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Political Bondage (Ijon) and Democracy:

How do Natural Resources Build High Electoral Political Financing Orders?

Hendy Setiawan

Abstract: The practice of political bondage (ijon) in electoral political events is a threat to democracy, which to this day is still relatively limitedly studied. This creates minimal gaps in how to view the phenomenon of high electoral political financing from the perspective of natural resource politics. So far, natural resources have always been viewed as inanimate objects. However, in the study of natural resource politics, this object is not neutral. The presence of the political bondage system which is a small part of the form of transactional politics in the informal democratic space has actually become the identity and characteristic of electoral politics in Indonesia. In the context of political bondage, the exchange of roles between patron becoming client and, vice versa, client becoming patron will continue to recur. This research uses a qualitative approach with library research methodology. Researchers collect data through secondary data, namely various relevant literature, starting from media, books, journals, news reports, formal institutional data, and other data which is sorted according to research needs. The results show that the practice of political bondage still fulfils and always colors electoral politics in Indonesia. This informal democratic practice leads to high levels of financing of electoral politics. Interestingly, the involvement of corporations in funding general elections outside of political party funds also has an impact on reciprocation for the management of natural resources. The development of transactional political practices in informal spaces will create challenges for the quality of democracy: the birth of corrupt behavior, the weakening of the government structure, dynastic-oligarchic politics, and the increase in electoral political financing. The conclusion is that the practice of political bondage will always grow in the space of informal democracy. The relationship between the public sector, elites and the private sector will always exchange roles as patron and client according to the conditions and electoral political map in the field.

Keywords: political bondage (ijon); natural resources; electoral politics; patron-client

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I. Introduction

The aim of this article is to discuss the high level of funding for electoral politics from an approach to studying the politics of natural resources as a non-neutral object. The involvement of natural resources in creating a system of high political costs has become a very interesting study, especially in the study of natural resource politics. Various studies show that natural resources are no longer considered neutral objects, because they are capable of building political influence, for example in the design of high political costs. The study from Mehlum et al. (2005), Ross (2001), Gelb (1989), Auty (2005), Near (1982) and also Billon (2019) have all proven how natural resources interact non-neutrally with state political affairs. How the power of natural resources is able to create resource wars, mobilize the masses for conflict, how natural resources are able to fund movements that carry out political resistance against the government in power, and even create wars between countries. It is in this context that it must be realized that natural resources are no longer considered as silent and inanimate objects, but the silence of natural resources is an accumulation of power that has not yet been demonstrated within the state's sphere of power. The way in which the accumulation of resource power is manifested can be understood by how the interaction process occurs and the impact of this interaction process.

If we look closely, the high-cost electoral politics currently being carried out in Indonesia cannot be separated from how natural resources become political actors that are intertwined with contestants and political actors who actually play in the country's political arena. This is because Indonesia, as a country that has abundant natural resource wealth, makes this object an object that is transacted in the electoral political process. In this situation, natural resources have been involved in the electoral political process and in the future this will become a threat in building a democratic electoral political system (Setiawan & Widyana, 2022). For this reason, it can be understood that natural resources, especially in areas rich in natural resources, will present new challenges in the electoral political system (Risal et al., 2022) & (Paramesthi & Dwiyantri, 2023). If the electoral political system in a country requires

high costs, then the political actors who will be elected to occupy political office will no longer think about the welfare of their people, but will think about how the economic concept of capital will return as quickly as possible, even multiplies of what has been spent (political costs).

The existence of abundant natural resources is like two blades that have contradictory functions. If managed well it will help ease human work. However, on the other hand, it can be a threat and can even kill. In the Indonesian context, regions that have abundant natural resources tend to have high levels of conflict intensity. There is an interaction that is built between the natural resources themselves and the political system that is being implemented. Table 1 below is a mapping of the relationship between conflict intensity and natural resource rich regions.

Table 1. Regions Rich in Natural Resources and Characteristics of Conflict in Indonesia

Province	Main Resources	Conflict Intensity	Conflict Manifestation
Aceh	Natural gas, timber	High	Well-articulated secessionist political movement A significant violent insurgency by an organized rebel group (GAM)
Papua	Oil, copper, gold, natural gas, timber	Medium	Fragmented and poorly articulated secessionist political movement, A minor violent insurgency by a less organized rebel group (OPM)
Riau	Oil, natural gas, minerals, timber	Low	Minor political secessionist sentiment
East Kalimantan	Oil, natural gas, minerals, timber	Low	Low Minor political secessionist sentiment

Source: (Tadjoeddin, 2007) & (Setiawan, 2022)

Based on table 1 above, it can be seen that regions that are rich in natural resources tend to have high conflict intensity (Aceh). This means that, indirectly, natural resources have reconstructed an increasingly dynamic social order, where conflict is a marker of the dynamic social order system that exists in the midst of people's lives. On this basis and reality, it can be said that if natural resources as inanimate objects are capable of increasing the intensity of conflict, then it is not wrong to say that due to

the high costs of electoral politics there is also an interdependence of natural resources.

