



Article




Received
01 February 2024


Accepted
28 August 2024

Published online
October 2024


Author(s)

Corresponding Author

 Rosita Dewi
 0000-0002-0550-684X
 rosi008@brin.go.id

 National Research and Innovation Agency

 Bondan Widyatmoko
 0009-0004-2233-0745
 bond001@brin.go.id

 National Research and Innovation Agency

Keywords: Political transactions, high cost, anak adat, Papua, election

Trade-off *Anak Adat* Status as a High-cost of Political Transaction in Papua Local Elections

Rosita Dewi, Bondan Widyatmoko

Abstract: Currently, the political transaction through trade-off *anak adat* (customary child) status is wider applied in Papua local election. Benefiting from the direct elections, the elites competed for political power in the regions by mobilizing ethno-religious sentiments and utilizing money-politics. The voters, in return, behave as clients as they seek to gain material benefits from their preferred candidates in exchange for political loyalty. This condition caused the high-cost politics during the local election. Based on this problem, this paper attempts to analyze the hijacking of *adat* (customs) through trade-off *anak adat* status as a form of political transaction which impacted to high-cost politics. This study cultivates the theory of political transactions to analyze the political transaction in Papua local election especially in the gubernatorial election 2018 and election of DPRD (Regional Representative Council)'s member in 2019. This form of political transaction has caused the high-cost of local election in Papua, which is not only in the form of money, but also carried the social cultural high-cost impact. Of course, vote buying will make the candidates have to spend a lot of money. The trade-off of *anak adat* status from other than Papuan through buying and selling mechanism rather than using achievement and acknowledgement from the *adat* community would harm the Papuans. Moreover, this practice has brought detrimental destruction to the socio-cultural values of Papuan *adat* community. This study is qualitative research that use political approach to observe the local election processes in Papua. We used the criteria of credibility and confirmability to validate the data in our qualitative research.

About the Author(s)

Rosita Dewi, is a researcher at the Research Centre for Politics - National Research and Innovation Agency. She has been working on issues related to Papua since 2005. She obtained her doctoral degree in 2017 from Kyoto University with a dissertation titled *Adat Recognition in Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate in Papua, Indonesia*. Her works include: "Gaining Recognition through Participatory Mapping" (*Austrian Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 2016, 9 (1)); "Hijacking Adat Recognition through the Establishment of New Customary Community Council in Papua, Indonesia" (*Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, 2017, 4 (3)); "The Implementation of Noken Election System in Papua, Indonesia: Could Noken as Election System Canalize Papua Conflict?" (Chapter 11, 2022, IGI Global); and "The Uneasy Road to Peace: Papuanization and the Politics of Recognition" (Chapter 4, 2022, Kyoto University Press - Transpacific Press).

Bondan Widyatmoko, has been a researcher at the Research Centre for Area Studies - National Research and Innovation Agency (Pusat Riset Kewilayahan - Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional) since 2005. He earned his doctoral degree from Kyoto University in 2019. His current research focuses on adat communities in palm oil plantations, artisanal practices, politics, and resource nationalism.

© 2024 The Author(s)



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/).



I. Introduction

Indonesia is categorized as a flawed democracy according to the EIU democracy index, which is based on five indicators. Although Indonesia has adopted the principles of democracy, the implementation of these principles remains questionable. For instance, while elections are conducted across the region, the freedom and fairness of these elections have been criticized due to issues such as money politics, military involvement, manipulation, and violence (Embong, 2016; Power, 2018; Timberman, 2019; van Klinken, 2009). Patronage democracy and clientelistic practices pose significant challenges to Indonesian democracy. The election process in Indonesia remains highly clientelistic, characterized by patron-client relationships involving vote buying and financial transactions, with legitimate regimes often perpetuating such practices (Ulum, 2020, p. 38).

In general, political transaction is seen from government behavior in manipulating cost of transaction to influence political behaviors and assess institutional transformation (Twight, 1994). The decision-making process is situated within uneven information and limited public commitment (Dixit, 2003). Politicians simply take advantage from the situation and use their political power for practices such as vote-buying, masking material exchange using social programs, setting up political brokers to reap for support. Aspinall and Hicken (2020) acknowledged these practices and highlighted the creation of a clientelist ephemeral organization, the so-called success team for such purposes (Aspinall & Hicken, 2020). This success team takes different forms such as religious elites (Fardian, 2021), *adat* (customs) elites and apply different strategies such as political dowry (Hafid & Prasetyo Nugroho, 2021; Masdar, 2022) to shape the result of democratic processes.

The concept of political transaction provides a perspective for observing the dynamic relationships between power, influence, and exchange among different agencies. Politically, this concept acknowledges a situation where there is a mutual relationship between dominant and subservient agencies. The elements of power and influence are exercised through exchange mechanisms aimed at mutual benefits (Arifin et al., 2020; Butler, 2015). These exchange

relationships become increasingly complex within diverse cultural and societal settings. In cultures and societies where self-interest is a primary value, political coalitions and alliances are often driven by considerations of risk, loss, and profit (Chong et al., 2001; Nell, 2017; Rapoport et al., 1995). In such micro-societal communities, where dyadic relationships are central, these risks are communicated and shared, leading to political exchanges (Hsu, 1943) rather than simple transactions. However, when a dominant party rises and exerts significant power and influence, bargaining and negotiation often become unequal. These practices can create and perpetuate various forms of inequality within the community (Larmour, 2012; Moosavi, 2019).

Political transactions have garnered significant attention from scholars following Indonesia's reformation and democratization. Previous studies have examined various aspects of political transactions, including the involvement of political parties (Wikrama, 2020), the close relationships between companies and political parties (Supatmi et al., 2021; Habib et al., 2017), and how businesses and local entrepreneurs fund local candidates (As'ad et al., 2021). These studies highlight the formation of clientelist relationships, which often result in high economic costs.

Other research has focused on societal behaviors related to political transactions. For instance, studies have highlighted the prevalence of money politics due to society's inclination towards financial gain (Rizkika et al., 2019), the Indonesian political culture's tendency towards pragmatism that facilitates the acceptance of transactional politics (Sumartono, 2018), and the influence of paternalistic culture combined with socio-political choices that can lead to political transactions (Umam & Muchlisin, 2022). Additionally, corruptive transactions are often linked to non-Western societies due to perceived moral deficiencies (Larmour, 2012) and the absence of local norms (Moosavi, 2019). These findings collectively illustrate how political transactions contribute to high-cost politics during local elections in Indonesia, frequently involving money politics.

