BESTUURSKUNDE
Journal of Governmental Studies

The Author(s). (2026). *Bestuurskunde: Journal of Governmental Studies, 6*(2), 145-159
https://doi.org/10.53013/bestuurskunde.6.2.145-159

OPEN ACCESS

Article

Regulation of Community Organizations in Indonesia: Toward a Proportionate Regulatory Framework

Muhaimin, Novi Enjelina Putri

Abstract: Freedom of association is a constitutional right guaranteed under Article 28 and Article 28E(3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Nevertheless, the development of regulations governing community organizations (*Ormas*) in Indonesia has not followed a linear trajectory from repression toward democratization. This study examines changes in the regulatory regime governing *Ormas* based on three principal legal instruments: Law No. 8 of 1985, Law No. 17 of 2013, and Law No. 16 of 2017. The study employs a normative juridical method with a qualitative and historical-analytical approach. Unlike previous studies, which have generally adopted a descriptive-historical approach, this study analyzes the three legal regimes through the framework of manifest and latent functions. This framework demonstrates that the expansion of opportunities for *Ormas* participation following the Reform Era did not necessarily eliminate the coercive power of the state. Rather, the expansion of participation occurred alongside selective facilitation and practices of co-optation. The findings indicate that compliance with the principle of proportionality, which encompasses legality, legitimate aims, and the necessity and balancing of measures, varies across the three regulatory regimes. Law No. 8 of 1985 fails to satisfy the latter two elements. Law No. 17 of 2013 provides a stronger normative framework but faces weaknesses in its implementation. Meanwhile, Law No. 16 of 2017 represents a regression in terms of proportionality by eliminating judicial review mechanisms in the process of dissolving *Ormas*. Based on these findings, this study proposes four policy principles as a basis for restructuring *Ormas* regulation: legal certainty, restoration of fair legal process, strengthening the state's supportive functions, and symmetrical accountability. These four principles are expected to provide a relevant framework for the Ministry of Home Affairs' agenda for reforming *Ormas* regulation.

Received
25 August 2025

Accepted
08 September 2026

Published online
30 October 2026

Author(s)
Corresponding Author
Muhaimin
0009-0001-9634-155X
muhaimin@utssurabaya.ac.id
Universitas Teknologi Surabaya, Indonesia

Novi Enjelina Putri
0009-0007-6960-9227
novi.enjelinap@utssurabaya.ac.id
Universitas Teknologi Surabaya, Indonesia

Keywords: Freedom of association, legal proportionality, *ormas* regulation, co-optation, repression

About the Author(s)

Muhaimin is a lecturer in Public Administration at the University of Technology Surabaya, with a focus on public policy. He is also actively involved as a researcher at the Nexus Law and Society Study Center, with research interests in governance, law, and civil society.

Novi Enjelina Putri is a lecturer in Criminal Law, with a research focus on gender issues and restorative justice. She currently serves as the Director of the Nexus Law and Society Study Center and is actively engaged in research and advocacy aimed at promoting legal reform grounded in social justice perspectives.

© 2026 The Author(s)

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

I. Introduction

Freedom of association and assembly constitutes one of the pillars of a democratic state governed by law. Articles 28 and 28E(3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia explicitly guarantee the right of every citizen to associate, assemble, and express their opinions. This constitutional guarantee is reinforced by international legal instruments, including Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Indonesia ratified through Law No. 12 of 2005 (International Law Making, 2006).

The right to peaceful assembly must also be recognized by the State, and no restrictions may be imposed on its exercise except as provided by law and where necessary in a democratic society. This right is also stipulated in Article 21 of Law No. 12 of 2005 concerning the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI), 1966).

Civil society organizations represent the most important expression of this right to freedom of association. As organizations that emerge from citizen initiatives, they play a strategic role in Indonesia's democratic model. They consolidate public interests, monitor government performance, promote social development, and strengthen citizens' political participation beyond formal electoral mechanisms (Wibowo & Harefa, 2015). From the perspective of deliberative democracy theory, the civil society sphere they occupy serves as an important arena for the formation of rational public opinion and legitimate decision-making (Habermas, 1996).

Therefore, the state not only guarantees the freedom to establish and operate community organizations (Ormas), but also regulates their activities through legislation in accordance with the principles of democracy, national unity, and public order. Ormas serve as a forum for members of society to exercise their freedom of association and assembly (Setiawan, 2020).

Ormas, as a form of public participation or civil society, are expected to function as a balancing system (Fransen & Dupuy, 2024) and as a *check and balance* mechanism vis-à-vis the nation-state (Prayudi, & Lindawaty, 2022). Fundamentally, Ormas occupy a strategic position in Indonesia's political and democratic life. As part of civil society, Ormas serve to represent interests, consolidate collective efforts, and provide a space for citizens' political participation beyond formal electoral channels (Adam, 2024).

