, Ratu Tatu, won the Serang regional head election again. Ratu Tatu and her running mate Pandji Tirtayasa gained 62.56% of the votes based on LSI Denny JA's quick count. While her opponent, Nasrul Ulum-Eki Baihaki, only gained 37.44% of the votes. Pilar and Ratu Tatu's victory shows that the kinship politics of former Banten Governor Ratu Atut Chosiyah is still powerful. Ratu Tatu is Atut's sibling, and Pilar is Atut's nephew. Atut is currently in prison due to the bribery case of the regional head election in Lebak, which also dragged the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court Akil Mochtar.

Gibran Rakabuming's emergence in the Solo Election sphere for the candidate of Mayor for the 2020-2025 term had elicited varied responses from the public. It was viewed as the start of the Jokowi's kinship politics, although it was merely a preliminary survey. Jokowi has a significant capital to develop kinship politics legally, particularly since the Constitutional Court "allowed kinship politics" in its decision on July 8, 2015.

In a trial presided over by Arief Hidayat, the then-Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, the institution revoked Article 7 letter (r) of Law Number 8 of 2015 concerning Regional Election. This article prohibited individuals with blood or marital ties (father, mother, in-laws, uncles, aunts, brothers, sister, brothers-in-law, children, and

sons-in-law) to the incumbent leaders from running for regional offices (Governor, Regent, or Mayor). According to the Constitutional Court, the best way to execute democracy is to engage as much community participation as possible in the political process. Although limitations are necessary to ensure that public officials perform their obligations, they must not impede the fundamental rights of individuals. As a result, family members, relatives, and groups connected to the incumbent were able to run as candidates in the simultaneous regional elections in December 2015, rather than waiting for the incumbent's term to be over. The Constitutional Court found that the laws banning conflicts of interest with the incumbents caused significant disparities in treatment based on one's birth and kinship status during its review.

Based on existing data, the political network of kinship politics will not be eliminated only due to regulation. Other factors would replace it. One way to ensure fair competition in politics (or business) is for the bureaucracy that oversees the electoral process (or economy) to be competent, transparent, and responsible. Based on this background, this study aimed to analyze the public perception of kinship politics toward the 2020 regional head election. Understanding public perceptions regarding this phenomenon are necessary for evaluating the kinship politics in Indonesia.

## II. Methods

This study used a quantitative method with questionnaires and a literature review to obtain data to analyze the phenomenon. The population of this study was those with voting rights in regional head elections in Solo. The total population was 418,283 people. Based on this population, the number of samples in this study was 400 respondents. The determination of the sample size is using the slovin formula with a margin of error of 5%. The answers to the questionnaires were processed using SmartPLS 3.0 software.

With the rise of kinship politics, people will likely be presented with political actors from the same family. Kinship politics takes various forms, such as encouraging families to hold power using democratic system. The following factors led to the emergence of kinship politics: position in the party, network strength, capital strength, and unequal democracy (Susanti, 2017). Those factors were the variable or hypotheses in this study.

Kinship politics occurs when power is practically handed down through generations based on kinship for the benefit of certain political elites to gain or maintain power. Position in the party can determine which person to choose as a candidate to represent the party. Networks or relationships are one of the political strategies for the survival of power. The economic or capital strength is one of the tools to move and lubricate the political machinery to get a positive response and influence the community. In an election, money is the driving force of the political machine, for example, for conducting campaigns, making banners, and provide transport money for the candidates' support teams. Lastly, in every election, whether for regional heads, national legislatures or at the lowest level, namely village heads, there are many frauds committed by individual actors for their interests and gains. The elites often targeted problems at the grassroots level to gain public support by promising various programs that are rarely fulfilled. It is difficult to deny that the power obtained by kinship politics leads to abuse of power, and usually, most of the positions and facilities provided by the state are used for personal interests or certain groups (Susanti, 2017).

The hypothesis in this study was:




Figure 3. Research Framework

## III. Results and Discussion

The 2020 regional head election had made a new history. Since the implementation of direct elections, for the first time, the president's son won the most votes in the election. Gibran made the decision when he expressed his interest in

running as a candidate in Solo regional head election in 2020. In 2019, he registered himself with the Democratic party and ran as a candidate for Solo's Mayor with Teguh Prakosa. Gibran-Teguh was overwhelmingly superior to his opponent, Bagyo-Supardjo (Bajo). This study tested the variables or factors that affect the 2020 regional head election in Solo.

