



ARTICLE

Received
February 2021

Accepted
May 2021

Published online
May 2021

Author(s)

¹ Corresponding Author
M Saidi Rifki
saidirifky@gmail.com
+62 856-1325-8250
Ministry of Home Affairs of the Republic of
Indonesia
<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5284-7308>

² Mujaeni
muzaeni12@gmail.com
+62 878-2852-4786
Ministry of Home Affairs of the Republic of
Indonesia

President, Kinship Politics, Election 2019, and Its Influence on Regional Head Elections 2020 in Surakarta

M Saidi Rifki, Mujaeni

Abstract: This research departs from the victory of President Joko Widodo's son and son-in-law in the 2020 Regional Head Election. Approximately 44% or 55 candidates of the 124 regional head candidates who have a kinship with the authorities are confirmed to win the 2020 simultaneous Regional Head Election and stroll as regional heads. For this reason, this study will explore the phenomenon of winning candidates exposed to kinship politics, especially with the president in the 2020 Regional Head Election. This research also analyzes some of the causes of nepotism in the democratic system that are still visible in the 2020 simultaneous Regional Head Election. To achieve this goal, the research uses descriptive research methods with a qualitative approach. The method was chosen because the 2020 simultaneous Regional Head Election were multidimensional. The results of the study found several factors that led to kinship politics still coloring the 2020 Regional Head Election, including the advancement of candidates who were exposed to kinship with the president. These factors, such as the popularity of family names, are deliberately carried out by politicians as a way of inheriting power and the weak democratization of political parties, such as recruiting candidates for the regional head. This also led to candidates exposed to kinship with the president in striding to win the Regional Head Election. This research concludes that kinship should be able to lead to moral behavior, not just a pursuit of power. Concerning kinship politics, it can be controlled through internal reforms of political parties as institutions that carry out the role of candidate recruitment.

Keywords: kinship politics; Regional Head Election 2020; kinship; democracy

About the Author(s)

M Saidi Rifki was born in Sukabumi on April 17, 1991. Completed his studies at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta majoring in Communication and Broadcasting. Since 2016 he has worked at the Ministry of Home Affairs in charge of popular publications and scientific publications. He also wrote several scientific articles and often carried out direct research into the field.

Mujaeni was born in Indramayu on May 6, 1995. Completed his studies at the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta, majoring in Islamic Communication and Broadcasting. Since 2019, he has worked at the Ministry of Home Affairs to write and document popular publications.



I. Introduction

This research is about the victory of candidates who are affiliated with kinship politics in the 2020 Regional Head Election. What is meant by kinship politics in this research is politicians who compete in the 2020 Regional Head Election who have a direct or indirect kinship with the current President. This research will look at the winning factors for candidates who are exposed to kinship politics with the president. Apart from that, we want to see the phenomena of political parties that are part of the practice of kinship politics. This research departs from the fact that the 2020 Regional Head Election contest was enlivened by a number of regional head candidates affiliated with kinship politics. Of the 270 regions held, 124 candidates were identified as part of kinship politics. They have a kinship with the authorities. When compared to the 2015 Regional Head Election, the kinship politics in the 2020 simultaneous Regional Head Election increased by 300 percent, from the initial 52 candidates who were related to the family. It is confirmed that 44% or approximately 55 candidates out of 124 regional head candidates who have a kinship with the authorities, won 2020 simultaneous Regional Head Election, and walked to become regional heads. Of the 55 candidates, there are several candidates who are in the public spotlight. Among them are the advancement of President Joko Widodo's eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, who won the election for Mayor of Solo, Jokowi's son-in-law, Bobby Nasution, who also succeeded in becoming Mayor of Medan, as well as a number of other names such as Hanindhito Himawan Permana, son of Cabinet Secretary Pramono Anung and a number of other candidates. Gibran grabbed a vote like fighting an empty box. Likewise, with Hanindhito, based on the results of the General Election Commission (KPU) Electronic Recapitulation Information System (Sirekap), Hanindhito had an overwhelming lead over the empty box with 76.8% in the Kediri Regional Head Election. Then, Pilar Saga Ichsan, who is a candidate for Mayor of South Tangerang, accompanied the incumbent, Benyamin Davnie. He is the nephew of the Mayor of South Tangerang Airin Rachmi Diany and the son of the Regent of Serang Ratu Tatu Chasanah. Similar to Pilar, his mother won the Serang Regional Head Election again. Ratu Tatu who is paired with Pandji Tirtayasa pocketed 64.4% of the votes (Ridho, 2020).

In the history of Indonesian politics, kinship politics has become a natural law. A ruler will pass

his power to his family. In fact, this phenomenon also occurred in the kingdom era. In that era, kinship politics was common. In the current democratic system, kinship politics is manifested in Regional Head Election. The participation of relatives and families in local contestation is supported by the strong influence of family politics that has long been rooted in local and national power circles. So that this supremacy becomes a genealogical political legacy (Aminuddin, 2020).

In addition, the rise of kinship politics cannot be separated from the role of political parties. This is because one of the functions of political parties is to carry out political recruitment (Hamudy & Rifki, 2019b). Therefore, political parties play an important role in generating the names of candidates for regional head candidates. This is in accordance with the regulations of Article 29 Paragraph (1) of Law No. 2 of 2011 on Political Parties. This paragraph emphasizes that political parties recruit Indonesian citizens to become candidates for regional head and deputy regional head.