As social institutions, Ormas perform several strategic functions in society. First, Ormas serve as a means of socialization that can shape the character and social behavior of their members. For example, organizations engaged in religious outreach contribute to instilling moral and religious values in community life. Second, Ormas function as a means of aggregating and articulating the interests of the social groups they represent. Third, organizational activities provide members with opportunities to develop a sense of responsibility, social awareness, and the ability to work collaboratively. Fourth, Ormas constitute an important element of democratic life because they can serve as channels for conveying public aspirations. The more citizens are organized within a particular association, the greater their opportunity to collectively advance shared interests. Fifth, Ormas function as a medium for leadership development, contributing to the emergence of both formal and informal leaders within society.

However, the relationship between the state and Ormas has never been entirely harmonious. The history of Indonesian law demonstrates that, since the New Order era, the state has tended to adopt a repressive approach and employ legal instruments that restrict freedom of association (DPR RI, 2012). The legacy of state-dominated regulations, such as Law No. 8 of 1985 on Ormas, placed Ormas under state authority and significantly constrained their role in strengthening democracy and social oversight (Prayudi, 2018).

Under the New Order regime, suppression and strict oversight of Ormas considered potential threats to security and political stability were predominant. These measures were undertaken to achieve political stability by controlling organizational dynamics, particularly those of mass-based organizations (Jentera, 2013). Critical and independent organizations tended to be marginalized or have their freedom of action restricted (DPR RI, 2012). The political environment

during this period was characterized by a hierarchical culture and patron-client relationships, in which public political participation was subject to processes of alienation and exclusion from public policy-making (Prayudi, 2018).

The constitutional framework requires that the regulation of Ormas strike a balance between protecting freedom of association and addressing legitimate interests that may justify its restriction. From a human rights perspective, Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees freedom of association while, at the same time, permitting restrictions prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society to protect national security, public safety, public order, public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. Therefore, the grounds for imposing restrictions do not confer unlimited power upon the state; any restriction must have a legal basis and pursue a legitimate aim, while complying with the principles of necessity and proportionality.

Several previous studies, such as Prayudi (2018), have examined the development of civil organizations and civil society in the post-Reform Era period. The findings indicate that the Reform Era expanded the scope of public participation by strengthening the role of civil society in democratic life. Nalle (2017) analyzed Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) No. 2 of 2017 concerning civil organizations, focusing on the application of the *contrarius actus* principle. This principle expanded the government's authority to dissolve mass organizations without judicial proceedings, thereby potentially restricting freedom of association and undermining the principle of due process of law. Similarly, the analysis of *administrative crackdowns* describes situations in which the state employs legal and administrative instruments as means of restricting the activities and operating space of civil society organizations (Chaudhry, 2022).

Based on these two studies, research on mass organizations has continued to focus on the development of civil society after the Reform Era, as well as the constitutionality and protection of human rights in the dissolution of mass organizations. Previous studies have tended to adopt a descriptive-historical approach. This article addresses this gap by analyzing shifts in regulatory regimes through a manifest–latent functions framework. Few studies have comprehensively analyzed the paradigm shift in the regulatory policy governing mass organizations, from a repressive approach to a supportive one, by comparing Law No. 8 of 1985, Law No. 17 of 2013, and Law No. 16 of 2017. This study examines how the state combines facilitation, regulation, oversight, and coercion in governing Ormas, and the implications of these approaches for civil society autonomy. Regulatory changes have expanded the scope of Ormas participation. However, this expansion has been accompanied by the continued maintenance of state regulatory and oversight mechanisms. This research gap constitutes the focus of the present study.

The novelty of this study lies in the development of a framework for reforming the regulation of community organizations based on the principle of legal proportionality. The manifest and latent functions framework is employed to identify the regulatory functions explicitly established for mass organizations, such as promotion, empowerment, participation, and maintaining public order, as well as latent functions in the form of oversight, discipline, and control over the scope of organizational activities. This framework is then integrated to assess whether the exercise of state authority is proportionate to the objectives pursued while safeguarding the rights and autonomy of civil society. Accordingly, this study not only reveals the formal and latent functions of regulation but also proposes a more democratic and proportionate policy model grounded in the rule of law and the protection of human rights.

Based on the evolving regulatory framework governing community organizations in Indonesia, this study proceeds from the assumption that regulating Ormas is a state obligation to maintain public order through proportionate legal instruments. Accordingly, this study seeks to address three principal research questions: first, how does the development of regulations governing community organizations in Indonesia reflect a paradigm shift in the relationship between the state and freedom of association. Second, how does the Indonesian legal system establish a balance between freedom of association as a constitutional right and the public order interests pursued through the regulation of community organizations. Third, how can a proportionate

regulatory model for community organizations be formulated to strengthen the protection of freedom of association while maintaining public order within a democratic state governed by the rule of law.

Based on the research questions outlined above, this study aims to: (1) map the development of regulations governing community organizations in Indonesia and examine how these reflect shifts in the paradigm governing the relationship between the state and freedom of association; (2) analyze how the Indonesian legal system establishes a balance between freedom of association as a constitutional right and public order interests in the regulation of community organizations; and (3) formulate a proportionate policy model.