Hypothesis testing between variables, namely exogenous variables to endogenous variables ( $\gamma$ ), and endogenous variables to exogenous variables ( $\beta$ ) was conducted with the bootstrap resampling method after knowing the validity and reliability of the data. The test statistic used the t statistic or the t-test. The comparative t value in this study was obtained from t-table. The test was declared significant if the T-statistic was  $> 1.96$  and the P values  $< 0.05$  (Varadarajan, 2010). Hypothesis testing was conducted by looking at the output path coefficient of the bootstrap resampling. Results can be seen in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Hypothesis Test Result

Figure 4 shows the results of the research hypothesis test.

### A. Hypothesis 1 Test Results

Ha: Network strength has a significant influence on kinship politics

H0: Network strength has no significant influence on kinship politics

Table 1 shows that Network strength has a significant influence on kinship politics. This means network strength has a dominant role in the nomination and victory of the Gibran-Teguh

Table 1. Hypothesis 1 Network Strength -> Political kinship

Hypothesis	T Statistics	P Values	Result
Network Strength → Political Kinship	2.007	0.045	Supported

pair. Gibran Rakabuming Raka inherited the political network of his father when he served as Mayor of Solo. This network was even stronger because Gibran's father (Joko Widodo) is the Republic of Indonesia's president.

Gibran's nomination as Mayor of Solo was relatively easy. Gibran's candidacy officially began when he received a recommendation from the PDIP Central Leadership Council to be paired with the Secretary DPC PDIP Solo, Teguh Prakosa. PDIP is the leading party supporting Jokowi in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. PDIP is also Jokowi's current party. Gibran obtained further support from the Gerindra Party. Although the Gerindra Party challenged Jokowi in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, the General Chair of the Gerindra Party has joined President Jokowi's cabinet.

PSI also offered further support. Although PSI did not get the ministerial assignment in Jokowi's cabinet, PSI supported Jokowi in the last 2019 presidential election. Furthermore, parties that supported Jokowi at the previous presidential election in 2019, such as Golkar, Nasdem, PPP, and PKB, have positions in Jokowi's cabinet. Only PKS, the opposition party of Jokowi's administration, openly refused to support Gibran-Teguh.

Combining his father's and his own networks, Gibran has an extensive and robust political network. The result in Table 1 shows that the Jokowi network's involvement in building kinship politics is apparent.

Kinship political networks are caused by a ruler's relationship with networks that see the relationship in line with their interests. Interests are vital in forming connections for an exchange in a power network.

In the Indonesian context, an elite group is a group that can influence the political decision-making process. It is relatively easy for them to access power or assert dominance (Mietzner, 2009). The strengthening of the political networks of kinship politics based on its family ties led to diminishing opportunities for political recruitment of those outside the kinship. Turner (Hermansyah & Adi, 2017) explained that a network has an important influence on the dynamics of the

transition to political power, which can have an impact on political recruitment.

**B. Hypothesis 2 Test Results**

Ha: Position in the party has a significant influence on kinship politics

H0: Position in the party has no significant influence on kinship politics

**Table 2.** Hypothesis 2 Position in the party -> Political kinship

Hypothesis	T Statistics	P Values	Result
Position in the party → Political kinship	0.591	0.555	Rejected

Table 2 shows that the position in the party does not significantly influence the formation of Kinship politics in the Solo regional head election.

This result indicated that the candidate's position in the party did not guarantee the occurrence of kinship politics phenomena. Kinship politics will occur if a candidate is close to a leader or influential person in the party. This phenomenon occurred in the Solo regional head election. As a candidate for Mayor of Solo, Gibran did not have a strategic position in party management. Gibran was a new member who just joined in 2019.

Gibran's nomination as Mayor of Solo drew many criticisms internally and externally. Gibran's nomination as a candidate for mayor was seen as a violation of the PDIP party's regulation.