The public's anxiety and worry about the high costs of electoral politics has actually been responded to by electoral political organizers. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that increasingly the political costs or economic modalities incurred by each candidate competing in elections are not small. Based on data from the Ministry of Home Affairs as stated by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), to become regent/mayor, it requires economic capital of at least 20-30 billion (Kompas, 2019). Meanwhile, it costs around 20-100 billion to become a candidate for governor (Medistiara, 2020). Referring to the website of the Directorate General of Politics and General Government (polpum) of the Ministry of Home Affairs, there are at least four reasons why the cost of electoral politics is so expensive. The first is due to culture and public beliefs which see political parties as no longer a tool for their ideological struggle. Second, there are doubts from the public that executive legislative candidates are able to represent their aspirations. Third, the direct election system for the public is not yet ready, and finally, many people have doubts about the independence of the General Election Commission (KPU), to the point that they have to install witnesses at every polling station and KPU offices (Kemendagri, 2018). For this reason, to anticipate and criticize the high costs of electoral politics, simultaneous regional head elections have been arranged since 2015 and simultaneous general elections since 2019 in order to minimize the high political costs.

The decision to determine the Regional Head Election is based on article 56 of Law Number 32 of 2004 which was later amended in Law Number 12 of 2008 is the spirit of substantive and consolidated democratic reform (Prianto, 2016 p. 107). This regulation is also a momentum to criticize the towering financing of electoral politics. Since 2015, regional head elections have been held in 269 regions spread across 9 provinces, 36 cities and 224 districts. Meanwhile in 2017 it was spread across 101 regions covering 7 provinces, 18 cities and 76 districts. In fact, in 2018 there were 171 regions covering 17 provinces, 39 cities and 115 districts. The uniformity of the timing of Regional Head Elections is merely a milestone in awareness of the high costs of politics. The aim is

to build efficiency in political budgets both spent by candidates and the election bureaucracy while maintaining humanistic democratic values (Puskapol Universitas Indonesia, 2018). However, the question is, have these regulations reduced the costs of electoral politics? Are the high costs of electoral politics an implication of the hijacking of the system carried out by the ruling oligarchy? Or are there other significant factors (for example natural resources) that cause electoral political financing to also increase? These several questions are the beginning and main opening of the issues that will be discussed in this interesting article.

The tendency for natural resources to be considered a two-legged game can actually be understood through the concept of "political bondage". This concept is reflected in the situation of high financing of electoral politics in each region. Interestingly, the concept of "political bondage" in elections is still very little studied. The term political bondage is basically used to describe the interaction of natural resources with electoral political practices. In simple terms, the pattern of the bonded debt system can be seen as an agreement or a deal that has been built between two parties, namely the political candidate and the baron who is trying to bring in natural resources as an object that will be transacted simultaneously and continuously. The initial financing was carried out involving barons as a form of anticipation that today's political financing requires quite a lot of money. If political candidates have limited economic modalities, then financing barons is an alternative and they will still be able to compete in the democratic party. One form of awareness that occurs in the field is that the need to participate in funding contestations is far greater than the wealth that is owned. So the next question is how and where should funding be taken to cover this shortfall? On this basis, political bondage is actually the answer to various obstacles faced by political contestants. This is the root of why political costs are higher.

On the other hand, political bondage is still looked down upon and not even considered to have much of an impact on the electoral political system. Therefore, it is time for the practice of the political bondage system to receive sufficient space for how its existence will threaten the

health of democracy in the future. This is what is called the shock effect of natural resources in the practice of implementing elections. There are several studies that have examined and explored the factors and triggers why financing democracy and electoral politics is so expensive. There are those who study the practice of money politics, the concept of political clientelism, the political culture of society, the concept of oligarchic hijacking of power on the political system, and even the use of approaches to the study of natural resource politics. There are at least three divisions (classifications of causes) in previous literature traced by the author that cause high political costs. For example, high political costs are caused by the massive practice of money politics, as studied by Sjafrina (2019). Furthermore, the cause of high political costs is caused by the process of political clientelism as studied by Ramadhan & Oley (2019) and Habibi (2021). The third phase where political financing has high costs is caused by the interaction of natural resource wealth with electoral politics - Setiawan & Widyana (2022). In short, the summary of the literature can be understood as follows.