This research is relevant to the Ministry of Home Affairs, which has the authority to promote public participation in overseeing policy regulation at both the national and regional levels. As regional development is an integral part of national development, the establishment of Ormas at both the national and regional levels is necessary to monitor and oversee regional development policy issues.

This study provides recommendations to the Ministry of Home Affairs for evaluating and improving policies on the guidance, oversight, and handling of community organizations (Ormas). The findings can be used to identify the impacts of Ormas regulatory policies, assess the proportionality between public order and security interests and the protection of freedom of association, and formulate regulatory mechanisms that are more measurable, transparent, and risk-based. For local governments, this study can serve as a reference for implementing the guidance and oversight of Ormas in a manner that is more consistent with the legal framework and the principles of protecting civic space.

The governance of civil society in post-Reformation Indonesia has not been characterized by a linear transition from repression to democracy. Rather, the expansion of civic inclusion has occurred alongside the continued maintenance of the state's capacity for control. This thesis will be systematically examined through normative juridical and historical-analytical analyses in the following sections.

II. Methods

The research method employed in this journal article is normative juridical, with qualitative and historical-analytical approaches, to examine in depth the reorientation of policies governing community organizations (Ormas). The qualitative approach is used to capture the socio-political dynamics underlying changes in the regulations governing Ormas from the New Order era to the post-Reformasi period. The normative juridical approach focuses on critical analysis. This analysis adopts a comparative-historical approach by examining the regulations governing mass organizations under Law No. 8 of 1985, Law No. 17 of 2013, Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2 of 2017, and Law No. 16 of 2017. The comparison covers four aspects: (1) the legal status and standing of mass organizations; (2) the state's authority to promote and oversee mass organizations; (3) the legal grounds for suspension, revocation of legal status, and dissolution; and (4) mechanisms for oversight and legal remedies against state action. Based on these four aspects, the study identifies changes in state authority, procedural safeguards against the abuse of power, and guarantees of legal protection for mass organizations. The analysis compares the provisions, responsibilities, and procedures established under the different regulatory regimes and interprets the direction of change in the regulation of mass organizations.

This study is limited by its normative-textual approach, which does not incorporate primary data from affected Ormas. This limitation has direct implications for the validity of claims concerning co-optation, dependency, selective promotion, and selective repression. In this study, these four concepts are not treated as empirical findings demonstrating specific practices targeting mass organizations, but rather as analytical categories for interpreting the potential and structural consequences of regulatory design. The historical-analytical approach is used to map the political evolution of Ormas within the context of Indonesia's political transition, from strict state control during the New Order era to the paradoxical democratization efforts of the post-Reformasi period, which have instead intensified state intervention in the name of stability and the continued operation of Ormas. The primary data for this study consist of legal texts and official

regulations, which are systematically analyzed. Secondary data are drawn from research reports, legal studies published by credible institutions, and relevant newspaper articles to support the validity of the analysis and provide empirical context regarding the impact of regulation.

III. Results and Analysis

A. Phases of Community Organization Regulation in Indonesia

1. The Phase of Hegemonic Control: Law No. 8 of 1985

During the New Order regime in 1985, a policy was introduced requiring all community organizations (Ormas) and political parties to adopt Pancasila as their organizational principle. The explanatory considerations (President, 1985) stated that community organizations were required to make Pancasila their sole guiding principle (Article 2) and to explicitly incorporate it into their articles of association (Article 4). The stated objective was to strengthen the internalization and practice of Pancasila in social, national, and state life, thereby ensuring its continued preservation.

Law No. 8 of 1985 on Mass Organizations emerged within the political framework of the New Order, which prioritized stability as a prerequisite for development. This legislation required all mass organizations to adopt Pancasila as their sole organizational principle, a policy that substantially curtailed ideological diversity within civil society.

From the perspective of social control theory, Law No. 8 of 1985 positioned the state as the dominant actor, empowered to determine the boundaries of legitimacy for social organizations. Articles 13 to 15 established mechanisms through which the government could dissolve or suspend mass organizations based on broadly defined and ambiguous criteria, such as "disrupting public order and security." Adequate judicial review mechanisms to counterbalance executive power in enforcing these provisions remained lacking.

As a result, many organizations rooted in religious values or particular ideologies were forcibly dissolved because they were considered incompatible with the state ideology. The Indonesian Islamic Students Association (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, PII), for example, provides a clear illustration of an organization that rejected the single-principal requirement and was consequently classified as illegal (Ertanti, 2021). This demonstrates how regulation was used both as an instrument of ideological co-optation and as a means of eliminating potential political opposition (Pradoto & Umar, 2025).

Many community organizations (Ormas) had emerged as expressions of the political currents developing in Indonesia. Consequently, nearly all Ormas attempted to adapt by changing their organizational principles. However, some organizations rejected the requirement to adopt Pancasila as their sole principle, including the Indonesian Islamic Students Association (PII). As a result, the New Order regime dissolved the organization, and PII was declared a prohibited and even illegal organization (Ertanti, 2021).