PDIP Party Regulation Number 24 of 2017 mandates through Articles 9, 10, and 11 that DPCs with more than 25 percent of legislative votes use a closed recruitment and selection system or mechanism. PDIP party rules also require regional head candidates to be selected from cadres who have been party members for three years.

However, this regulation was overruled by the recommendation of the PDIP chairman on the nomination of Gibran as Mayor of Solo.

The charismatic figure in the central leadership is very dominant in determining the party's candidates for the regional head. Despite having a mechanism for the nomination and candidate selection, the final decision is based on the recommendation of the party's central leadership.

Conflicts in the nomination of recruitment and selection of candidates for regional heads can occur horizontally between party elites because

of competition at the same level; it can also occur vertically when there is no agreement between the regional and the central leadership on nomination of a candidate. This phenomenon supports the findings of (Amundsen, 2016), which show that kinship politics is not influenced by position in the party but by personal relationships and closeness.

Democracy requires leaders' accountability, especially morally, to voters, not to the political parties that carry them (Thalhah, 2009). Leaders must be accountable for their political morale, including their family's involvement in elections while they are in office.

Democracy is the will of the people. The regional leaders are decided by the people, not by the president.

Democracy was born to limit one's power, unlike a monarchy system. Historically, democracy was born as a response to the dictatorship monarchy in the days of Ancient Greece.

Democracy should be against kinship politics. In a democratic society, when the people see kinship politics practices, they should be able to criticize the practice of kinship politics and choose to vote against the kinship power in the elections.

**C. Hypothesis 3 Test Results**

Ha: Unequal Democracy has a significant influence on kinship politics

H0: Unequal Democracy has no significant influence on kinship politics

**Table 3.** Hypothesis 3 Unequal Democracy -> Political kinship

Hypothesis	T Statistics	P Values	Result
Unequal Democracy → Political kinship	1.364	0.173	Rejected

Table 3 shows that unequal democracy does not significantly influence kinship politics practice in the Solo regional head election.

This finding showed that democratic equality drove the emergence of kinship politics in Solo. This result supported the fact that Gibran followed the recruitment process for prospective regional head candidates following the PDIP party mechanism. Gibran also competed with other candidates such as Achmad Purnomo and Teguh Prakosa. The PDIP party still opened its opportunities for other candidates to run for the



Mayor of Solo, although the final decision remains in the hands of the PDIP chairman.

The Constitutional Court (MK) had issued Decision Number 33/PUU-XIII/2015 (Decision No. 33/PUUXIII/2015). This decision examines Law Number 8 of 2015 concerning Amendments to Law Number 1 of 2015 concerning Government Regulations in Lieu of Law for the Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors (regional head election Law) against the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD 1945). This decision was on the constitutionality of the rules in the election law that regional head candidates must not have conflicts of interest with incumbents and regional head candidates who are members of the legislature in regional head elections.

This decision generated pros and cons and public anxiety, especially concerning the incumbent's family's conflicts of interest. The polemic arose because the public viewed that through Decision No. 33/PUU-XIII/2015, the Constitutional Court declared the practice of kinship politics as a legal practice according to Indonesia's constitution. The public viewed that the Constitutional Court's decision had supported kinship politics and legalized the candidacy of the incumbent's families during regional head elections. This concern arose because kinship politics in this country were rising and spreading wider.

In some countries with established democratic systems, such as the United States, Japan, and Singapore, kinship politics is not a problem because the political process is transparent and accountable to obtain a competent leader. Besides, candidates from kinship politics replace an official that is not part of their kinship, and the replacement goes through a transparent process.

Based on the constitution, Gibran has the right to run for office. The 1945 Constitution stipulates that every citizen has the right to vote and be elected. Thus, Gibran's nomination was not violating the state constitution. Gibran's nomination process was also considered to be following the election law. Gibran successfully met the requirements as a candidate for Mayor of Solo. Thus, Gibran's nomination had followed the principles of democracy, as well as the prevailing laws and regulations.

Kinship politics practices will continue if the laws and regulations governing the democratic system do not change. It is challenging to expose abuse of power in kinship politics since each

member tries to protect the other. At first glance, there is nothing wrong with kinship politics. Based on the democratic argument, every citizen has the same right to be elected and to vote. However, it also cannot be denied that kinship politics have damaged the essence of democracy itself.