This study aims to fill research gaps regarding high-cost electoral politics in Indonesia. The first gap is the consistent emphasis in studies

on the rampant behavior of political dowry, as well as the various practices and local terms referring to vote-buying, which have fostered clientelism through patron-client relationships. Maintaining and managing these relationships are high costs for the elites of political parties. This high-cost problem has been mitigated through party businesses and skyrocketing fees for party memberships and election participation. The effort has been linked to a tendency toward corrupt behavior.

This study expands the definition of economic cost to include social costs, which are indicated by the corrosion of cultural and *adat* (customary law) structures, as well as the potential for horizontal conflicts. The second gap is the heavy focus of research on culture as a hindering factor for democratization processes, which ultimately leads to high election costs. Rather than adopting a stance of cultural relativism, this study views the existence of cultural elements, such as collectivism, patrilineal and matrilineal systems, paternalistic social structures, and the embedding of socio-political values into belief systems, as cultural richness for Indonesian democracy.

However, political elites and the government, through political transactions, have been manipulating these cultural elements for vote-buying activities. The third gap this article addresses is the focus on the case of Papua. Papua still implements traditional/*adat* practices, which are legally recognized by the Papuan Special Autonomy Law (Otsus), making it different from other regions. Moreover, several districts in Papua still use the *Noken* election system. By focusing on the case of elections in Papua, this study aims to show the transgression of political transactions into the Papuan cultural *adat* structure. Research on this topic is still rare.

Papua serves as an observational laboratory for various forms of manipulation that have been carried out institutionally by political elites and the government, transposing cultural structures and values into monetary valuation. By analyzing *adat* practices in Papua, this study demonstrates that the central government has hijacked the role of the MRP (Majelis Rakyat Papua) as a legal institution and cultural representative of Papua. This has led to a trade-off of the *anak adat* status

for individuals from tribes other than Papuan through buying and selling mechanisms, rather than through achievement and recognition by the *adat* community. This practice could harm Papuans' access to development in the future.

In Papua, local politics are characterized by patronage democracy. Political transactions in the form of clientelism are also evident during local elections in Papua. Given Papua's close ties to *adat* (tradition), elite candidates can use not only money politics but also mobilize ethno-sentiment in exchange for the political loyalty of voters. This condition illustrates the nature of political transactions occurring in Papua. After the implementation of Special Autonomy Law No. 21 of 2001, the law provided greater opportunities for Papuans as indigenous people to hold positions in the bureaucracy as decision-makers in their provincial and local governments. Nonetheless, gaining OAP (Orang Asli Papua) status has become increasingly important. Induction as *anak adat* has flourished, especially when local elections approach, through transactions with *adat* leaders. In recent years, it has been observed that, suddenly, some Javanese individuals have become *anak adat* of the Biak tribe, or Batak people have become *anak adat* of the Sarmi.

More interestingly, the trade-off of *anak adat* status has shifted. It is no longer just a transaction between Papuans and non-Papuans, but also among Papuans themselves (Dewi, 2022: 132). Of course, vote-buying forces candidates to spend significant amounts of money. The trade-off of *anak adat* status through buying and selling, rather than through achievement and recognition by the *adat* community, could harm Papuans. Moreover, this practice has caused significant harm to the social and cultural values of the Papuan *adat* community. Therefore, this paper fills a gap in previous studies, which have mostly focused on the high cost of elections in an economic context. This paper analyzes political transactions not only as high-cost due to money politics but also in terms of the social costs that the *adat* community in Papua has to bear.

Based on the explanation above, this paper analyzes the impact of political transactions in Papua's local elections. The initial process of political transactions involves transgressing the definition of OAP. This transgression has allowed

OAP to become an inclusive identity, transforming the cultural properties of development for Papuans into a generalized communal status. The opening of OAP as a communal identity is the result of momentary material exchanges for votes during local elections in Papua. The subsequent process involves the claiming of *anak adat* status, which serves as the genetic basis for the OAP identity.

The material exchange for electoral votes has opened access to *adat* status, allowing individuals from any *adat* community in Papua to claim *anak adat* status and declare themselves as OAP. This process has reshaped the *adat* structure in Papua. Political transactions have influenced the formation of OAP identity, leading to further trade-offs in cultural traits and beliefs for Papuans, such as inheritance, access to *adat* land and livelihood, and rights to inclusive development, which were previously exclusive to *adat* members. This represents an immense social cost that must be borne by the present and future *anak adat* of Papua. As a result, the political landscape in Papua faces high costs in local politics.

II. Methods

This study is qualitative research that observes local election processes in Papua. Using a political transaction perspective, it analyzes the transgression of political transactions into the cultural identity and structure of the Papuan community. This perspective not only comprehends the process but also identifies the involved agencies in political transactions and their roles. The descriptive process provided by this perspective offers a glimpse into how the cultural structure and Papuan identity have been reshaped and reconstructed through material exchange in political transactions. This reshaped structure and reconstructed identity demonstrate how political transactions have eclipsed the *adat* and the immense social costs that must be borne by the Papuan people.

Primary data collection was conducted through observations and interviews with representatives from local and central governments, Papuans, and NGOs in Papua in July, August, and October 2019; April 2022; and June 2023. These informants were selected through


purposive sampling, ensuring their relevance and direct or indirect relation to the research topics. Data was also collected in Jakarta, where decisions about Papua are made. This study also utilized secondary data, particularly on the social and political dynamics of Papua and local politics, which the researcher has gathered through extensive fieldwork experience since 2018.

Data analysis was conducted in two steps. First, the interview recordings were transcribed. Second, the grouped responses were analyzed using analytic induction. Ultimately, all data gathered from written sources and interviews were interpreted and analyzed to produce a claim within the framework of the research question. We used the criteria of credibility and confirmability to validate the data in this qualitative research. Credibility is demonstrated through the selection of informants who provide believable and convincing data for our findings. As previously mentioned, informants were chosen through purposive sampling. The criteria of confirmability examine how objective, unbiased, and reliable the informants were in providing information during the research. We employed triangulation to cross-check, verify, and reduce bias among the informants in our findings.