Law No. 8 of 1985 on Community Organizations was enacted within the New Order framework, which placed development and political stability at the center of its governing philosophy. The state played a pivotal role in regulating and directing all aspects of social life. Its objective was to achieve equitable national development, understood as inclusive development for all Indonesians. Within this context, Ormas were viewed as instruments for achieving successful development rather than as independent forces capable of acting as a counterbalance to the state.

Law No. 8 of 1985 was implicitly used as a principal instrument for unifying and organizing social movements. In practice, it contributed to the erosion of ideological pluralism, the monopolization of philosophical truth in the public sphere, and the suppression of diversity within civil society. These measures were intended to consolidate political power, eliminate potential ideological opposition, and transform Ormas into extensions of the state in pursuit of national development (Suteki & Jalil, 2021).

Law No. 8 of 1985 reflected the nature of the New Order regime. Following the regime's collapse in 1998, Indonesia entered a period that opened up space for political liberalization and various freedoms, including freedom of association, assembly, and expression. This transition paved the way for the revival of civil society, which had long been constrained (Usman, 2002), and led to the emergence of numerous new Ormas that filled the

vacuum in opportunities for political participation. Ormas played a role in driving the regime change that accompanied the fall of Soeharto in 1998, followed by various reforms involving political parties, parliament, and the national security sector (Prayudi, 2018).

2. Democratic Liberalization Phase: Law No. 17 of 2013

The 1998 Reformasi movement ushered in a new era of civil rights in Indonesia. The collapse of the New Order regime led to the emergence of thousands of new mass organizations, filling the vacuum in political participation that had been suppressed for three decades. Law No. 17 of 2013, enacted in response to these demands for democratization, introduced a significant paradigm shift. The requirement to adopt a single, uniform organizational principle was abolished. Ormas were now free to choose their own principles, provided that they did not conflict with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The dissolution mechanism was also fundamentally reformed, requiring judicial proceedings before an Ormas could be dissolved (Article 71), thereby upholding the supremacy of law.

The most fundamental change was reflected in the definition of Ormas (community organizations), which emphasized participation in the development process to achieve the objectives of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The law introduced the strengthening of civil society organizations as a state obligation, rather than treating it merely as a declarative right. Central and regional governments were required to strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations through policies, training, and institutional support (Articles 40–42). This represented a paradigm shift from state-centered control toward a cooperative governance model.

Nevertheless, Law No. 17 of 2013 was not without criticism. Article 59, which prohibited activities that "disturb public order and peace," remained vague and susceptible to abuse. Furthermore, the law was considered insufficient to address mass organizations that openly threatened the state ideology or engaged in systematic violence, thereby creating a significant regulatory gap.

The demands for reforming the regulation of Ormas during the transition from the New Order regime to the Reformasi era, which emphasized democratic freedoms and a human rights-based approach, were addressed by the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) through new legislation. These demands led to the establishment of a legal framework under Law No. 17 of 2013 on Community Organizations. A shift in the regulatory approach can be observed in the law's recognition that Ormas could "participate" in development to realize national objectives within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, founded on Pancasila.

Nevertheless, democratic freedom and a human rights-based approach did not mean an absence of control. State control persisted in a different form: its expansion through circumstances in which dependence on state resources and access to state institutions began to diminish organizations' ability to set their own agendas and sustain their criticism. Changes to Ormas regulations since 2017 have expanded the state's authority to restrict and dissolve organizations. The dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Gerakan Fajar Nusantara (Gafatar) illustrates how this expanded authority has been applied in practice. However, this study does not assume that the expansion of state authority automatically results in violations. Rather, it examines, through a proportionality-based analysis, whether the resulting restrictions are legally justified and necessary, and whether they extend beyond their intended objectives.

3. The Phase of Critical Adjustment: Law No. 16 of 2017

Growing political polarization and the emergence of movements perceived as threats to the national consensus prompted the government of President Joko Widodo to issue Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perpu) No. 2 of 2017. This regulation introduced fundamental changes to the procedure for dissolving mass organizations by eliminating the judicial process (Winata, 2018).

The most controversial change was the removal of the courts' role in dissolution proceedings, transferring this authority entirely to the executive branch through the Ministry of Law

and Human Rights. The principle of "contrarius actus" allows the authority that granted legal recognition to an organization to revoke its legal status immediately without judicial review. This represented a significant departure from the principle of the rule of law established under Law No. 17 of 2013 (Nalle, 2017).

From a formal legal perspective, the enactment of Perpu No. 2 of 2017 also triggered constitutional debate. Article 22(1) of the 1945 Constitution stipulates that a Government Regulation in Lieu of Law may be issued only in circumstances of "compelling urgency." Critics argued that, objectively, the prevailing situation did not meet the threshold of compelling urgency, potentially rendering the issuance of the regulation unconstitutional (Zia Ul-Haq, 2023). However, in its legal reasoning, the Constitutional Court granted the president broad discretion in determining whether circumstances of compelling urgency existed.