First, a study conducted by Sjafrina regarding the impact of money political practices on the high cost of winning general elections and political corruption explains that general elections no longer reflect democracy with integrity. This is due to the buying and selling of nomination tickets and the buying and selling of votes. In her research, Sjafrina said that there were at least 13 corruption cases handled by the anti-corruption agency, the Corruption Eradication Commission, where the cases involved the cost of winning the general election. This research emphasizes and answers the question of why in Indonesia winning a candidate requires quite a lot of financial capital (Sjafrina, 2019). They have to finance one vote so that the financed vote chooses and wins the person concerned. If the number is thousands, even millions and if one vote is valued at a minimum of IDR 100,000, then how much aggregate nominal must be spent by each pair of candidates to obtain the winning edge in political positions? What about elections at the village level? Do you spend that much money too? In this context, a conclusion can be drawn that the practice of money politics in general elections is one of the causes of the high cost of electoral

politics at every democratic party held in the country, from the village to the central level.

Second, a research conducted by Ramadhan and Oley regarding clientelism as corrupt behavior and banal democracy found empirical facts that the practice of homeland democracy in terms of electoral politics is still carried out in the concept of political transactions, namely the process of demand and supply through the concept of clientelism. In simple terms, clientelism can be interpreted as a socio-political phenomenon that is correlated with the general election phase. Clientelistic power is a special form of informal power that influences the game (Kusche, 2014 p. 207). In the practice of electoral politics, it is reflected as a power relationship between the political actor, as the epicenter and providing something (patron) non-programmatically, and the target party who receives it (client) which is based on the concept of loyalty by the recipient (paternalistic). This clientelism is different from bribery, because the transactions built in the patron-client concept are continuous and uninterrupted like the concept of bribery (Ramadhan & Oley, 2019). Meanwhile, Medina and Stokes argue that patronage involves a "political monopoly" over relevant patronage goods and services, which can only be controlled by a politician while in office (Adnan & Chhibber, 2016 p. 85). This research emphasizes that the concept of clientelism in practice then triggers expensive electoral political costs. The concept of electoral politics that is implemented is patterned after buying and selling transactions in the market. The existence of a demand and supply system in electoral politics is what indirectly requires political candidates and contestants to spend high amounts of independent financing in order to be elected in the democratic contestation process.

Third, a research conducted by Habibi related to political corruption in regional head elections and a new style of clientelism explains that in the development of the effects of natural resources, especially in areas rich in natural resources, it is actually capable of triggering the formation of expensive democratic financing as indicated by the practice of the political debt bondage system (Habibi, 2021). Such conditions will result in the democratic system in the regional realm becoming increasingly limited. This means

that in terms of accessibility, only certain groups can take part in the contest. Democracy is no longer carried out openly and fairly, but only by those who have strong economic capital. In the end, this democracy will reduce citizens' political opportunities and create inequality in participating in the democratic party (Setiawan & Sa'diyah, 2021) & (Setiawan & Widyana, 2022 p. 2). The political bondage system can simply be interpreted as a process of intertwining between political candidates who will compete in elections and entrepreneurs (political elites and economic society) by involving natural resources as objects that will be used as political transactions. This means that if the candidate has limited economic funds, the initial financing will be provided by a businessman (baron) with the hope that when selected it will smooth out the natural resource management process, both from the licensing process and the acquisition of ownership and management of natural resources.

Fourth, a study conducted by Setiawan and Widyana related to the high financing of democracy: political bondage stimulus in local general elections in regions rich in natural resources shows that there is a connection with how high electoral costs in the local sphere are in Regional Head Elections, especially regions that tend to have an abundance of natural resources. For example, various corruption cases intersect with natural resource governance. Corrupt behavior in this area started from the obsession of the elected candidates to return the economic capitals they had previously spent (Setiawan & Widyana, 2022). In this situation, the involvement of natural resources in the Regional Head Election contestation becomes increasingly complex considering that the objects being transacted are objects that are not neutral to the country's political system.

The latest study comes from Risal et al related to natural resources in the vortex of simultaneous Regional Head Elections. This study is very interesting because it tries to draw out the object of natural resources in the electoral political process. The findings produced in this research are that regional head elections have become an arena for battle between barons and regions that are indicated to have natural resource wealth. This struggle was carried out between local and national barons over areas rich in natural

resources as the object. The process is that they fight and compete through funding and financing all the needs required by the candidate concerned (Risal et al., 2022 p. 135). The emphasis and locus in this research show that natural resources are able to move the electoral political machine. Therefore, on the basis of a system with a pattern like this, the electoral political costs externalities felt by candidates are getting higher day by day.