As a constitution, the practice of kinship politics is legitimate (Intan, 2019). During the process of advancing, prospective candidates who have family ties to state officials do not violate existing regulations. They still have the right to compete in political contestation. The practice of kinship politics is also found not only in Indonesia but in several countries in Asia and even in the United States (Wardani, 2015). Likewise with direct Regional Head Election, which provides opportunities for the people, provided that they can meet the requirements. In fact, not only through political parties but also through independent channels. In the United States, for example, the Bush dynasty perpetuated 2 members of his family to become American presidents. George H. W. Bush was in power between 1988 and 1992 as the 41st president. Then George W. Bush who was also his son became the next president. This fact at least illustrates, even though democracy exists to lead the government, kinship politics remains entrenched in those countries, including Indonesia.

Cases of kinship politics such as those in America are common. This is because America is a country with strong institutions, tight supervision, and a balanced government (Wardani, 2015). It is another matter when kinship politics occurs in countries with developing country systems of government that are still

looking for a form of democracy that is in accordance with the level of development of people. Kinship politics is often seen as a form of a prohibition against certain parties or individuals from participating in Regional Head Election competitions. Kinship politics also correlates with the corrupt behavior of public officials. As a result, democracy was far from expectations. This is because democracy that is currently happening in Indonesia is more of a tool for gaining power (see [Hamudy & Rifki, 2019b, p. 93](#)). In addition, the existence of kinship politics can be dangerous in terms of political ethics because it will hinder political work. The interests of certain groups will be accommodated more than the public interest. Even though democracy provides understanding, power from the people and not for the benefit of the family ([Taher, 2020](#)).

One of the bad examples of kinship politics is the hand-arrest operation (OTT) that occurred to the Klaten Regent Sri Hartini, who was the wife of the former Klaten regent in 2016. She was arrested by the National Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) for the practice of buying and selling positions of the Klaten Regency Government. Prior to the Sri case, the public had known the figure of Ratu Atut Chosiyah because he controlled a number of large projects in the Banten Provincial Government. The political kinship mode is usually carried out by the authorities by placing people who are related by blood, descent, or relatives as public officials. The rulers also placed trusted people in important positions in the government.

Criticism of the practice of kinship politics has also occurred in the Indian government. [Damodaran \(2008\)](#) in his research found that kinship politics controlled various public sectors including sugar factories that supplied various cooperatives. Apart from that, there are also several sectors, such as dairy companies, schools, and banks. Even though it looks democratic by placing some local farmers. However, in reality, the farmer is part of a family of officials who are often involved in local politics. Several cooperatives are also held by local figures whose powers and interests are protected by the Minister, as the goal of maintaining their political career ([Ruud & Nielsen, 2018](#)). Apart from India, Thailand is also not much different. Thompson (2012, pp. 204–220) calls this the Thai network monarchy. Although the institutions appear organized and open, they are only coordinated by a strong circle between the military, leading industry players, and the conservative circle of the state. Even

Thompson also found the practice of kinship politics occurred in Bangladesh and Pakistan (see [Ruud & Nielsen, 2018](#)).

Based on the background above, this study will explore the phenomenon of kinship politics, especially the victories of candidates exposed to kinship with the president in the 2020 Regional Head Election. This research will also analyze some of the causes of nepotism in the democratic system still visible in the 2020 Regional Head Election. Kinship politics is a popular term to describe the progress of candidates who have a kinship with the authorities in elections events such as Regional Head Election. This is important to discuss because Indonesia as a democratic country puts forward the principles of transparency and accountability in need of a leader who truly represents the people according to their capacity.

Research related to kinship politics is actually not the first time it has been reviewed. The focus of research on kinship politics has been widely discussed by a number of researchers both at home and abroad. In Indonesia, [Fitri \(2019\)](#) has examined politicians who perpetuate power through local kinship politics. The results of her research found several factors causing kinship politics, among them being influenced by social, economic, psychological, historical, political, and cultural factors. The next factor is that the absence of periodic restrictions makes candidates who have popularity continue to run as a great opportunity for families to participate in elections at the local level.

Another domestic researcher who examines kinship politics is [Gunanto \(2020\)](#) who comprehensively reveals the developing kinship politics in Indonesia. His research found two ways of kinship politics were carried out by political actors, namely through by design and by accident. By design, because kinship has been strong historically, kinship politics can be regulated by all means. Furthermore, by accident occurs because it occurs in a situation of government succession that suddenly nominates a relative to replace him in order to maintain informal power over his successor if he wins in political contestation. In addition, [Sukri \(2020\)](#) in his research highlighted the kinship politics of Ratu Atut's family in Banten who won the 2015 and 2017. According to him, the Atut family's kinship politics was in the form of an octopussy dynasty by utilizing the power network that had been built by Tubagus Chasan Sochib, Atut's father. To eliminate the negative implications of kinship politics, [Rahayu \(2020\)](#) in

her research suggests several things, including limiting someone from the dynasty. Furthermore, upholding the integrity of administrators such as the General Election Commission (KPU) and the Supervisory Committee (Panwas) in holding Regional Head Election that are honest, fair, and transparent.