The most tangible consequence of the repressive tendency associated with Perpu No. 2 of 2017 was the revocation of the legal status and dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) without due process of law or judicial review. This action triggered widespread debate about its implications for the guarantee of freedom of association and the right to a fair legal process (Tampubolon & Silaban, 2020).

The dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) was based on the government's assessment that its ideology and its vision of establishing a caliphate were incompatible with Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the principles of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), and were therefore considered potential threats to the state ideology and constitutional order. Nevertheless, the dissolution of an organization must remain proportionate and should not be based solely on differences of opinion with the government. In a democracy, organizational and ideological diversity forms part of pluralism and reflects civil society's oversight function. Accordingly, any restriction or dissolution must have a clear legal basis, verifiable evidence, and a proportionate justification, while preserving civic space within the constitutional framework.

The change of government in 2014 and developments in Indonesia prompted tensions concerning the preservation of Pancasila. In response, the government of President Joko Widodo introduced a legal framework through Law No. 16 of 2017 on the Enactment of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perpu) No. 2 of 2017 concerning Amendments to Law No. 17 of 2013 on Community Organizations, citing an urgent need for such regulation.

The amendments introduced through Law No. 16 of 2017 were justified on the grounds of an urgent need to regulate and supervise community organizations whose organizational principles were contrary to Pancasila and/or the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Latifah, 2020). The Perpu was based on the view that Law No. 17 of 2013 on Community Organizations had not incorporated the principle of "contrarius actus", rendering it ineffective in imposing sanctions on community organizations that adhered to, developed, or disseminated teachings or ideologies contrary to Pancasila and the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, 1945).

The formal aspects of the Perpu's enactment raised concerns regarding its consistency with the constitutional requirement that such regulations be issued "in the event of compelling urgency," as stipulated in Article 22(1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Although this provision requires the rapid adoption of emergency legal measures, the enactment of the Perpu on Community Organizations was considered inconsistent with this requirement and insufficiently justified by circumstances of compelling urgency (Khasanofa, 2017).

Substantively, the Perpu was also problematic because it removed the courts' role in dissolving community organizations (Ormas) (Zia Ul-Haq, 2023). This change is reflected in the dissolution mechanisms set out in Articles 61 and 62. Under Article 61(1)(c) and Article 61(3)(b), the authority to revoke an organization's legal-entity status was vested in the minister responsible for governmental affairs in the field of law and human rights, who could seek input from relevant agencies. Article 62 was also amended to address compliance with sanctions involving the cessation of activities, while Articles 63 through 80 were repealed (Law No. 16 of 2017).

The shift introduced by the Perpu and subsequently enacted into law clearly demonstrates the removal of judicial proceedings from the dissolution of Ormas, including the elimination of the Supreme Court's role provided for under the 2013 Community Organizations Law. This removal concentrated authority in the executive branch, enabling it to dissolve organizations on the basis of its own assessment that they tended to conflict with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This regulatory change can be interpreted as a manifestation of authoritarianism and repression directed at community organizations.

This study recognizes the state's authority to dissolve organizations proven to be involved in crime, terrorism, violence, or activities that endanger public safety. However, it criticizes the removal of judicial oversight, particularly by the Supreme Court, following the amendments to the Law on Mass Organizations. These amendments potentially expand the government's power to assess organizations deemed incompatible with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Therefore, dissolution must be based on clear evidence, transparent procedures, and judicial review to safeguard the rule of law and freedom of association, while preventing arbitrary and repressive abuses of power.

Law No. 16 of 2017 on the Enactment of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) No. 2 of 2017 concerning Amendments to Law No. 17 of 2013 on Community Organizations. Law No. 16 of 2017 on the Enactment of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) No. 2 of 2017 concerning Amendments to Law No. 17 of 2013 on Community Organizations (Nalle, 2017).

Community organizations (Organisasi Kemasyarakatan or Ormas), which should strengthen civil society through empowerment and represent the aspirations of their members and the wider public, have instead faced repression under the changes introduced by the 2017 amendments to the Law on Community Organizations (Kurniawan, 2018). As summarized in Table 1, the regulatory trajectory from Law No. 8 of 1985 to Law No. 17 of 2013 and its amendment through Law No. 16 of 2017 reflects a shift in the state's approach to Ormas, from maintaining organizational order and providing guidance to strengthening state control and oversight. Although these regulations formally establish mechanisms for organizing and regulating Ormas, they may also produce latent consequences, including the narrowing of organizational autonomy and the increased potential for political control. In principle, Ormas should be able to realize collective autonomy through empowerment. Instead, empowerment risks being used to turn them into instruments serving the interests of those in power and political elites. In this context, Ormas must remain committed to strengthening public participation and serving as a bridge for representing community interests, while the state should ensure that regulatory oversight does not undermine their independence or constrain their role in democratic life.