III. Results and Discussion


A. The Dynamics of Social Politics and Democracy in Papua

As elections approach, Papua often comes into the spotlight. The implementation of elections in Papua is always of interest. Recently, the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) released the Election Vulnerability Index. According to the index released by Bawaslu, Papua has consistently been identified as a vulnerable region for elections since 2014. However, Papua's electoral vulnerability index is rated as only moderate for 2024. Nevertheless, when examining the details, the vulnerability in social and political dimensions remains high (Bawaslu, 2023). This election vulnerability index aligns closely with the vulnerability index released by the Indonesian Police (Polri), which also categorizes Papua as a very high-risk area (Chaterine, 2023).



Source: BPS, 2024

Figure 1. Index of Democracy in Indonesia



Source: BPS, 2024

Figure 2. Increase and Decrease of the Democracy Index in Indonesia


Although Papua is considered a high-vulnerability area, its democracy index is showing slight improvement. As seen in Graphs 1 and 2, the democracy index in Papua has improved, rising from 34 to 32. One key measurement of democracy is the successful implementation of elections. Elections have consistently been held in Papua, although there have been occasional delays in certain districts for various reasons. However, Papua has not entirely escaped the trap of democratic patronage, a common issue across many regions in Indonesia. Negative practices, such as political transactions, still characterize elections in Papua. Nonetheless, the unique social and political conditions in Papua continue to make it a compelling area for analysis.

After the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law (Otsus) No. 21/2001, the political situation in Papua changed significantly. During Suharto's regime, government positions in Papua were predominantly held by non-Papuans, with more than 50% of district heads (*bupati* or regents) being non-Papuan (Dewi, 2017b: 58). The law aimed to restore Papuan supremacy and enable Papuans to become masters in their own land. Several institutions were established to increase political access for Papuans, as mandated by

the law. The Papuan People's Assembly (*Majelis Rakyat Papua*, MRP) was created as a cultural representative body, with all members required to be Papuan. In addition to the MRP, the Papuan People's Representative Council (DPRP) became a legislative body composed of both elected and appointed members, with the appointed members required to be Papuan. These institutions provided broader opportunities for Papuans to participate in the political sector following the implementation of Otsus in 2001, a process often referred to as "Papuanization" (Dewi, 2022a: 134-137).

Graph 3 shows that Papuan representation increased in the 2009 general election, as indicated by the percentage of Papuans occupying seats in the Regional People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*, DPRD). This result was influenced by the affirmative action measures provided by Otsus, which granted Papuans greater opportunities to participate in politics and the economy—sectors that were dominated by non-Papuans during Suharto's regime.

Unlike in 2009, the results of the 2019 general election showed a different outcome. Fillep Mawafma, a member of the DPD, also stated that Otsus could not guarantee Papuan



Source: Dewi, (2022a: 136)


Figure 3. Percentage of Papuan Members in the DPRD for the 2009-2014 Period

domination in the political sector (DPD, 2023). Even with the provisions granted by Otsus, Papuan representatives in Papua could not ensure a dominant presence in local politics (FGD with LI & FY, 8 July 2021; Interview with FR, 12 June 2023). This situation is evident in the 2019 general election results for the DPRD, as shown in Graph 4. In many districts, non-Papuans dominated the seats in the DPRD, including Sorong, Sorong City, Jayapura, Jayapura City, South Sorong, Boven Digoel, and Merauke. For example, in the Merauke District, Papuans secured only 3 out of 30 seats, representing just 10% of the total DPRD seats. A similar decline in Papuan participation was seen in Jayapura City, where Papuans held only 13 seats, while non-Papuans occupied the remaining 27 seats (Interview with DPRD members of Jayapura City, 27 April 2022).

To expand political access for Papuans, they requested the central government allow the formation of local parties, as mandated by Otsus. Papuans argued that difficulties in gaining access to national parties during general elections contributed to the decrease in the number of Papuans in the DPRD across several districts and cities in Papua. To facilitate the formation of local parties, the DPRD drafted local

legislation (*peraturan daerah*), but it was rejected by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The possibility for Papuans to establish local parties, similar to those in Aceh, was closed with the removal of the article on local party formation in Papua in the revised version of the Papua Special Autonomy Law No. 2 of 2021. This decision was based on the ruling of the Constitutional Court on October 26, 2020.

To compensate for the abolition of the article on local parties, the revision of the Papua Special Autonomy Law in 2021, known as Otsus *Jilid II*, sought to increase the number of Papuan political representatives by adding Article 6A concerning the *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Kota/Kabupaten* (DPRK). The revised law, Special Autonomy Law No. 2 of 2021, introduced this new article on the DPRD with the aim of protecting and enhancing Papuan dignity. The DPRK is similar to the DPRD but operates at a different level; while the DPRD is at the provincial level, the DPRK functions at the district/city level. Like the DPRD, the DPRK also consists of both elected and appointed members, with the appointed members required to be Papuan.



Source: Dewi, (2024)

Figure 4. Percentage of Papuan Members in the DPRD for the 2019-2024 Period

B. Hijacking *Adat* through the Tradeoff of *Anak Adat* Status as a Form of Political Transaction in the Elections in Papua

In the process of democratization, where formal agreements and treaties become the golden rule, individual self-interest often accumulates into group interest (Funk, 2000). This collective interest is expressed as political capital (Bawn et al., 2012; Schmitt, 1963), which functions as a form of power used to enter negotiation and bargaining processes with the government to influence policy decisions and secure group interests. This process becomes corrupted and hijacked when groups informally exercise their political power and influence through lobbying, campaigns, donations, and other political pressure activities that undermine policy legitimacy. In such cases, groups effectively prioritize their own benefits over the public interest.

The contestation between self-centered and public interests in political transactions becomes more complex and problematic when the democratization process encounters diverse cultural and societal settings. In China, for example, *guanxi* has become a cultural norm for building ties and strengthening group connections (Tsui & Farh, 1997). Many strong economic businesses and the resilience of the Chinese diaspora are built upon these cultural norms (Brunner et al., 1990; Hutchings & Weir, 2006). However, the exchange and obligations that bind personal relationships through *guanxi* can influence policy and political decisions based on *guanxi* interests. This study demonstrates that the existence of *guanxi* practices does not inherently lead to corrupt conduct, but rather, corrupt participants may use *guanxi* as an alternative operating mechanism to facilitate corruption (Luo, 2008; Zhan, 2012)

In Latin America, practical norms have emerged where community elites exchange favors and resources for broader community loyalty and support (Hilgers, 2012; Piattoni, 2012). This exchange often empowers the community's political power rather than concentrating it within small groups of elites, functioning as a form of dowry for political support. However, it is important to differentiate between routine and non-routine processes of patronage through such dowries (Auyero et al., 2009). Unfortunately, this political dowry can foster clientelistic relationships, where

both parties involved exchange benefits at the expense of the public interest (Albuquerque & Werner, 1985). In the region, traditional clientelism has been modified by elite patrons through modernization processes, enabling them to mobilize low-status clients for mass demonstrations of political loyalty to the ruling regime (Safford & Martz, 1998).