Apart from Indonesia, the phenomenon of kinship politics is also a concern of foreign researchers. [Ruud & Nielsen \(2018\)](#) in a study entitled Political Dynasticism: Networks, Trust, Risk stated that kinship politics is a phenomenon in several democratic countries, especially in South Asia. According to him, although kinship politics has received a lot of attention at the national level, it is almost systematically neglected at the regional and local levels. In their research, they argue that kinship politics at the local level is driven by conditions that are crucially different from the conditions that drive national politics. He concluded that kinship politics occurs because of political phenomena that are made possible by certain conditions in government, and especially the character of a country, so that according to him, kinship politics is natural.

Furthermore, researchers from foreign countries who focus on researching kinship politics are [Labonne et al. \(2021\)](#) about women's political representation in elections in the Philippines. Her research focuses on the effect of term limits on women's political representation in an electoral district, which has imposed strict term limits since 1987. Her research shows that term limits lead to a large increase in the number of women running and winning mayoral elections. However, he did not deny that the increase was entirely driven by the female relatives of the incumbent with a limited term of office. Furthermore, his research shows that the different gender impacts of these policies are driven by an adaptive strategy of kinship politics to remain in power ([Labonne et al., 2021](#)).

In contrast to some of the studies above, the focus of this research is not only to explore the root causes of the revival of nepotism and kinship politics in the 2020 Regional Head Election but also to see the victories of candidates exposed to kinship politics with the president. Apart from that, we want to see the phenomena of political parties that are part of the practice of kinship politics. The research also looks at the negative effects of controversial and problematic kinship politics in democracy even though it is recognized by the constitution. For this reason, this study will describe several things related to the proliferation

of kinship politics, which is caused by the popularity of family names. As well as the democratization of political parties which until now has been far from the word democracy.

II. Methods

This study uses the literature method ([Zed, 2004](#)), which collects relevant information related to political kinship in the 2020 simultaneous Regional Head Election. This information is obtained from books, research reports, scientific essays, regulations, and written sources, both printed and other electronics. There is also an approach used is a qualitative approach. This approach is considered appropriate because it is related to multidimensional political kinship. And, the phenomenon of kinship and Regional Head Election in Indonesia has interconnected variables and it is not yet known with certainty the nature of the relationship ([Alwasilah, 2002, p. 103](#)). Meanwhile, the collection of facts and data was carried out by tracing the news of political kinship in the mainstream mass media. Facts and data on kinship politics circulating in the mainstream mass media are specifically quoted to enrich the analysis.

III. Results and Discussion

Kinship politics is defined as a regime of political power that has been run from generation to generation by family or closest relatives. Kinship politics is formed because of the very high concern between families, in which the orientation is power ([Bimantara & Harsasto, 2018, p. 202](#)). Kinship politics is also understood as a form of control of power at the government at the local level. In the traditional political sense, kinship politics can be proven by politicians in power trying to place their families, relatives, and relatives in strategic positions with the aim of building a political empire. These efforts were made to maintain the perpetuity of his kinship politics ([Fitri, 2019](#)). Kinship politics is considered dangerous because this practice is the behavior of power before recognizing democracy. The political kinship circles will then protect each other's interests.

The Regional Head Election which took place in December 2020 were also inseparable from the practice of kinship politics. Even referring to the independent research of 2020 BBC East Asia Visual Journalism, there are 145 candidates out of 1,476 candidates who have met the requirements to contest at the 2020 democracy party that have

a kinship. Among them are 68 candidates for regent, 35 candidates for vice-regent, 26 candidates for mayor, 12 candidates for deputy mayor, 7 candidates for governor, and finally 4 candidates for deputy governor. Official wives run the most (as many as 43 people) when compared to family and other relatives such as children, fathers, mothers, husbands, nieces, sons-in-law, or cousins. BBC News (2020) states that out of the 43 wives of these officials, one is a corruption convict and some are said to have received bribes in corruption cases as in [Table 1](#).

Table 1.

Candidates for the 2020 Regional Head Election who are suspected of being entangled in nepotism and corruption

Electoral District (Province)	Number of candidate pairs	Number of kinship political candidates *
Central Java	41	15
East Java	42	13
North Sumatra	65	8
North Sulawesi	24	10
South Sulawesi	33	10
Total	205	56

*some people are suspected of being involved in corruption

Source: [BBC News Indonesia \(2020\)](#)

A. Popularity of Family Names and Legacy of Power

At least there are several factors that make the 2020 simultaneous Regional Head Election full of kinship politics. In addition to the already strong relations and networks of familism in government ([Haliim & Hakim, 2020, pp. 258–273](#)), also by taking advantage of the popularity of family names. This is evident from the victories won by several competing candidates. For example, Bobby Nasution, who is running for mayor of Medan. Bobby won the election by garnering 393,327 votes (53.45 percent) from 21 sub-districts, beating incumbent Akhyar-Salman to 342,580 votes (46.55 percent). Bobby's victory is considered to have taken advantage of the power network owned by his fathers-in-law, namely Joko Widodo as President. In addition, Bobby's victory was also influenced by the network of the ruling political party in Medan, namely the PDIP ([CNN Indonesia, 2020](#)). This fact is not without reason, because, as a newcomer, Bobby is an unpopular figure and difficult for the people of Medan to accept ([kumparan, 2020a](#)). This fact is also proven

by the research of [Panjaitan & Harahap \(2021\)](#) which found that the Bobby Nasution brand tends to be less than optimal in the people of Medan, especially in Tanjung Selamat District. The reason is, the people of Tanjung Selamat do not yet know the figure of Bobby Nasution as a candidate for Mayor of Medan 2020. Bobby Nasution's experience, who had never steeped in politics, served as a background for public perception ([Panjaitan & Harahap, 2021, p. 79](#)).