Several studies that have been presented by researchers make it clear what actually triggers the high costs of electoral politics in Indonesia. Starting from the massive practice of money politics in society, the existence of a patron-client system pattern that creates banal democracy, weak community participation, to the emergence of the political bondage system as a new challenge to the electoral political system. These five previous studies still very limitedly studied the problem of high election financing which was associated with the non-neutrality of the natural resources themselves. Only researches by (Habibi, 2021) & (Setiawan & Widyana, 2022) examine how the high costs of democracy are due to the strong manifest of the political bondage system. The limitations of previous literature are what the author then wants to offer, namely that natural resources have strange effects which then give rise to very expensive election financing. The study of elections and natural resources was then strengthened by research by Risal et al. (2022) which tries to show the position of SDA involvement in the vortex of simultaneous Regional Head Elections. Risal in his research said that the link between natural resources and democracy gave birth to a political industry, where high electoral political financing made the wheels of democracy turn. The study of high cost political financing in the political study approach to natural resources in Indonesia has not been presented well enough. Even though natural resources have long had a strange effect on democratic systems, where oil natural resources are able to hurt democracy (Ross, 2001).

Therefore, this study is interesting and challenging because it presents and tries to see how natural resources play an important role in creating expensive election financing arrangements. The main and fundamental question of this research is how natural resource objects play a role in creating electoral political

costs through the political bondage system. This question will of course be resolved using the concept of the natural resources political approach as conceptualized by Gelb (1989), Billon (2019), Mehlum et al. (2005), and elaborated with Ross (2001) to answer the main research formulation that has been determined by the researcher. The natural resources political approach tries to explain how the existence of natural resources are able to change the electoral political order that operates in a country. At first glance, electoral political financing is indeed a national phenomenon, but if we look more closely there are connections that tend to show how the abundance of natural resources will become the object of electoral transactions between investors and political contestants. In this position, the existence of natural resources is considered not neutral from the political side of natural resources. In simple terms, this paper will analyze the dynamics of the existence of natural resources in coloring the electoral political financing system so that the relationship between natural resource abundance basically has the capacity and ability to build an electoral political system structure in terms of financing. Changes in electoral political financing are not neutral and natural, but are a form of politicization of natural resources, which involve various actors who have access and interest in obtaining votes in political contestation (Herdiansyah, 2018 p. 146).

II. Methods

This type of research uses a qualitative approach with the library research method. The author uses this approach to collect various data spread across various media and of course relevant secondary literature so that data reduction is carried out according to needs. The use of the library research method in this research has at least some research reinforcement. Firstly, through this method, it will be easier for researchers to reach and collect various data, both from data sourced from literature, such as formal authorities (government), media, books, journals, or other sources that are relevant to the topic being studied in this research. Secondly, through library research, the researcher will get a lot of data both quantitatively and qualitatively, so that later the data will be sorted and selected to answer research questions according to needs.

Third, through this method the researcher has the freedom to interpret data by comparing it to the reality of the research object being studied.

This research was conducted by collecting data from February 1, 2023 to June 26, 2023. The object used as the locus of this research is the high costs of electoral politics connected by natural resources through political bondage as a threat to the country's political system. The reason the research locus was chosen was because so far the approach used to understand the high level of electoral political financing has rarely been studied using the natural resources political approach. As a result, election studies related to natural resources politics, for example political bondage studies, are still very minimal, resulting in limited literature. However, on the other hand, natural resources political studies are able to explain various phenomena in electoral political practice, one of which is why the costs of electoral politics can be high. Departing from the limitations of this approach in understanding high political financing, researchers will try a new approach, namely the political approach to natural resources, which states that natural resource objects are not inanimate objects as an element of research novelty. This approach was used because it is very relevant to the issue of soaring electoral political financing issued by political contestants, especially involving natural resources as the object being transacted.

The distinctiveness of this research, apart from the approach method used by the researcher, lies in the factual and recurring issues. The problem of financing electoral politics which is increasing day by day certainly creates an unhealthy and uncompetitive democracy. Moreover, the high political costs have given rise to a system of political bondage. On the one hand, this system is indeed a middle way to deal with high levels of political financing, especially for contestants who experience financial constraints. However, on the other hand, this system has seriously threatened the quality of democracy itself. On this basis, political bondage must be a study that should be given space in electoral politics so that it will enrich the body of science and knowledge in explaining the phenomenon of expensive financing in electoral politics. Meanwhile, the researcher in carrying out the research stages used Creswell's concept. According to Creswell,

the stages of qualitative research consist of problem identification, literature search, research aims and objectives, data collection, data analysis and interpretation, and research reporting (Raco, 2018 p. 38).