Table 1. Summary of Mass Organization Regulations

Regulation	Regulatory Orientation	Manifest Function	Latent Function	Key Findings
Law No. 8 of 1985	State control	Maintaining order and guiding mass organizations (Ormas)	Restricting the independence and autonomy of civil society	The state is dominant; civil society is subordinate
Law No. 17 of 2013	Regulation and participation	Providing legal certainty, protection, and space for Ormas participation	State control is retained through requirements, supervision, and sanctions	Democratization opens civic space, but it is not yet fully autonomous
Law No. 16 of 2017	Executive control and discretion	Safeguarding Pancasila, order, and security by taking action against Ormas deemed contrary to the law	Expanding government authority and reducing judicial oversight in dissolution	State control is reinforced again in a new form

Source: Processed by the author, September 14, 2026

Both regulations illustrate two sides of the post-Reformasi model of governance of community organizations (Ormas). The regulation of Ormas in the post-Reformasi period does not reflect a linear movement from repression toward democratization, or vice versa, but rather reveals a dual configuration of state governance over civil society. The state simultaneously recognizes, facilitates, and opens up opportunities for Ormas to participate, while maintaining and developing regulatory, supervisory, restrictive, and sanctioning instruments. In this context, Law No. 17 of 2013 and Law No. 16 of 2017 are better understood not as representations of two conflicting regimes, but as stages in the rearticulation of state capacity to manage civil society space within a democratic framework.

Law No. 17 of 2013 does not merely mark a shift by the state from control toward facilitation. The regulation also retains several administrative and supervisory mechanisms that place Ormas activities within boundaries determined by the state. Thus, the expansion of opportunities for participation is not equivalent to the elimination of control; rather, it indicates that facilitation and regulation have begun to operate simultaneously. This law demonstrates that the state has never entirely relinquished its coercive capacity.

The provision of opportunities for participation through Law No. 17 of 2013 reflects a change in the position of Ormas from objects of regulation to recognized actors in public governance. However, this recognition does not eliminate the state's capacity to determine the legal and administrative boundaries of organizational activities. Consequently, the expansion of participation takes place within a space that is simultaneously shaped and supervised by the state.

The regulation of Ormas has undergone a transformation from direct control toward a form of governance that combines facilitation, regulation, supervision, authority, partnership, access provision, and differentiated relationships with civil society organizations.

The more the state opens up opportunities for partnerships with Ormas, the more important it becomes to examine whether such opportunities genuinely strengthen Ormas autonomy or instead create dependence on the state. Dependence on state resources, facilities, and support may encourage Ormas to align their positions with government interests and reduce their willingness to criticize. Under such conditions, state control does not necessarily operate through repression; it can also function through mechanisms of dependence and co-optation, leading Ormas to prioritize maintaining relations with those in power to preserve their continued existence rather than fulfilling their social oversight function independently.

B. The Dialectic of Freedom of Association and Public Order: A Proportionality Analysis

International human rights law recognizes that freedom of association may be subject to restrictions. However, such restrictions must satisfy three cumulative requirements: (1) they must be prescribed by law; (2) they must serve a legitimate aim, including national security and public order; and (3) they must be necessary and proportionate in a democratic society. This framework, based on Article 22(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), serves as the principal benchmark for evaluating Indonesia's regulations on community organizations.

An assessment of the three phases of regulation reveals an interesting pattern. Law No. 8 of 1985 satisfies the first requirement (prescription by law) but fails to satisfy the second and third requirements because its objectives were more political than oriented toward protecting public order, and its implementation was disproportionate. Meanwhile, Law No. 17 of 2013 largely satisfies all three requirements, although its weakness lies in ineffective enforcement mechanisms. Although Law No. 16 of 2017 satisfies the first requirement and provides a strong justification for the second, it raises concerns regarding the third requirement, as the elimination of judicial proceedings is considered to exceed the limits of proportionality (Latifah, 2020).

From a legal perspective, community organizations (Ormas) deemed dangerous by the Government and subsequently dissolved have the right to challenge the dissolution through legal proceedings, beginning with administrative remedies and a lawsuit before the State Administrative Court (PTUN). Pursuant to Articles

75–76 of Law No. 30 of 2014 on Government Administration and Supreme Court Regulation (PERMA) No. 6 of 2018, organizations may file appeals and seek remedies before bringing a lawsuit before the State Administrative Court (PTUN) against government decisions they consider detrimental to their interests. Such lawsuits are based on Article 53 of Law No. 5 of 1986, as amended by Law No. 51 of 2009.

Law No. 16 of 2017 does not eliminate judicial review of the dissolution of community organizations; rather, it shifts the role of the courts from a mechanism that could previously operate before dissolution to a corrective mechanism that operates after an administrative decision has been issued. This change warrants examination because the expansion of state authority must be balanced by effective oversight mechanisms to ensure legal certainty, freedom of association, and proportionality, as guaranteed under Articles 28D(1) and 28E(3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

From a proportionality perspective, the three regulatory frameworks differ significantly. Although Law No. 8 of 1985 satisfies the requirement of legality, its restrictions reflect the interests of political control and state stability rather than the protection of public order. Its instruments are relatively broad and therefore fail to satisfy the principles of necessity, minimal intrusion, and proportionality in the strict sense, as the burden imposed on civil society autonomy outweighs the benefits. Law No. 17 of 2013, on the other hand, demonstrates a more proportionate approach through legitimate objectives for imposing restrictions, such as maintaining public order, ensuring legal certainty, and protecting the public interest, as well as more moderate restrictive mechanisms.