The victory of Bobby Nasution, which is associated with the popularity of Jokowi's name, remains relevant, even though a number of parties have compared Jokowi's vote in the 2019 presidential elections which suffered defeat in Medan. At that time, Jokowi indeed lost to Prabowo in Medan by a vote of only 46.85 percent, while his opponent, Prabowo Subianto, pocketed 53.15 percent ([kumparan, 2020b](#)). Comparing the results of Jokowi's vote in the 2019 presidential elections with the 2020 Regional Head Election is fine, but it must be seen that at that time, Gerindra and a number of Bobby-bearing parties became rivals of the political parties that supported Jokowi. Meanwhile, currently, the Bobby-Aulia pair is supported by eight parties, namely PDIP, Gerindra, Hanura, PPP, PSI, PAN, Golkar, and NasDem with a total of 39 seats in the Medan Regional House of Representatives (DPRD). So that the factor in President Jokowi's name in Bobby's victory makes a lot of sense.

Apart from Bobby, the popularity of Jokowi's name as a new kinship politics was also a factor in the victory of the 2020 Solo Regional Head Election, which carried President Jokowi's first son Gibran Rakabuming Raka-Teguh Prakosa. Gibran against Bagyo Wahyono-Supardjo (BaJo) who was carried through independent or individual channels. Meanwhile, the Gibran-Teguh pair is supported by a coalition of several parties, such as PDIP, PAN, Golkar, Gerindra, and PSI. The superiority of Gibran's vote against the BaJo pair almost equaled the Regional Head Election candidate pair who were fighting an empty box. This is because the BaJo pair had only thirteen percent of the votes. Not much different from the vote acquisition obtained by empty boxes in several regions that held the 2020 Regional Head Election.

President Jokowi's influence is very strong in Solo ([Adhiyuda, 2020](#)). Apart from being a big name as president, Jokowi has also served as mayor of Solo for two terms, making an impression on the minds of the public. In fact, Gibran's

electability when he planned to run for mayor was still far from his senior Achmad Purnomo. This is evidenced by the results of the Median survey in December 2019 of hundreds of respondents who concluded that Achmad Purnomo was chosen as mayor of Solo by 40.9% of respondents. While Gibran was only chosen by 19.1 respondents (Herlambang, 2019). The strong prestige of President Jokowi in his hometown has also unconsciously shaped the character of Solo citizens in electing each candidate for Regional Head. Jokowi, who is considered successful in leading Solo, has become the benchmark for Solo citizens in choosing a leader. The research results of Suwardi et al. (2020, p. 219) concluded that there are five characteristics of leaders desired by the people of Solo, namely (1) the entrepreneur profession, (2) generations x and y; (3) a nationalist ideology, and (4) an anti-corruption attitude. Meanwhile, Surakarta City figures with high personal political, namely Gibran Rakabuming, Achmad Purnomo, and Teguh Prakosa.

The fact of the victory of the candidate for a regional head who has the above kinship can be said to be dangerous. This is because it can have a direct impact on the process and quality of the simultaneous Regional Head Election in Indonesia. This fact can undermine the nature of rational voters who consider the advantages and disadvantages of material aspects. Profits and losses that lead to the aspects of track record, capability, integrity, public policies produced from the time they took office until the end of their term of office. So that there is a reward and punishment mechanism, namely the award is given by being re-elected if an incumbent is deemed capable of producing these aspects. Meanwhile, the punishment was given by not being re-elected, because it was deemed incapable of producing public policies that were beneficial to the region. Not based on kinship or family skills.

Good democracy occurs when citizens will rationally consider the benefits that will be derived from voting (Foster, 1983, pp. 678–690). No exception when choosing political actors in elections. This is like the economic theory of democracy, in *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Downs (1957). In some cases of elections in America of congressmen, a person will vote positively related to the expected changes in their consumption and interests. In many studies, voting is considered an expression of rational behavior. That is, people choose when they expect the benefits (Durden & Gaynor, 1987, p.

239). In the case above, for example, it cannot be said that voters prioritize rationality when viewed from some of the candidates who are incumbent. Even if the incumbent is said to be bad, the three candidates who have kinship relations do not have a political track record that is capable of being able to lead. Indeed, in some theories, it is argued that the voters' lack of information undermines the defense of democracy which is rooted in elections accountability. However, rationality sometimes makes democracy's performance better than worse (Ashworth & de Mesquita, 2014, pp. 565–587).