Similar examples are found in Africa, where traditional power vested in chiefs and cultural leaders can lead to power transactions in which political elites hijack traditional leaders' personal benefits over the interests of their communities. This often occurs through acts of bribery. Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo once distinguished between traditional gift exchange and bribery, stating that a gift is a token of appreciation and hospitality, spiritually valued, exchanged openly, and not excessive (Larmour, 2012). In these contexts, potential political transactions can materialize when political elites exploit traditional and cultural power relations. Therefore, in discussing political transactions, we should focus on the acts of political elites, whether vicious or benevolent, in taking advantage of traditional and cultural power, rather than simply viewing these relations through a formal-informal lens that might exclude traditional and cultural power from the democratization process.

Political transactions have attracted significant attention from scholars following Indonesia's reform and democratization period. After the fall of the authoritarian regime, political parties flourished as key democratic agencies in the country. In Indonesia, political parties are the only democratic institutions with the power and legitimacy to determine state heads and government leaders (Wikrama, 2020). Many studies have examined the role of political parties in various developmental externalities, such as corruption. A study by Habib et al. found that firms closely connected with political parties have used party loan mechanisms for their business activities. These firms, often involved in extractive industries, expropriate natural resources for profit. Such underhanded practices, or abnormal related party transactions (RPTs), exist (Supatmi et al., 2021) and affect the way political parties select financial auditors (Habib et al., 2017). Further research by As'ad et al. (2021) shows that, in the case of local elections, businessmen

and local entrepreneurs often act as funders for local authority candidates (As'ad et al., 2021). By forming these clientelistic relationships, facilitated through material transactions, both political parties and business organizations efficiently bypass the rules, procedures, norms, and principles upheld by democratic society. These practices inevitably result in high economic costs.

However, this practice has also become rampant due to society's limited commitment to democratic processes. Society often equates the democratic process with the election process, which allows for monetary transactions. A psychological study by Rizkika et al. shows that political transactions, or money politics, are widespread during elections due to society's inclination towards money or material benefits. There is a prevalent belief that money politics represents prosocial action, common values, and underlying factors influencing these behaviors (Rizkika et al., 2019). Similarly, Sumartono's study indicates that Indonesia's political culture, which leans towards pragmatism and encourages people to seek instant benefits, makes transactional politics more easily accepted (Sumartono, 2018).

A study by Chamidah and Imawan demonstrates that cultural factors such as collectivism and patrilineality significantly influence political choices, particularly among women voters (Chamidah & Imawan, 2018). Umam and Muchlisin further reveal that the paternalistic nature of Indonesian society, combined with the inseparable socio-political-religious context, can trap religious elites into the pragmatism of political transactions (Umam & Muchlisin, 2022). This creates a convenient pathway for political transactions, especially when societal pragmatism aligns with the belief that elections are a period of fortune. This is exacerbated when influential community figures fail to shift the perception of democratic processes towards broader benefits for social, economic, and cultural life. A study by Mahsun et al. on women candidates in elections suggests that while culture can be a hindering factor in democratic processes, women candidates can overcome this by leveraging women's networks to focus on advocating gender issues and gaining grassroots political support (Mahsun et al., 2021).

These studies indicate that transactional politics arises from an intertwined relationship between government and societal beliefs, norms, and culture, with both sides contributing to the practice (Amin, 2021). While these studies highlight the role of culture in enabling transactional practices by the government and political parties, they often simplify cultural compatibility as merely facilitating money politics, rather than as an element that could promote democratic processes. According to Syed Alatas, viewing culture as the victim in corruptive transactions reflects a Western colonial perspective of cultural relativism (Larmour, 2012). This perspective suggests that corrupt transactions predominantly occur in non-Western societies due to their perceived moral deficiencies (Larmour, 2012) and the supposed absence of local norms to prevent such acts (Moosavi, 2019). From these studies, it can be concluded that political transactions lead to high-cost politics during local elections in Indonesia, primarily involving money politics.

In Papua, *adat* became a renewed source of political and economic power after Otsus formally recognized the *adat* rights of indigenous Papuans and mandated the involvement of *adat* communities in the decision-making process. Following the enactment of this law, obtaining status as a Papuan became particularly important, especially for non-Papuans. Through positive discrimination and affirmative policies, Otsus provided a mechanism for Papuans to secure equal rights. These affirmative policies were implemented to position Papuans as central actors and to address previous policies that had marginalized them politically. To address these issues, Otsus created broader opportunities for Papuan political participation, aiming to ensure that Papuans would occupy important decision-making positions in their region.

Otsus also ensured that the central government could not ignore the role of the MRP (Majelis Rakyat Papua) as a legal institution and cultural representative of the *adat* communities. The MRP sought to limit political access for non-Papuans by strictly defining the term "native Papuan," or OAP (Orang Asli Papua). According to the MRP, all governors and vice governors in Papua (including West Papua) must be native Papuans. The MRP defined native Papuans as those born to both a Papuan mother and father

or those born to a Papuan father. This definition is based on a patriarchal system. Although the MRP's decree specifically addressed the positions of governor and vice governor, it was also applied to local head elections in Papua (Dewi, 2022: 100-103).

As a result, the eagerness of non-Papuans to be inducted as *anak adat* increased after the MRP established the definition of a native Papuan to gain political access. It became both a written and "unwritten" rule that strategic positions in Papua must be held by Papuans, making it challenging for non-Papuans to obtain those positions. This can be seen in the enthusiasm of non-Papuans to become Papuans by being recognized as *anak adat*. Following the implementation of Otsus, induction as *anak adat* has become more common, particularly as local elections approach. The induction of non-Papuans usually occurs through a transactional process with *adat* leaders. In recent years, it has been observed that some Javanese individuals have suddenly become *anak adat* of the Biak tribe, while Batak people have become *anak adat* of the Sarmi (Dewi, 2017: 132)

This situation has led to political transactions where *adat* has become a crucial element in transactional politics in Papua, influencing the existence and role of *adat* institutions and organizations. Politicians compete for recognition from *adat* institutions, not only at the provincial level but also down to the village (*kampung*) level, the lowest administrative unit. As a result, *adat* has been cultivated and transformed into a tool for obtaining *anak adat* status. On one hand, this revitalizes *adat* and underscores the importance of *adat* and *adat* institutions, restoring the role of *adat* leaders that had been undermined during Suharto's regime.