III. Results and Discussion

A. Natural Resources and Electoral Political Order

Natural resources have actually played a very important role in constructing the political system (Rakhman & Haryadi, 2020). However, ironically, the involvement of natural resources is rarely studied and does not even have space in the study of electoral politics. On the contrary, this study has a very dynamic space in the debate on resource politics, especially in the study of natural resource politics. Therefore, this article actually tries to be interesting and provide space for how the study of natural resources will begin to be debated seriously in electoral politics. As a starting point to provide a more in-depth discussion of this article, for example, we can look at the Election Vulnerability Index (IKP) data conducted by the Central Election Supervisory Agency. Indirectly, the highest IKP is dominated by provinces with large natural resource wealth. In this context, we can actually see a correlation in how regions rich in natural resources tend to result in high IKP. Therefore, the correlation between the abundance of natural resources and high levels of electoral political financing is a logical, rational, and non-far-fetched relationship to be studied and its scientificity does not need to be doubted. Table 2 below shows the IKP released by Indonesian General Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu RI) with either high, low or medium IKP levels in each province in Indonesia.

Table 2. Relationship between Election Vulnerability Index and Regions Rich in Natural Resources

Election Vulnerability Index (IKP)		
Category	Region/Province	Index Score
High (5 Regions)	D.K.I Jakarta	88,95
	North Sulawesi	87,48
	North Maluku	84,86
	West Java	77,04
	East Kalimantan	77,04

Medium (21 Regions)	Banten	66,53
	Lampung	64,61
	Riau	62,59
	Papua	57,27
	East Nusa Tenggara	56,75
Low (8 Regions)	North Kalimantan	20,36
	Central Kalimantan	18,77
	East Java	14,74
	West Kalimantan	12,69
	Jambi	12,03

Note Not all regions are shown in the table above


Source: (Bawaslu, 2022)

If you look closely at the IKP data as released by Bawaslu 2022, the majority of IKP in the high and medium categories are dominated by provinces with a tendency to have large natural resources. For example, in the high category, the regions that have natural resource wealth are North Sulawesi, North Maluku and East Kalimantan. The inclusion of East Kalimantan province in the high category of IKP confirms the interaction of natural resources with the electoral political system of the local community. The East Kalimantan region is famous as the largest natural gas producing region in Indonesia. One of the points that holds natural gas wealth is the Mahakam Block. Natural gas reserves stored in this area are estimated to reach 607.15 million TFC (Ningrum, 2018). This wealth then interacts with the electoral political system to the extent that it is known as political bondage in the democratic space.

B. Abundance of Natural Resources is a Threat to Democracy?

Long before, a natural resources political scientist from California University, namely (Ross, 2001) had proven how natural resources objects were capable of hurting democracy in every country. Even natural resources themselves are capable of generating bloody conflicts between groups, so the cautionary principle is needed so that natural resource externalities do not have a negative impact. In the concept of relationship between fund providers (baron) and political contestants, the two will exchange roles depending on success in winning by transacting natural resource objects. This means the pattern of how and when political contestants play as patron or client or vice versa when and how the baron plays as patron and

client. Figure 1 below shows the relationship between barons and political candidates in the concept of patron client which forms political bondage.



- Political Contestant Candidate
- Funding Provider (Business/Baron/Businessman)
- Patron
- Client
- Access provider and Ease of Business Licensing
- Elections In Natural Resource Rich Regions
- Win
- Corrupt Behavior
- Politics Of Retribution

Figure 1. Patron Client Relationships (Barons & Political Contestants) in the Mechanism of the Political Bondage System in Natural Resources Rich Regions
 Source: (Setiawan & Widiana, 2022 p. 12)

Based on the cycle of relationship between fund providers and potential political contestants, it can be seen how political bondage can be built. Political bondage is formed as a result of the existence of natural resources, which are used as objects of reciprocation that will be given by political candidates who win the election to entrepreneurs who have funded them from the start. This interconnectedness of relationships then makes it inevitable that the costs of electoral politics are getting higher day by day. Without the help of entrepreneurs, of course political contestants who have limited economic capital will have difficulty financing the political process, starting from campaign activities, buying and selling votes, even various electoral activities leading to political victory. Therefore, basically every electoral political activity related to the victory of political contestants certainly requires

money, including mobilizing the masses in whatever form it takes. This condition is certainly a threat to democracy itself because it will give birth to leadership that does not take sides with the people (Hidayat, 2020 p. 65).