However, enforcement remains inadequate, meaning that the regulatory objectives have not been optimally achieved. Law No. 16 of 2017 formally satisfies the requirement of legality and pursues legitimate objectives, namely upholding Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and public order and security. Although the dissolution of community organizations may be an appropriate instrument under certain circumstances, the removal of judicial proceedings raises questions regarding the necessity, least restrictive means, and proportionality of such restrictions. With broad state powers operating without adequate judicial oversight, the risk of disproportionate restrictions on freedom of association increases. Therefore, the main problem with Law No. 16 of 2017 lies not in the legitimacy of its objectives, but in the means by which they are pursued.

The greatest challenge in this dialectic is the lack of objective and measurable parameters for defining "public order." Without a precise definition and independent oversight mechanisms, public order clauses are vulnerable to selective abuse to silence groups critical of the government. Indications of selectivity arise when organizations with similar violation characteristics are treated differently without objective and legally justifiable reasons. However, if differences in treatment can be explained by differences in the severity of violations, legal grounds, procedures, or legitimate legal objectives, such differences do not necessarily indicate selectivity.

A selective approach to regulating community organizations, in which groups with ties to those in power tend to escape punishment despite committing violations, while organizations critical of the state are dissolved, strongly indicates the instrumentalization of regulations (Prayudi, 2018).

Community organizations (Ormas) are legally recognized entities that operate independently of the government, or at least without direct government influence. Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution guarantees all Indonesian citizens the right to associate and assemble, express their thoughts orally or in writing, and exercise other related freedoms (Suci, 2022). This is further affirmed in Article 24 of Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, which states that everyone has the right to assemble, express opinions, and associate for peaceful purposes (Wibowo & Harefa, 2015).

However, the establishment of community organizations as institutional spaces for participation and the expression of positions toward the state has ultimately become obscured by the proliferation of organizations in Indonesia whose objectives are to hinder democratic progress and development.

Because the growth of certain Ormas can be categorized as obstructing democratic progress and development, community organizations

are often perceived negatively by the public. This phenomenon primarily refers to certain organizations that engage in activities such as providing informal security services, guarding business premises, collecting debts, or forcibly controlling parking. In practice, some of these groups are frequently associated with criminal activities. As a result, the public often labels Ormas as "thugs" (Pramono, 2003).

However, these characteristics cannot be generalized to community organizations as a whole, as such organizations vary in their forms, objectives, and orientations. They include social, religious, humanitarian, professional, advocacy, and public-interest organizations.

C. Regulatory Pathologies: Between Co-optation and Selective Repression

The transition from Law No. 17 of 2013 to Law No. 16 of 2017 demonstrates that the liberalization of civil society space has not been accompanied by the elimination of the state's coercive capacity. The state can expand participation and establish partnerships with community organizations (Ormas) while simultaneously maintaining or strengthening instruments for restricting certain organizations. This configuration indicates that state–civil society relations in the post-Reformasi period have not evolved linearly, but rather through a combination of facilitative and coercive mechanisms.

Following the Reformasi period, relations between the state and civil society organizations have shifted from open confrontation to a more complex relationship. On the one hand, the state offers partnerships and access to resources, encouraging many large-scale civil society organizations (KPP) to integrate themselves into structures of power. On the other hand, KPPs that maintain their independence and criticize state policies risk facing repression.

State policies toward Ormas can be understood in terms of selective facilitation, which refers to the provision of support, recognition, access to participation, or state partnerships to Ormas based on certain criteria whose consistency and objectivity can be assessed. Meanwhile, *residual coercion* refers to the use of coercive instruments, including supervision, administrative sanctions, revocation of legal entity status, and dissolution, when mechanisms of guidance fail to achieve compliance. Indicators of these two mechanisms include the consistency of criteria for providing facilities, equality of access among Ormas, the legal basis and proportionality of sanctions, and the effectiveness of judicial review. Thus, state control is not always exercised through direct restrictions, but also through the provision of facilities that may encourage Ormas to align themselves with the interests of those in power.

The state can establish different relationships with civil society organizations based on their degree of compatibility with the state's agenda. Organizations willing to operate within the government's policy framework may gain access to resources and opportunities for participation, whereas organizations that maintain critical positions may face increased political, administrative, or institutional costs.

This phenomenon of co-optation can be analyzed scientifically through the concept of "civil society co-optation," whereby the state strategically tames the critical potential of civil society through material and symbolic incentives (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014). As a result, many Ormas have lost their critical capacity to serve as a counterbalance to power.

The growth of Ormas without strong internal control mechanisms has also created serious problems. A report by Tempo Journalists (2025) documents numerous cases of extortion by individuals claiming to represent civil society organizations against economic actors. This not only undermines the investment climate but also damages the reputation of the broader civil society movement. This situation provides empirical evidence of the need for stricter regulation, while simultaneously creating a risk that such regulation may be abused to impose undue restrictions on community organizations.