However, on the other hand, this situation allows *adat* leaders to "trade-off" *anak adat* status for individual interests, often without consideration of *adat* values or the consent of *adat* community members. Currently, this practice has become widespread in Papua, especially as general or local elections approach. This has brought negative impacts. In reality, many individuals are granted *anak adat* status not because of their achievements or recognition by the *adat* community but through a process of buying and selling. Of course, there is no such

thing as a "free lunch" in the buying and selling of *anak adat* status—the candidates must provide a dowry in return to the *adat* leaders.

Several cases of the trade-off of *anak adat* status in Papua can be observed, such as the induction of Komarudin Watubun by a tribe in Port Numbay ahead of the gubernatorial election, where he was paired with Aleks Hese gem in 2006. Another example is John Manangsang, who was crowned as *anak adat* of the Wally tribe in Sentani in 2014, just before the local head election. Similarly, the induction of the Asso-Lokobal name to Jhony Banua Rouw occurred before the local head election in Jayawijaya District in 2014. Jhony Banua was also inducted as *anak adat* Yapen prior to the 2019 general election, leading to his election as head of the DPRP (2019-2024).

In the case of the election of head of Merauke District in 2020, there was non-Papuan candidate, Heribertus Silvinus Silubun Takafanem. He was a DPRD member of Merauke District (2019-2024) from Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*, PDIP). He ran his candidacy, together with Bambang S. Sudji as his vice head district candidate, supported by many parties (Tobari, 24 September 2024). Both of them are non-Papuan. Heribertus claimed as Papuan because he was conferred as *anak adat* Marind by Papuan Customary Community Council (*Lembaga Masyarakat Adat*, LMA). Herberitus was inducted as *anak adat* and received the clan name of Kaize, his name became Heribertus Silvinus Silubun Takafanem Kaize, on 28 November 2019 in Wapeko village.

Marind is the major tribe in Merauke District. This condition ignited protests from Marind tribe members in Merauke. The Marind elders never conferred that non-Papuan candidate as *anak adat* of Marind. The *adat* was hijacked by LMA through tradeoff *anak adat* status as a form of political transaction. This LMA was formed in 2009 and led by Lenis Kogoya. This *adat* institution is different from the LMA (*Lembaga Musyawarah Adat*) led by Theys Eluay. The same abbreviation of the new council under Kogoya—LMA—was used deliberately to confuse the *adat* communities. The LMA was formed to garner Papuan support to counter DAP's influence and bring *adat* institutions further under the influence of the central government. With the emergence

of the LMA, DAP was no longer the sole body of *adat* representation. In Papua communities, the LMA led by Lenis Kogoya assumed as “broker” and “the prolonged hands of central government” (FGD with LI, 8 July 2021; FGD with FM & YY, 2 November 2019; Dewi, 2017)

A pragmatic calculus of a current *adat* leader in Papua can make the transaction for *anak adat* proceed without consideration of the *adat* values. Clan or *fam* is identity, dignity, sacred symbol of tribes owned by Papuans in long period as ancestor inheritance. Then, due to political transaction, this *anak adat* status is “for sale”. The fact, *adat* leaders of several tribes have granted the status of *anak adat* without the consent of the *adat* community, to the benefit of the leader alone. This is particularly true when political advantage is to be gained. The given of *anak adat* status to outsider can ruin or even destroy the *adat* values because they limited understanding. This practice has become a concern of elders from several tribes. Moreover, it potentially creates conflicts among the *adat* members. This political transaction through *adat* hijacking brought the high social cost for Papuans. Several Papuan activists afraid that this case will cause the *adat* extinction in Papua (Dewi, 2022a: 133; Suara Papua, 2023)

There was a unique phenomenon during the 2018 governor election in Papua Province. The political transactional through *anak adat* status tradeoff is not conducted by non-Papuan candidates, but by the Papuan candidates. Both candidates were Papuan in the gubernatorial election in 2018. Moreover, both governor candidates came from the Papua highland area (Papua Pegunungan) and were often called *orang gunung*. Even though they were native Papuan (OAP), they still attempted to gain *anak adat* status from other tribes in the coastal areas.

They thought it was important to get legitimacy as “the origin of Papuan” that was accepted not only in the highland areas, but also in coastal and island. For example, first governor candidate, Lukas Enembe was inducted as *anak adat* of the Byak, a large tribe in the Saereri *adat* region. He is also supported by the DAP of the Mampta-Tabi *adat* region. Meanwhile, the second governor candidate, John Wempi was inducted

by *ondoafi* (*adat* leaders) from four tribes in Skouw. He was also inducted as *anak adat* of the Yawonda tribe in Yapen Islands Regency. This political transaction through trade off *anak adat* status as a form of vote buying from both candidates. The battle between two candidates in the Papua governorship election together with local elections in seven districts in highland areas—Jayawijaya, Puncak, Paniai, Deiyai, Memberamo Tengah, Biak Numfor and Mimika—has entrenched internal Papuan conflict (Dewi, 2022a: 134).

Currently, the new division of provinces (*pemekaran*) on Papua Island from two into six provinces has raised concerns among Papuans. All these provinces will hold simultaneous gubernatorial elections in November 2024. On one hand, the *pemekaran* will provide more opportunities for Papuans to become governors and vice governors, and it will also create other strategic positions for Papuans. On the other hand, there is anxiety among Papuans that these positions will be occupied not by Papuans but by non-Papuans through political transactions. A young activist from Raja Ampat, in the newly formed province of Papua Barat Daya—created from the division of Papua Barat province—urges *adat* leaders/elders and heads of *adat* institutions/organizations, such as the Dewan Adat Papua (DAP) or the Lembaga Masyarakat Adat (LMA), not to grant “*anak adat*” status to non-Papuans during the local head elections in 2024.

He warns that political transactions involving the buying and selling of “*anak adat*” status will only harm Papuans. The formation of the new *Majelis Rakyat Papua Barat Daya* (MRPBD) has triggered his anxiety. He fears that the new MRP will not adhere to the previous MRP decree on the definition of Orang Asli Papua (OAP), which stipulates that the governor and vice governor must be Papuans born to a Papuan mother and father or a Papuan father. He is concerned that this definition might be changed, especially considering that the process of creating the new provinces has faced many criticisms, with some claiming that it was imposed by the central government. Therefore, he believes it is possible that the OAP definition could be altered (Samagita, 2023).