The high level of funding for electoral politics has clearly created real and serious challenges and threats. This will clearly limit access and opportunities for every citizen in politics. Interestingly, this high level of political financing was triggered by the repeated practice of the political debt bondage system. This reality then strengthens his findings (Ross, 2001) that natural resources have strange properties, including being able to make democratic systems very volatile. If we look at Ross's approach, then the high level of election financing will certainly not only create an unstable democracy, but will also create an unhealthy democracy, especially for the rationality of voters. This is certainly very far from the narratives and expectations of the orientation of all parties, namely consolidated substantive democracy. In this context, it can be understood that the bondage system is a manifestation of money. This means that money has created a basic tool in the practice of modern democracy. Political financing influences almost every democratic activity in both developing and consolidated countries (Sahroni et al., 2019 p. 147). Table 3 below shows the correlation of the quality of democracy with the level of dependence on natural resources in each province in Indonesia based on regional resource curse index (RRCI) calculations using the geometric mean conditional weighted product method carried out by (Rahma et al., 2021). To obtain the RRCI index, two other indices were used, namely the Regional Dependence Index on Natural Resources or Natural Resources Dependence Index (NRDI) and the Regional Sustainability Development Index (RSDI).

Based on data from the Indonesian Democracy Index which is linked to the natural resource dependency index, it can be seen that there is a tendency for regions that have high natural resource dependency to also have a pattern on the quality of their democracy. Based on the data above, regions such as Aceh, Papua, West Papua, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Riau Islands and Riau obtained an index value for natural resource dependence which tends

Table 3. Indonesian Democracy Index 2018-2020 and Natural Resources Dependence Index 2021

Province	Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI) Based on Province				Natural Resources Dependence Index 2021	
	2018	2019	2020	IDBHSDA	NRDI	
ACEH	79.97	78.00	73.93	26,84	14,84	
NORTH SUMATERA	64.33	67.65	65.13	0.11	0.79	
WEST SUMATERA	67.06	67.69	73.00	0.08	0.24	
RIAU	77.59	75.21	76.86	18.64	21.50	
JAMBI	68.71	69.76	75.53	5.46	9.06	
SOUTH SUMATERA	77.14	78.96	74.80	9.51	9.52	
BENGGKULU	70.71	78.79	72.20	1.62	1.26	
LAMPUNG	68.67	72.56	72.79	0.60	1.28	
BANGKA BELITUNG ISLANDS	73.43	76.75	77.39	5.85	1.64	
RIAU ISLANDS	79.19	81.64	76.72	16.18	16.82	
DKI JAKARTA	85.08	88.29	89.21	0.29	0.26	
WEST JAVA	65.50	69.09	71.32	0.44	0.54	
CENTRAL JAVA	72.17	77.22	75.43	0.01	0.28	
DI YOGYAKARTA	80.82	80.67	81.59	0.00	0.00	
EAST JAVA	72.86	77.68	70.71	0.92	1.61	
BANTEN	73.78	72.60	75.82	0.02	0.08	
BALI	82.37	81.38	77.59	0.00	0.17	
WEST NUSA TENGGARA	73.63	76.64	74.27	1.34	3.19	
EAST NUSA TENGGARA	82.32	81.02	77.29	0.06	0.06	
WEST KALIMANTAN	76.14	77.66	81.09	0.49	0.89	
CENTRAL KALIMANTAN	71.27	81.16	74.91	5.31	6.31	
SOUTH KALIMANTAN	79.92	79.47	74.05	15.10	12.86	
EAST KALIMANTAN	73.88	77.67	81.99	59.82	75.72	
NORTH KALIMANTAN	81.07	83.45	78.24	-	-	
NORTH SULAWESI	77.77	77.08	79.00	0.63	1.24	
CENTRAL SULAWESI	75.29	77.27	75.85	1.21	3.11	
SOUTH SULAWESI	70.88	70.58	67.61	0.36	1.36	
SOUTHEAST SULAWESI	74.32	65.21	67.73	1.84	5.18	
GORONTALO	72.59	76.29	83.21	0.06	0.12	
WEST SULAWESI	71.46	77.42	73.09	0.06	0.25	
MALUKU	75.51	68.22	73.22	0.07	0.28	
NORTH MALUKU	72.10	69.89	71.68	3.07	2.72	
WEST PAPUA	58.29	57.62	61.76	83.97	50.86	
PAPUA	62.20	65.25	64.54	39.29	31.88	
INDONESIA	72.39	74.92	73.66	-	-	