The phenomenon of kinship politics also suggests that voters tend to judge potential leaders in terms of popularity rather than capacity and capability. Personal branding of the family is one of the directions of politics in Indonesia continuously to get a perception that creates a positive reputation for potential local leaders. Popular family breeds make it possible to be the most effective promotion of political brands, to ensure dynastic rule continues. It is also useful for future political campaigns. It will even be considered by politicians in the future. It would be dangerous if the next generation of political actors believed that the family line was an important decision (Barkov et al., 2020, p. 820).

In addition, several cases of kinship politics mentioned above refer to power politics as a legacy of power, meaning that politicians get power easily without struggling. Meanwhile, in a democratic political system, all attainment of a position must be done through a struggle to win the hearts of the people or voters, aka not inherited. Power politics in the context of dynasties eventually became an interest to play projects and organize everything that is strategic (Sutisna, 2017, p. 103).

B. Democratization of Political Parties

On the other hand, the rise of kinship politics in the 2020 Regional Head Election cannot be separated from the role of political parties. This is because one of the functions of political parties is to carry out political recruitment (Hamudy & Rifki, 2019b, p. 92). As a forum that has the authority for candidacy, political parties play an important role in generating the names of regional head candidates. This is as stated in Article 29 Paragraph (1) of Law No. 2 of 2011 on Political Parties, which emphasizes that political parties recruit Indonesian citizens to become candidates for regional head and deputy regional head. Even so, candidates can also emerge from the

individual route as stipulated in Law No. 8 of 2015 on the Regional Head Election. However, to run as an individual candidate is not easy because the person concerned must pocket 8.5 to 10 percent of the support from the total number of fixed voter lists (DPT) in the area. This condition is not easy, making individual candidates from year to year decreasing. In fact, in the 2020 Regional Head Election, the decline reached 40 percent from the previous Regional Head Election. In the 2020 Regional Head Election, there were 68 candidate pairs who emerged as individual candidates. Apart from the difficult requirements, the decrease in the number of individual candidate pairs was due to the increasingly solid condition of the party, and the increasing confidence of voters in parties compared to individual figures.

But unfortunately, as an institution that carries out the function of recruiting candidates, instead of avoiding kinship politics, political parties have mostly supported this strategy to launch their agenda. For example, this happened in the Regional Head Election of Solo City and Kediri Regency. Candidate for Mayor of Solo Gibran Rakabuming Raka-Teguh Prakosa from PDIP who is supported by 5 parties in the Solo City Regional House of Representatives (DPRD). The only party in the Solo City Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) that does not support this pair is the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The opponent of the president's son then emerged from an individual line, namely the Bagyo Wahyono-Fx Suparjo pair. In addition, similar support also occurred in Kediri Regency, namely the Candidate pair for Regent Hanindhito Himawan Pramana-Dewi Maria Ulfa. No half-heartedly, as many as 9 parties supported the pair, who then pitched as the sole candidate against the empty box. Hanindhito is the son of the Secretary of the Advanced Indonesia Cabinet, Pramono Anung, and is a PDIP politician. As a result, Hanindhito was declared victorious by the Kediri Regency General Election Commission (KPU) after obtaining 590,644 votes from a total of 771,799 valid votes.

The elections of a number of candidates exposed to kinship politics promoted by the parties was not without problems, because in the process it had sparked conflicts within the party. At the beginning of Gibran's advancement as a candidate for Mayor of Solo, he became a polemic because previously the Solo City PDIP Branch Leadership Council (DPC) had determined the candidate pair for Mayor of Solo in the 2020 Regional Head Election, namely Achmad Purnomo

who was paired with Teguh Prakoso. However, the PDIP Central Leadership Council (DPP) actually recommended Gibran as a candidate for mayor rather than Achmad Purnomo, having previously registered through the Regional Leadership Council (DPD) of Central Java Province. Gibran himself registered as a cadre of the PDIP party on September 29, 2019. In addition, the polemic of recruiting candidates for regional head candidates also occurred in the Banyuwangi Regency Regional Head Election. Previously, the Deputy Regent of Banyuwangi, Yusuf Widyatmoko, wanted to run again as regent to replace Abdullah Azwar Anas, who he had accompanied for two terms. But unfortunately, the PDIP Central Leadership Council (DPP) recommended Abdullah Azwar Anas' wife, Ipuk Fiestiandani. In fact, Ipuk is not a party cadre, in contrast to Yusuf who is a cadre of the bull party. Yusuf then continued to insist on running through support from other political parties and ended up being fired from the PDIP.

The two phenomena above show that party decisions often depend on the recommendations given by the party chairman. In fact, the party that chose to support a partner from another party was the same. This is in line with the results of research by [Witianti & Hendra \(2019\)](#) which concluded that the tendency of the general chairperson of political parties is strong in determining regional head nominations ([Witianti & Hendra, 2019, pp. 55–67](#)). On the other hand, political parties actually provide easy access for candidates who have kinship political networks. This is confirmed by the results of research conducted by [Fitriyah \(2020\)](#) which found that political parties provide an easier way for candidates with dynastic backgrounds when recruiting regional head candidates. Moreover, political parties add requirements for the level of popularity and electability of candidates, as well as their financial capabilities for those who want to run as candidates in the Regional Head Election ([Fitriyah, 2020, pp. 1–17](#)).