C. Political Transaction: Buying Votes through the *Noken* Election System

The *Noken* election system is a unique tradition in Papua that is not found in other areas of Indonesia. The implementation of the *Noken* election system was upheld by the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, MK) in 2009, stating that the court “respected and recognized the unique mechanism of holding general elections by Papuans (in certain areas) through *adat* community consensus or acclamation” (Constitutional Court Decision 47-81/PHPU.A-VII/2009). This decision by the Constitutional Court was based on the use of the *Noken* election system in Yahukimo District. It was further reinforced by another Constitutional Court decision regarding the dispute over the local head election in Dogiyai District in 2012 (Constitutional Court Decision No. 3/PHPU.D-X/2012). The *Noken* system was first used in 1971 and continued to be used up until the 2018 gubernatorial election (FGD with LI, 8 July 2021). This system will still be used in the 2024 general election and the simultaneous local elections in 2024, especially in the highland areas and the new provinces of Papua Pegunungan and Papua Tengah. The *Noken* election system remains crucial in ensuring the political participation of Papuans.

Even so, the implementation of the *Noken* election system in several areas of Papua Province is still debatable. The group supporting the *Noken* election system argues that this system represents an *adat* community mechanism that the central government should respect. The *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* (AMAN) stated that the *Noken* election system cannot be replaced by a modern voting system, as a modern voting system would deteriorate social and political relations within *adat* communities. Furthermore, the implementation of elections in Indonesia does not have to be uniform, especially in *adat* communities. Additionally, Meepago *adat* leader John NR Gobay countered the argument that the *Noken* election system is prone to manipulation. He argued that manipulation does not occur during the election itself; instead, votes are manipulated by authorized officers after the ballots have been transferred (Dewi, 2022b).

The group that disagreed with the implementation of the *Noken* election system

is still questioning whether this system violates democratic principles. Additionally, those who oppose the *Noken* election system, including the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) and the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), argue that the system is prone to manipulation because the results do not purely represent the will of the *adat* community. Manipulation can occur in several forms. First, the *adat* leader may mark all the ballots in a way that differs from the *adat* community consensus. Second, the *adat* leader may mark all the ballots without the consent of the *adat* community. Third, manipulation may not happen during the election itself but may be carried out by election officials afterward. The MRP also argues that the *Noken* election system has a negative impact because it limits women’s opportunities to participate in the election (Dewi, 2022b; Pasaribu, 2017).

Looking at the facts, the *Noken* election system has brought a positive impact on the election process. This system creates close ties between the candidates and the voters, particularly the *adat* leaders. It provides a direct link between a voter and the candidate. This mechanism serves as an effective way to control whether the candidates have fulfilled their promises. The performance of the elected candidate will determine whether they will be re-elected in the next election.

However, this system also carries negative impacts. As mentioned earlier, the group calling for the elimination of the *Noken* election system argues that it is prone to manipulation. It cannot be denied that manipulation often occurs within this system. Ideally, the *Noken* election system should involve a process where the candidate to be elected by the *adat* community is selected through discussions among all the *adat* members. After the *adat* meeting decides on the candidate to be elected, the *adat* leader marks the ballots for all *adat* community members, using the “*ikat*” system or acclamation based on the consensus result. The role of the *adat* leader in the *Noken* election system is vital.

During this process, manipulation sometimes occurred. Political transactions took place through vote-buying, which invariably involved a sum of money. This was the cost that candidates had to pay. Candidates would buy

the votes of *adat* members through the *adat* leaders. It was not uncommon for *adat* leaders to be approached by politicians or political parties to support certain candidates. The candidates would typically give money and pigs to the *adat* community through the *adat* leader. In the name of *adat*, the politician would ask the *adat* leaders to persuade community members to vote for a particular candidate (Utama, 2018). If persuasion did not work, they would ask the *adat* leader to mark the ballots, even if it differed from the consensus result. Vote-buying was usually done during the stone burning (*bakar batu*). In addition, there were instances where certain *adat* leaders actively approached candidates to serve their individual interests. These leaders promised to deliver the votes of their *adat* members to a particular candidate. They could guarantee all the votes because the *adat* leader marked all the ballots on behalf of his *adat* community members. Under this system, the winner takes all in one location because the *adat* leaders vote for all the community members using the *ikat* system (Ananda, 2015; Pasaribu, 2017)

Aside from the financial cost, the destruction of *adat* values and norms is another consequence. This is the real high cost that the *adat* community has to face. The *Noken* system, which was originally used as a traditional mechanism by the *adat* community, is now viewed as an unreliable democratic mechanism. This situation is ironic. On one hand, Papua has received legal recognition through the implementation of Otsus for its struggle for Papuan and *adat* recognition. On the other hand, this hard-won legal recognition of *adat* is being undermined because the good image of tradition has been ruined and tainted by political transactions and manipulation. Sometimes, even the *adat* members themselves no longer trust the *Noken* system, which has been used by the Papuan *adat* community. Moreover, this situation has led several election watchdog activists to request the discontinuation of the *Noken* system in national or local elections. This has created a chain of consequences affecting other socio-economic aspects of *adat* beliefs, structures, culture, and traditions. The deteriorating trust in *adat* leaders has led to emerging horizontal conflicts within Papuan society. *Adat* institutions are no longer able to resolve these tensions, as they are now seen as conflicting parties. This has influenced

traditions within the Papuan community, and the deterioration of *adat* has become a high cost that the Papuan community has to bear.

IV. Conclusion

Papua's uniqueness lies in its many tribes or *adat* communities, each with equal status, regardless of size. Whether a tribe is large or small does not affect its representation; a large tribe cannot represent a small one, and vice versa. This situation shapes the dynamics of social politics in Papua. The presence of *adat* also influences the political landscape in local elections. Patronage democracy is evident in Papua, similar to other regions in Indonesia. Political transactions, in the form of clientelism, are observed during local elections, with the role of *adat* being crucial, especially following the enactment of Otsus in 2001.