Source: * Provincial Gross Regional Domestic Product in Indonesia according to BPS Business Fields (processed);

**LKPP, Ministry of Finance (Rahma et al., 2021 p. 156) and Central Bureau of Statistics 2021 (processed)

to be high, followed by natural resource dependence which tends to be high. Even in East Kalimantan, dependency reached 75.72. Meanwhile, natural resource dependency in Aceh is more than 14.00. This confirms Tadjoeidin's 2007 findings that the inclusion of Aceh with a natural resource dependency of 14.94 represents a dilemma regarding the relationship between natural resources and conflict and democracy (Tadjoeidin, 2007). On the one hand, Aceh has the highest conflict intensity as a region rich in natural resources. On the other hand, according to the democracy index, Aceh tends to be stable, so the effect of natural resource externalities has a strange nature, in fact it has been tested in Aceh.

Based on data released by Publish What You Pay (PWYP) in its release in September 2020, there are several regions in Indonesia that are affected by the resource curse amidst its abundance. Before the data was released, PWYP Indonesia held a Knowledge Forum (PKF) with the title "Regional Resource Index Rich in Natural Resources, Corruption and Governance" on August 6 2020. Harian, an academic and observer of natural resources from the University of Indonesia used the Regional Resource Curse Indonesia index (RRCI) to measure the degree of natural resource curse. As a result, East Kalimantan, West Papua, Papua, Riau and Aceh became regions with a high natural resource curse (Pransuamitra, 2023). Therefore, this resource dependency in the natural resources political approach is known as the paradox of plenty phenomenon. PWYB and PKF collaborated by presenting Dr Hania Rahma, an academic and observer of natural resource issues, explaining and showing the results of her dissertation research while studying at IPB (Bogor Agricultural Institute). His dissertation explains the phenomenon of the natural resource curse (NRC) in various regional developments in Indonesia. The results show that the curse of natural resources occurs in the local area, especially in the oil and gas sector. Figure 2 below shows the level of natural resource depletion based on research by Dr Hania Rahma (academic at the University of Indonesia).




Figure 2. Natural Resources Curse Index in the Province (RRCI)
Source: (PWYP, 2020)

Based on the data above, using the geometric mean of conditional weighted product method to determine the natural resource curse index, the results show that the regions of East Kalimantan, West Papua, Riau and Aceh are the four regions in Indonesia that have the highest level of resource curse. This data confirms and is in line with Tadjoeidin (2007) & Rahma et al., (2021) where in his research shows the link between the abundance of natural resources and the high curse of natural resources.

C. The Political Bondage System and the Soaring of Electoral Financing

The development of an interesting correlation between natural resources and the high costs of electoral politics can be seen through the concept of a political debt bondage pattern carried out by the integration of two or more groups represented by barons as funders and political elites as the funded parties (Ata, 2022 p. 67). The case of political bondage based on data from the National Coordinator of the Mining Advocacy Network (Jatam) states that investors use political momentum to ensure that their businesses survive and even expand. Jatam noted that in Indonesia there are 8,000 coal mining permits, 300 oil and gas permits, there are rare earth metals and radioactivity. This practice creates an arena for the exchange of influence ranging from political corruption and political interference, from donations to electoral political costs from the private sector (Widiyanto, 2020). Not to mention the case in the 2018 simultaneous regional elections, as stated by Kontras, especially in East Kalimantan, the candidates who ran in the

regional elections had a bad record regarding the management of the mining industry. During his four terms as deputy mayor and mayor of Samarinda, Syahrie Ja'ang issued 63 mining permits which covered 71% of the area of Samarinda, causing 17 children to die. Isran Noor, former Regent of East Kutai with a controversial track record of allowing violations of the law in cases of illegal mining and the deaths of 28 children in a hole in a former coal mine in East Kalimantan (KontraS, 2018).

This practice is actually a loophole played by certain parties considering that candidates already understand how to create strategies to secure votes and consolidate votes in order to achieve political victory (Prasetyo, 2019 p. 16). The question that then arises is how is it possible for electoral political financing to be inexpensive if every candidate has to fund every political activity, starting from funds for donations to political parties, campaign teams which include success teams, political spending which also includes the need for campaign attributes, even buying and selling votes or the practice of money politics in order to influence the behavior and way voters use their votes? This series and density of financing is the concrete reason that political bondage is the way that must be taken that candidates can meet the demands of political financing, so in the end political remuneration will be obtained by the fund provider when the candidate in question succeeds in winning in the political contest.