This means that there are problems in political recruitment that also support the birth of kinship politics. Due to the strong dominance of the political parties Central Leadership Council (DPP) in determining regional head candidates, it is not uncommon for the aspirations of cadres at the Branch Leadership Council (DPC) and Regional Leadership Council (DPD) levels to be ignored as candidates, because they are considered to have no quality, financial, and also popularity ([Nge, 2018, pp. 59–84](#)). This makes candidates

promoted by political parties only controlled by certain circles. It is not wrong if kinship politics is seen as hampering consolidation at the local level, as well as weakening political party institutions. This is not in line with the democratic spirit adopted by Indonesia, which in electing leaders, the people have the opportunity to participate directly in general elections (Adyatama, 2021; Hamudy & Rifki, 2019a, p. 211).

The government actually made efforts to reduce the rate of kinship politics. This effort is carried out through Law No. 8 of 2015 concerning the Elections of Governors, Regents, and Mayors. Precisely in Article 7 which regulates that "Indonesian citizens who can become Candidates for Governor and Candidates for Deputy Governor, Candidates for Regent and Candidate for Deputy Regent, and Candidates for Mayor and Candidate for Deputy Mayor are those who meet the requirements". The letter (r) requires that those who nominate must "have no conflict of interest with the incumbent". The definition of conflict of interest is not having blood relations, marital ties, and/or lineage straight up, down, sideways to the incumbent, namely father, mother, parents-in-law, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, brother-in-law, children, children-in-law unless he has passed the lull of one term of office. However, the article was later canceled by the Constitutional Court (MK) after a judicial review, and the regulation was considered to limit the political rights of citizens to be elected as regional heads (Maharani, 2020).

The cancellation of this regulation is part of the reason why kinship politics still colors Regional Head Election. Because, by doing so, there are no specific regulations governing kinship politics. This is reinforced by research conducted by Susanti (2017) that weak regulations have contributed to the rise of kinship politics in the Regional Head Election (Susanti, 2017, pp. 111–119). Even if we use the logic of the right to be elected and to vote, the existence of kinship politics looks democratic because it protects the rights concerned. However, kinship politics can castrate democracy because its practice tends to influence processes that should be democratic, on the contrary, it works the other way around because of the interference of parties who have authority, power, influence, and political infrastructure (Rizan, 2019).

IV. Conclusion

From the research results, it can be concluded that when in power the incumbent can use his

position to build the political power of his relatives. It is not uncommon in some developing countries to use public budgets to fund patronage and clientelistic practices which are important drivers of electoral success (Querubin, 2016, p. 153). Candidates from the ruling party can enjoy electoral advantages because of the characteristics of the party that make them popular in certain regions. Kinship should be able to lead to more moral behavior, not just the pursuit of power. Several democratic countries in America and Europe are also inseparable from the practice of political familism. This is to foster favoritism, nepotism, sectionalism, and regionalism, based on an attitude of enthusiasm in an effort to maintain and realize collective interests. However, blood relations are not the main standard in encouraging relatives to enter the world of politics.

Nevertheless, kinship politics can be controlled through internal reforms of political parties as institutions that carry out a recruitment role. Political parties need to carry out institutional reforms by implementing democratization internally. This is because political parties are part of democracy, so they must carry out democratic values in carrying out their roles. Do not let this form of dictatorship shift to the realm of political parties (Kalla, 2019). As for the internal democratization of political parties, it needs to be carried out in the following three dimensions. First, principles and procedures such as member participation; representative/inclusive; transparency and accountability; and institutionalization of democratic procedures in decision making. Second, delegating a number of tasks and authorities in the context of decentralization to party officials in the regions. Third, the institutionalization of democratic principles and procedures in implementing the role of parties in the National Elections (Surbakti & Supriyanto, 2013, p. 44).

In relation to recruitment as part of decision-making, this can be done through a transparent and accountable system. The process of candidacy can also be learned from political parties in the United States. Although the kinship politics in the Uncle-Sam country have also become an inseparable element. However, every candidate has the same opportunity to be tested, both in terms of electoral and political abilities. This test is determined through preliminary elections within the party. Each candidate has the same opportunity, constituents and party cadres have the right to determine who the party will nominate as a candidate (Nurhasim, 2020).

The management of a political party can also consider the system by dividing the three components, namely the component of the people's representative cadre, the component of the cadre of executive officers, and the component of professional management. The three of them are arranged in a separate structure, and there are no double positions or choice of paths. Cadre recruitment and promotion patterns are required to follow the paths that have been determined in the three components. In order for the management and management mechanism of the party to be better, the regulations need to be regulated in laws and other statutory regulations. On the other hand, related to the decentralization of party authority from the central level to the regions it is important as an effort to democratize parties. This is because this step is not only an effort to develop the capacity and independence of party elites in the regions but also to support the national agenda related to decentralization and regional autonomy (Haris, 2006).

Acknowledgment

The authors would like to thank all those who supported this research. Likewise to the Secretariat General of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which has provided opportunities for the public to express their thoughts.