After the enactment of this law, gaining status as a Papuan became particularly important, especially for non-Papuans. Strategic positions in Papua are required to be filled by Papuans, making it challenging for non-Papuans to obtain these roles. This situation has led to the tradeoff of *anak adat* status for non-Papuans. Induction as *anak adat* has become more common, particularly as local elections approach. To serve their individual interests, *adat* leaders or institutions, especially the LMA, have exploited *adat*. In the name of *adat*, they trade *anak adat* status as a form of political transaction. Interestingly, the tradeoff of *anak adat* status is not only sought by non-Papuans but also by Papuans. This was evident in the 2018 gubernatorial election, where both gubernatorial candidates competed to be recognized as native Papuans (*Papua asli*).

In addition to this phenomenon, the use of the *Noken* election system has also become a practice of political transactions. Politicians have exploited the traditional mechanism of the *Noken* election system by making "deals" with *adat* leaders to secure their candidacy. These politicians are often known as *adat* leaders who hold a vital role in the *Noken* election system. This hijacking is not only carried out by elites or politicians but also by *adat* leaders themselves. Aware of their significant role in the *Noken* election system, some *adat* leaders approach elites or politicians to negotiate vote-buying from

their *adat* community members. This practice has been observed in the implementation of the *Noken* election system. However, this does not mean that the *Noken* election system cannot be implemented. It simply requires better supervision from election officers to reduce such practices. The *Noken* election system remains important for Papuans in certain areas to participate in elections.

To conclude, political transactions have imposed high costs on local politics in Papua. As highlighted by several theories of political transactions, politicians often exploit situations by using their political power for practices such as vote-buying, disguising material exchanges as social programs, and employing political brokers to garner support. This dynamic is evident in Papua's local politics, where *adat* elites act as brokers in the buying and selling of *anak adat* status and vote-buying through political dowries from politicians. These political transactions have affected the formation of OAP (*Orang Asli Papua*) identity and led to further trade-offs in cultural traits and beliefs for Papuans, such as inheritance rights, access to *adat* land and livelihoods, and certain inclusive rights traditionally reserved for *adat* members. This represents a significant social cost that must be borne by both current and future *anak adat* in Papua, resulting in high political costs in Papua's local politics.

References

- Albuquerque, C., & Werner, D. (1985). Political Patronage in Santa Catarina, Brazil. *Current Anthropology*, 26(1), 117–120. <https://doi.org/10.1086/203232>
- Amin, M. (2021). The Culture of Transactional Politics in Indonesia's Gubernatorial Elections Since Reformation. *International Journal of Criminology and Sociology*, 10, 845–858. <https://doi.org/10.6000/1929-4409.2021.10.100>
- Ananda, P. (2015, November 19). Pilkada Yahukimo Pakai Sistem Noken: Masyarakat Sipil Khawatir. <https://www.medcom.id/Pilkada/News-Pilkada/MkMIGomb-Pilkada-Yahukimo-Pakai-Sistem-Noken-Masyarakat-Sipil-Khawatir>.
- Arifin, T., Hasan, I., & Kabir, R. (2020). Transactional and relational approaches to political connections and the cost of debt. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 65. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101768>
- As'ad, M. U., Zhyvko, Z., Boyko, O., & Ruda, I. (2021). Economization of Political Processes in Indonesia. *Economics, Finance, and Management Review*, 2, 33–42. <https://doi.org/10.36690/2674-5208-2021-2-33>
- Aspinall, E., & Hicken, A. (2020). Guns for hire and enduring machines: clientelism beyond parties in Indonesia and the Philippines. *Democratization*, 27(1). <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1590816>
- Auyero, J., Lapegna, P., & Poma, F. P. (2009). Patronage politics and contentious collective action: A recursive relationship. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 51(3). <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2009.00054.x>
- Bawaslu. (2023). Indeks Kerawanan Pemilu dan Pemilihan Serentak 2024. Badan Pengawas Pemilu. https://www.bawaslu.go.id/sites/default/files/publikasi/BUKU_IKP_PEMILU_DAN_PEMILIHAN_SERENTAK_2024-2.pdf
- Bawn, K., Cohen, M., Karol, D., Masket, S., Noel, H., & Zaller, J. (2012). A theory of political parties: Groups, policy demands and nominations in American politics. In *Perspectives on Politics* (Vol. 10, Issue 3). <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712001624>
- BPS. (2024). Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia (IDI) Menurut Provinsi. Bps.Go.Id. <https://jambi.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/2/MTkyOSMy/-metode-baru-indeks-demokrasi-indonesia-idi-menurut-provinsi.html>
- Brunner, J. A., Chen, J., Sun, C., & Zhou, N. (1990). The role of Guanxi in negotiations in the Pacific basin. *Journal of Global Marketing*, 3(2). https://doi.org/10.1300/J042v03n02_02
- Butler, G. (2015). Political economy, negotiations, power and empowerment. *Journal of Australian Political Economy*, 2015(75). <https://search.informit.org/doi/epdf/10.3316/informit.347658108151227>
- Chamidah, N., & Imawan, K. (2018). Measuring The Consistency Of Female Voters In The Practice Of Money Politics. *JURNAL ILMU KOMUNIKASI*, 2. <https://doi.org/10.33005/jkom.v0i2.27>
- Chaterine, R. N. & S. N. (2023, October 11). Polri Ungkap Ada 12 Wilayah Polda jadi Prioritas Pertama Karena Rawan pada Pemilu 2024. <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/10/11/13473981/polri-ungkap-ada-12-wilayah-polda-jadi-prioritas-pertama-karena-rawan-pada>.
- Chong, D., Citrin, J., & Conley, P. (2001). When self-interest matters. *Political Psychology*, 22(3). <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00253>
- Dewi, R. (2017). Hijacking *Adat* Recognition Through the Establishment of New Customary Community Council in Papua, Indonesia. *Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies*, 4(3). <https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.193>
- Dewi, R. (2022a). "The Uneasy Road to Peace: Papuanization and the Politics of Recognition. In O. Masaaki & J. Suryomenggolo (Eds.), *Indonesia at the Crossroads: Transformation and Challenges* (pp. 110–148). Kyoto University Press- Transpacific Press - UGM Press.
- Dewi, R. (2022b). The Implementation of *Noken* Election System in Papua, Indonesia: Could *Noken* as Election System Canalize Papua Conflict? *Direct Democracy Practices at the Local Level*.