Kinship politics occurs not only due to the link to a powerful political family. However, if Indonesia wants to be a pioneer and a pilot country in political ethics, then it must manage kinship politics to follow the expectation of a democratic system.

Democracy is synonymous with the concept of a modern state. As such, many countries have begun to implement a democratization process towards a democratic state (Nurkhalis, 2012). Countries that previously held a monarchy system turned into democracy, including Indonesia. Ideally, Indonesia should move away from a monarchy or small kingdoms to democracy after its independence.

Some countries, including Arab nations, still have a monarchy system. On the other hand, a country that claims to be modern and democratic must consistently respect human rights, such as political or constitutional rights. This is in line with the principles of globalization on equal rights in life. Without respect for human rights, it is not a democracy but fascism or totalitarianism (Chaniago, 2017).

#### D. Hypothesis 4 Test Results

Ha: Capital has a significant influence on kinship politics

H0: Capital has no significant influence on kinship politics

**Table 4.** Hypothesis 4 Capital Power -> Political kinship

Hypothesis	T Statistics	P Values	Result
Capital Power → Political kinship	3.431	0.001	Supported

Table 4 shows that Capital Power has a significant influence on Kinship politics.

The result indicated that economic capital could be considered in nominating a regional head. Wealth owned by someone is very influential in society as the necessary capital to achieve a goal or victory.

Aside from being the president's eldest son, Gibran owned some assets as capital to run in the election for the position of Mayor of Solo. Based

on data from [elhkpn.kpk.go.id](http://elhkpn.kpk.go.id) Gibran's assets were IDR21,152,810,130 consisted of land and buildings, transportation, and cash equivalents.

Gibran's land and building assets were scattered in many areas, including Solo and Sragen, with a total of IDR13,400,000,000.

Gibran owned a 2015 Honda Scoopy motorbike of IDR7 million; motorcycle Honda CB 1974 IDR5 million; a Royal Anfield motorcycle in 2017 valued at IDR40 million; Toyota Avanza car IDR2016 IDR90 million; a Toyota Avanza car worth IDR60 million; Isuzu Panther car worth IDR70 million; a Daihatsu Grand Max car worth IDR60 million and a Pajero Sport worth IDR350 million.

Gibran's other movable assets totaled IDR260 million. His cash and cash equivalents were IDR2,154,396,134, and other assets were IDR5,552,000,000. In the LHKPN report, Gibran also had debts of up to IDR895,586,004.

The Gibran-Teguh pair received IDR3,215,436,590 of campaign funds and spent IDR3,215,119,818. The remaining campaign funds were IDR316,772. Their opponents, the Bagyo Wahyono-FX Supardjo pair, had received IDR153,475,000 of campaign funds, spent IDR110,217,386, and the remaining campaign funds were IDR43,257,614.

This phenomenon shows that, in addition to unequal political support from political parties, the regional head election in Solo also indicated an imbalance in campaign spending. This is because the Bagyo-Suparjo pair were not promoted by political parties. This finding supports the findings of [Guritno et al. \(2018\)](#) and [Susanti \(2017\)](#), which reveal that kinship politics flourished due to three factors: (1) capital; (2) network strength; and (3) position in the party.

#### IV. Conclusion

Kinship politics occur in political practice in various countries. The desire for political power made kinship politics one of the most widely used strategies, although the candidates' political talents also needed to win the election. Kinship politics' candidates inherit the political influence possessed by the incumbent official, which, in this case, was President Jokowi, the current president. Undoubtedly the accumulated power and political networks in Jokowi's coalition supported the candidacy of Gibran and Bobby.

In this study, the variables used to measure people's perceptions of kinship politics were network strength, position in political party,

unequal democracy, and capital. The results of this study showed that at least two variables influenced the occurrence of kinship politics: network strength and capital.

The limitation of this study was that it only focuses on one kinship politics candidate in the Solo amongst the many kinship politics candidates during the simultaneous regional head elections.

This study also only measures people's perceptions regarding the kinship politics phenomenon. The author recommends that future researchers examine this phenomenon using the political party organization's approach.

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