V. References

- Adhiyuda, F. (2020, December 10). *Pengamat: Nama Besar Jokowi Punya Pengaruh Atas Kemenangan Gibran dan Bobby Nasution*. Tribunnews.com. <https://www.tribunnews.com/pilkada-2020/2020/12/10/pengamat-nama-besar-jokowi-punya-pengaruh-atas-kemenangan-gibran-dan-bobby-nasution>
- Adyatama, E. (2021, February 11). *Sebut Dinasti Politik Menguat di Pilkada 2020, Lemhanas: Menghambat Demokrasi*. Tempo.co. <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1432063/sebut-dinasti-politik-menguat-di-pilkada-2020-lemhanas-menghambat-demokrasi>
- Alwasilah, A. C. (2002). *Pokoknya kualitatif: Dasar-dasar merancang dan melakukan penelitian kualitatif*. Pustaka Jaya. <https://books.google.co.id/books?id=egeMNwAACAJ>
- Aminuddin. (2020, December 14). *Kuasa Politik Kekerabatan*. JawaPos.com. <https://www.jawapos.com/opini/14/12/2020/kuasa-politik-kekerabatan/>
- Ashworth, S., & de Mesquita, E. B. (2014). Is Voter Competence Good for Voters?: Information, Rationality, and Democratic Performance. *The American Political Science Review*, 108(3), 565–587. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43654393>
- Barkov, S. A., Dorokhina, O. V., Markeeva, A. V., & Maximov, A. A. (2020). Dynasties and brand names in the political sphere of the post-industrial society. *RUDN Journal of Sociology*, 20(4), 801–820. <https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2272-2020-20-4-801-820>
- BBC News Indonesia. (2020, December 3). *Pilkada: Cari tahu kandidat terkait dinasti politik di wilayah Anda*. BBC News Indonesia. <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-55140058>
- Bimantara, N., & Harsasto, P. (2018). Analisis Politik Dinasti di Kabupaten Kediri. *Journal of Politic and Government Studies*, 7(04), 201–210. <https://ejournal3.undip.ac.id/index.php/jpgs/article/view/21909>
- CNN Indonesia. (2020, December 10). *Charta Ungkap Efek Jokowi di Kemenangan Bobby dan Gibran*. CNN Indonesia. <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20201209201506-20-580217/charta-ungkap-efek-jokowi-di-kemenangan-bobby-dan-gibran>
- Damodaran, H. (2008). *India's New Capitalists: Caste, Business, and Industry in a Modern Nation*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Durden, G. C., & Gaynor, P. (1987). The rational behavior theory of voting participation: Evidence from the 1970 and 1982 elections. *Public Choice*, 53(3), 231–242. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00127348>
- Fitri, A. (2019). Dinasti Politik pada Pemerintahan di Tingkat Lokal. *KEMUDI: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan*, 4(1), 91–111. <https://doi.org/10.31629/kemudi.v4i1.1333>
- Fitriyah. (2020). Partai Politik, Rekrutmen Politik dan Pembentukan Dinasti Politik pada Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada). *Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, 11(1), 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.14710/politika.11.1.2020.1-17>
- Foster, C. B. (1983). The Performance of Rational Voter Models in Recent Presidential Elections. *American Political Science Review*, 78(3), 678–690. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1961836>