- Dixit, A. (2003). Some Lessons from Transaction-Cost Politics for Less-Developed Countries. *Economics & Politics*, 15(2). <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00118>
- DPD. (2023). Otsus Berlaku di 4 DOB, Senator Filep: Pengisian Jabatan OPD Wajib Prioritaskan OAP. Dpd.Go.Id. <https://dpd.go.id/daftar-berita/otsus-berlaku-di-4-dob-senator-filep-pengisian-jabatan-opd-wajib-prioritaskan-oap>
- Embong, A. R. (2016). The Noisy Right and the Not-So-Silent Moderates: Democracy and All That in Malaysia. In *Globalization and Democracy in Southeast Asia*. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57654-5_3
- Fardian, M. I. (2021). Buying Voters: Money and Political Transaction in Legislative Elections. *Journal of Contemporary Sociological Issues*, 1(1). <https://doi.org/10.19184/csi.v1i1.21508>
- Funk, C. L. (2000). The Dual Influence of Self-Interest and Societal Interest in Public Opinion. *Political Research Quarterly*, 53(1), 37–62. <https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290005300102>
- Habib, A., Muhammadi, A. H., & Jiang, H. (2017). Political Connections and Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Indonesia. *International Journal of Accounting*, 52(1). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.01.004>
- Hafid, I., & Prasetyo Nugroho, D. (2021). Penegakan Hukum Mahar Politik dalam Pilpres 2019 Ditinjau dari Politik Hukum Pidana. *Jurnal Adhyasta Pemilu*, 2(2). <https://doi.org/10.55108/jap.v2i2.27>
- Hilgers, T. (2012). Clientelism in everyday Latin American politics. In *Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137275998>
- Hsu, F. L. K. (1943). Incentives to work in Primitive Communities. *American Sociological Review*, 8(6). <https://doi.org/10.2307/2085223>
- Hutchings, K., & Weir, D. (2006). Guanxi and Wasta: A Comparison. In *Thunderbird International Business Review* (Vol. 48, Issue 1). <https://doi.org/10.1002/tie.20090>
- Larmour, P. (2012). Corruption and the Concept of Culture: Evidence from the Pacific Islands. In *Corruption: Expanding the Focus*. <https://doi.org/10.22459/cef.09.2012.09>
- Luo, Y. (2008). The changing Chinese culture and business behavior: The perspective of intertwinement between guanxi and corruption. *International Business Review*, 17(2). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2008.02.002>
- Mahsun, M., Elizabeth, M. Z., & Mufrikah, S. (2021). Female Candidates, Islamic Women's Organisations, and Clientelism in the 2019 Indonesian Elections. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 40(1). <https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420988729>
- Moosavi, L. (2019). Decolonising Criminology: Syed Hussein Alatas on Crimes of the Powerful. *Critical Criminology*, 27(2). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-018-9396-9>
- Nell, G. L. (2017). Coordination and Collaboration: Agreement as a Criterion for Democratic Goodness. In *The Driving Force of the Collective*. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-46839-0_7
- Pasaribu, K. (2017). *Tambal Sulam Sistem Noken*. Perludem.
- Piattoni, S. (2012). Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation. In *Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation*. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139175340.010>
- Power, T. P. (2018). Jokowi's authoritarian turn and Indonesia's democratic decline. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 54(3). <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2018.1549918>
- Rapoport, A., Diekmann, A., & Franzen, A. (1995). Experiments with Social Traps III. *Rationality and Society*, 7(3). <https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463195007003006>
- Rizkika, H. L., Ummah, H., Raider, A. W., & Rahmawati, E. I. (2019). Banal Politik Transaksional Para Pemilih (Tinjauan Psikologis). *Insight: Jurnal Pemikiran Dan Penelitian Psikologi*, 15(2). <https://doi.org/10.32528/ins.v15i2.2094>
- Safford, F., & Martz, J. D. (1998). The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy and the State in Colombia. *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 78(2). <https://doi.org/10.2307/2518151>
- Samagita, H. (2023, February 10). "Politisi Non OAP Diingatkan Jangan Maju Sebagai Calon Gubernur/Wakil Gubernur PBD. <https://Teropongnews.Com/2023/02/Politisi-Non-Oap-Diingatkan-Jangan-Maju-Sebagai-Calon-Gubernur-Wakil-Gubernur-Pbd/>.
- Schmitt, H. O. (1963). Economic Interest and Indonesian Politics Once Again. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 12(1). <https://doi.org/10.1086/450041>
- Suara Papua. (2023, March 28). Fenomena Jual-Beli Marga Papua: Telanjangi Diri Sebelum Puna. <https://Suarapapua.Com/2023/03/28/Fenomena-Jual-Beli-Marga-Papua-Telanjangi-Diri-Sebelum-Punah/>.
- Sumartono, S. (2018). Budaya Politik dalam Masyarakat Pragmatis. *Lugas Jurnal Komunikasi*, 2(1). <https://doi.org/10.31334/jl.v2i1.119>
- Supatmi, S., Sutrisno, S., Saraswati, E., & Purnomosidhi, B. (2021). Abnormal related party transactions, political connection, and firm value: Evidence from Indonesian firms. *International Journal of Business and Society*, 22(1). <https://doi.org/10.33736/IJBS.3189.2021>
- Timberman, D. G. (2019). Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*.
- TSUI, A. S., & FARH, J.-L. L. (1997). Where Guanxi Matters. *Work and Occupations*, 24(1). <https://doi.org/10.1177/0730888497024001005>
- Twight, C. (1994). Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 6(2). <https://doi.org/10.1177/0951692894006002003>
- Ulum, M. B. (2020). Indonesian Democracy and Political Parties after Twenty Years of Reformation: A Contextual Analysis. *Indonesia Law Review*, 10(1). <https://doi.org/10.15742/ilrev.v10n1.577>

- Umam, Moh. K., & Muchlisin, M. (2022). Kyai Pesantren dan Politik Uang dalam Pilkada Indonesia: Kedudukan Kyai dalam Bernegosiasi dengan Demokrasi Neoliberal. *Resolusi: Jurnal Sosial Politik*, 5(2), 71–81. <https://doi.org/10.32699/resolusi.v5i2.2906>
- Utama, A. (2018, June 27). "Pilgub Papua: Janji kesejahteraan dalam bayang-bayang kontak tembak dan konflik perebutan suara. <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-44623771>.
- Wikrama, Utama A. A. N. A. (2020). Politik Mahar Di Indonesia: Antara Ada dan Tiada. *Jurnal Ilmiah Cakrawarti*, 1(2). <https://doi.org/10.47532/jic.v1i2.13>
- Zhan, J. V. (2012). Filling the gap of formal institutions: The effects of Guanxi network on corruption in reform-era China. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 58(2). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-012-9379-9>