Ward Berenschot and Edward Aspinall in their book entitled "Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia" state that Indonesian democracy in informal spaces is rarely studied by political scholars. Berenschot and Aspinall gave an example, transactional politics, one of which is buying and selling votes, has become a unique identity for informal political practices, even though the issue of transactional politics itself can be found in other countries (Argentina and India) and Indonesia as a comparison. High political costs are very troubled with transactional politics so they need to be limited because they can lead to corrupt practices, oligarchic politics, and even create a weak government structure (UGM, 2019). Based on this study, it can be understood that political bondage is also a form of transactional politics as a manifestation of democratic practice in informal

spaces. This practice of democracy in informal spaces is the reason why political financing is increasing day by day.

Political Observer from Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), or now National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), Siti Zuhro, stated that campaign fund donations could be a space as well as potential land for a political bondage system (transactional relationship system between government and donors/private sector) (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2015 p. 28). This practice has been widely proven in regional elections, but in nominal aggregate terms it is difficult to reveal. Political bondage is likened to a transactional political practice, which patterns and dynamics can be understood, but uncovering the nuggets of this practice on the surface is very difficult. For example, the Jokowi-Ma'aruf campaign funds that were reported to the KPU during the campaign were obtained from various sources. Campaign funds from the supporting party amounted to Rp. 79 billion and individual funds of Rp. 21 billion. There are as many as 40 companies, one of which is PT Rakabu Sejahtera which incidentally belongs to Jokowi and which is now held by his two sons, namely Gibran Rakabumung and Kaesang Pangarep. From around 40 companies, campaign funds of Rp. 253 billion. There were around 17 donors on behalf of the group, who contributed Rp. 251 billion. This group is fronted by barons or private groups (Tempo, 2019). Funds originating from non-political parties, namely from individuals and private groups, act as a bridge for political communication, where when the candidate supported by the funding wins the election, it is certain that they will be able to guarantee the continuity of this private group running its business. For example, providing various facilities for mining exploration and natural resources from the state to the private sector. This is actually a loophole used by groups of investors so that they can manage natural resources because at the start they have provided financial support for political contestation. This is because several private parties who fund politics have more or less contact with the natural resources management sector.

The involvement of private groups who also provide funds indirectly will create the power to dictate the powers that be in power. Therefore, the rise of various criminal cases, conflicts, murders

related to the struggle for power over resources between the state and society, corporations and society, states and individuals, corporations and individuals, even schemes between states and corporations has become clear evidence of how the position exchange system works. between patron and client turbulent in informal spaces. Various records from non-state groups such as the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA), the Mining Advocacy Network (JATAM), the Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN) movement, or movements and associations and even voluntary associations, have all shown how the power struggle between state and non-state groups is mutual. actualized in informal spaces. The hustle and bustle and complexity of this problem is a reality that occurs so that political financing for elections increases is not something that is considered taboo. This is all an externality of a transactional power struggle system that tries to dominate and dictate to each other. An important implication of the results of this research is that the abundance of natural resources in a region tends to influence the quality of electoral administration. The abundance of natural resources has great potential to create a political bondage system so that in the process of holding elections, the involvement of natural resources will be a financing shortcut. Therefore, ultimately the practice of electoral transactions in regions with high levels of natural resource abundance will trigger high costs of democracy. In the end, democracy will become an arena for the production of leadership in an area rich in natural resources as a result of transactions between political candidates and the business sector.

IV. Conclusion

Political bondage is a democratic practice in informal spaces that is part of electoral pathology in Indonesia. This practice of democracy in informal spaces is rarely seen by political scientists so that the phenomenon of high election financing is also limited from this approach. For a long time, natural resources have actually contributed to creating new hands in the form of political bondage. Various political interactions in holding people's parties do not escape the practice of transactional politics so that what emerges is money as the basis of political tools. Apart from that, the patron and client system between the dictator and those

dictated to in power operates very dynamically. The provider of political funds at a certain moment in the informal space of democracy turns into the patron while the political contestants who are funded become clients. After political victory, the politics of retribution becomes the main guarantee in the practice of transactional politics. Natural resources have become objects and commodities that are always transacted until finally the rise of agrarian conflicts, land disputes with the community, and even expensive political financing has become a rational risk for this informal practice of democracy. In the future, political bondage will be a serious threat to the quality of democracy. This is because equal space, opportunities and access are not opened for every community that will participate in political contestation. Therefore, it is natural that Aspinall and Sukmajati claim that a system like this will make the country's political system weak, and the nature of corruptive-oligarchic behavior is a characteristic of this bondage system.

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