- Gunanto, D. (2020). Tinjauan Kritis Politik Dinasti di Indonesia. *Sawala: Jurnal Administrasi Negara*, 8(2), 177–191. <https://doi.org/10.30656/sawala.v8i2.2844>
- Haliim, W., & Hakim, A. I. (2020). Dinasti Politik: Basis Politik dan Kepuasan Publik. *Jurnal Politik Profetik*, 8(2), 258–273. <https://doi.org/10.24252/profetik.v8i2a4>
- Hamudy, M. I. A., & Rifki, M. S. (2019a). Strengthening the Multi-Party Presidential Government in Indonesia. *Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review*, 4(2), 208–232. <https://doi.org/10.15294/ipsr.v4i2.18447>
- Hamudy, M. I. A., & Rifki, M. S. (2019b). The management of political parties in Indonesia (Pengurusan parti-parti politik di Indonesia). *Akademika*, 89(3). <https://ejournal.ukm.my/akademika/article/view/29337>
- Haris, S. (2006). Demokratisasi Partai dan Dilema Sistem Kepartaian di Indonesia. *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, 3(1), 67–76. <https://doi.org/10.14203/jpp.v3i1.537>
- Herlambang, A. A. (2019, December 16). *Survei Pilkada Solo: Elektabilitas Gibran Dikalahkan Achmad Purnomo*. AyoSemarang.com. <https://www.aoyosemarang.com/read/2019/12/16/49006/survei-pilkada-solo-elektabilitas-gibran-dikalahkan-achmad-purnomo>
- Intan, G. (2019, December 23). *Adakah yang Salah dengan Dinasti Politik?* VOA Indonesia. <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/adakah-yang-salah-dengan-dinasti-politik-/5216466.html>
- Kalla, J. (2019, December 4). *Demokratisasi Harus Dimulai dari Partai*. JawaPos.com. <https://www.jawapos.com/opini/04/12/2019/demokratisasi-harus-dimulai-dari-partai/>
- kumparan. (2020a, December 10). *4 Faktor Bobby Kalahkan Petahana di Medan: Jejaring Kuat Jokowi hingga Banjir*. kumparanNews. <https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/4-faktor-bobby-kalahkan-petahana-di-medan-jejaring-kuat-jokowi-hingga-banjir-1ukjEwL8H55>
- kumparan. (2020b, December 10). *Mengapa Bobby Bisa Menang Pilwalkot Sementara Jokowi Kalah Pilpres di Medan?* kumparanNews. <https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/mengapa-bobby-bisa-menang-pilwalkot- sementara-jokowi-kalah-pilpres-di-medan-1ukLqZoL4D>
- Labonne, J., Parsa, S., & Querubin, P. (2021). Political dynasties, term limits and female political representation: Evidence from the Philippines. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 182, 212–228. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.12.001>
- Maharani, T. (2020, September 5). *Soal Politik Dinasti, Mahfud MD: Tidak Ada Hukum yang Bisa Halangi Nepotisme*. KOMPAS.com. <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/09/05/11313811/soal-politik-dinasti-mahfud-md-tidak-ada-hukum-yang-bisa-halangi-nepotisme>
- Nge, H. J. (2018). Oligarki Partai Politik dalam Rekrutmen Calon Kepala Daerah. *Jurnal Academia Praja*, 1(01), 59–84. <https://doi.org/10.36859/jap.v1i01.42>
- Nurhasim, M. (2020, July 30). *Pilkada Dinasti Politik*. Kompas.id. <https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2020/07/30/pilkada-dinasti-politik/>
- Panjaitan, F. R., & Harahap, M. S. (2021). Community opinion on the personal brand of Bobby Nasution to Prospective Medan Mayor in 2020. *COMMICAST*, 2(1), 76–80. <https://doi.org/10.12928/commicast.v2i1.3152>
- Querubin, P. (2016). Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 11(2), 151–181. <https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00014182>
- Rahayu, A. S. (2020, July 30). *Menyoal Politik Dinasti dan Dinamikanya*. *Arsip Publikasi Ilmiah Biro Administrasi Akademik*. <http://research-report.umm.ac.id/index.php/API-BAA/article/view/4040>
- Ridho, R. (2020, December 14). *Real Count KPU 100 Persen, Adik Ratu Atut Berjaya di Pilkada Serang*. KOMPAS.com. <https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/12/14/22360821/real-count-kpu-100-persen-adik-ratu-atut-berjaya-di-pilkada-serang>
- Rizan, P. R. (2019, December 24). *Pro kontra politik dinasti*. AntaraNews.com. <https://www.antaraneews.com/berita/1221951/pro-kontra-politik-dinasti>
- Ruud, A. E., & Nielsen, K. B. (2018). Political Dynasticism: Networks, Trust, Risk. *Studies in Indian Politics*, 6(2), 157–167. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2321023018797407>
- Sukri, M. A. (2020). Dinasti Politik di Banten: Familisme, Strategi Politik dan Rendahnya Partisipasi Politik Masyarakat. *JISPO Jurnal*

-
- Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik*, 10(2), 169–190. <https://doi.org/10.15575/jispo.v10i2.8316>
- Surbakti, R., & Supriyanto, D. (2013). *Mendorong Demokratisasi Internal Partai Politik*. Kemitraan bagi Pembaruan Tata Pemerintahan.
- Susanti, M. H. (2017). Dinasti Politik dalam Pilkada di Indonesia. *Journal of Government and Civil Society*, 1(2), 111–119. <https://doi.org/10.31000/jgcs.v1i2.440>
- Sutisna, A. (2017). Gejala Proliferasi Dinasti Politik di Banten Era Kepemimpinan Gubernur Ratu Atut Chosiyah. *Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review*, 2(2), 100–120. <https://doi.org/10.15294/jpi.v2i2.9329>
- Suwardi, Sugiyarti, S. R., & Novaria, R. (2020). Kepemimpinan Kota Surakarta 2020 – 2025 Identifikasi Karakteristik Calon Wali Kota Surakarta Berdasarkan Persepsi Masyarakat. *JPAP: Jurnal Penelitian Administrasi Publik*, 6(2), 219–239. <https://doi.org/10.30996/jpap.v6i2.4298>
- Taher, A. P. (2020, February 21). *Dinasti Politik Era Jokowi Menguat: Apa Bahayanya Bagi Demokrasi?* tirto.id. <https://tirto.id/dinasti-politik-era-jokowi-menguat-apa-bahayanya-bagi-demokrasi-ezZ4>
- Thompson, M. R. (2012). Asia's Hybrid Dynasties. *Asian Affairs*, 43(2), 204–220. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2012.682366>
- Wardani, M. A. (2015). *Dinasti Politik di Amerika: Studi Kasus Dinasti Politik Kennedy* [Master Thesis, Universitas Gadjah Mada]. <http://etd.repository.ugm.ac.id/penelitian/detail/85809>
- Witianti, S. & Hendra. (2019). Peran Ketua Umum Partai Politik dalam Pencalonan Kepala Daerah pada Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Serentak di Indonesia. *JWP (Jurnal Wacana Politik)*, 4(1), 55–67. <https://doi.org/10.24198/jwp.v4i1.21130>
- Zed, M. (2004). *Metode Penelitian Kepustakaan*. Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia. <https://books.google.co.id/books?id=zG9sDAAAQBAJ>
-