The monolithization of Ormas, which forces organizations of a similar kind to unite under a single umbrella organization, undermines civil society autonomy, transforming independent entities into instruments of the government. This constitutes a strategy of preemptive control designed to prevent ideological or political threats from emerging or gaining strength. Therefore, the main issue is not

the existence of state oversight itself, but rather the limits placed on such authority. Oversight that is grounded in law and applied objectively and proportionately can serve as an accountability mechanism, whereas control that undermines organizational diversity and independence risks turning regulation into an instrument for co-opting civil society.

This system fundamentally contradicts the concept of democracy as a forum for criticism and advocacy and represents one of the legacies of the New Order regime that has persisted into the post-Reformasi era.

Although their rights are guaranteed and protected under Article 28 of the Fourth Amendment to the 1945 Constitution, the role of community organizations (Ormas) in association and assembly remains subject to certain limitations. There are four important limitations on the exercise of this role. First, they must respect the human rights of others. Second, they must maintain public order. Third, they must respect ethics and morality. Fourth, within the context of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), they must safeguard "national security" and national unity (Prayudi & Lindawaty, 2022).

The government needs to conduct a critical and substantive review of Law No. 16 of 2017 on Community Organizations, particularly Articles 61 and 62, which regulate the mechanisms for dissolving Ormas without court involvement or judicial proceedings. Any revision to this legal framework must take into account democratic principles and the civil liberties associated with organizational activity, as a means of fulfilling the state's obligation to respect and guarantee the constitutional rights of the public.

D. Toward a Proportionate Policy Framework: Transformative Recommendations

Based on the analysis above, this study formulates four fundamental principles for designing proportionate and democratic measures toward community organizations (Ormas):

First, the principle of legal certainty. Restrictions on freedom of association may be justified if they are prescribed by law and serve a legitimate aim, as recognized in Article 22(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), including the protection of national security. Broad terms such as "disturbing public order" or "violating Pancasila" must be operationalized through measurable criteria and must not permit arbitrary interpretation. This is consistent with the principle of the rule of law, which requires legal norms to be clear, accessible, and predictable.

In this context, legal certainty does not mean eliminating the scope for interpreting general legal concepts, but rather requires boundaries that allow restrictions on freedom of association to be reviewed on the basis of legal grounds, legitimate aims, necessity, and proportionality.

Restrictions on civil society organizations are influenced not only by legal rules but also by the government's perceptions of the political threats posed by those organizations (Popplewell, 2018). This pattern is clearly reflected in policies toward organizations considered ideological threats or detrimental to the principles of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). In the case of Gafatar, the organization's dissolution and the treatment of its members were associated with issues of ideology, security, and public order. In the case of HTI, however, the government justified the revocation of the organization's legal status on the grounds that its activities and ideology were incompatible with Pancasila and national objectives. These two cases demonstrate that, despite differences in their legal bases and procedures, the categories of "ideological threat" and "public order" play a significant role in state policies toward community organizations.

These findings underscore the importance of clear and measurable legal criteria for maintaining public order as a basis for restricting community organizations. Without verifiable parameters, there is a risk that the concept will be interpreted broadly, granting the government considerable discretion and resulting in inconsistent implementation. Therefore, implementing regulations are needed to establish objective indicators, verifiable thresholds, a clear link between an organization's conduct and the risks it poses, and a review process before restrictions are imposed. In this way, public

order can be protected without imposing further restrictions on freedom of association.

Second, the principle of substantive legal supremacy. The dissolution of community organizations fundamentally affects citizens' constitutional rights; therefore, it must always be carried out through independent judicial proceedings that guarantee an adequate opportunity for defense. The authority to dissolve organizations, vested solely in the executive branch without judicial review, is inconsistent with the standards of a democratic state governed by the rule of law. The mechanism introduced by Law No. 17 of 2013 must be reinstated and strengthened. The Ministry of Home Affairs should propose a limited amendment to Articles 61 and 62 of Law No. 16 of 2017, restoring the requirement for a district court ruling before the revocation of an Ormas's legal entity status, while also establishing a maximum time limit for judicial proceedings to prevent uncertainty for the organization concerned.

Third, the principle of active support. The state's responsibilities extend beyond oversight and restrictions to include an active commitment to promoting and strengthening the capacity of community organizations. Comprehensive development programs need to be established to strengthen internal governance, expand advocacy capacity, and create systematic policy dialogue mechanisms between civil society organizations and the government. Evidence-based capacity-building programs should be developed for Ormas, covering institutional governance and financial reporting training. Regular policy dialogue forums between central and local governments and Ormas representatives should also be institutionalized as part of the public policymaking cycle.

Fourth, the principle of symmetrical accountability. Accountability standards must be applied consistently and without discrimination based on political affiliation or proximity to those in power. To ensure the fair and impartial application of regulations, an independent oversight body for civil society organizations should be established, comprising representatives of the government, academia, and civil society.

Although community organizations are accountable for their activities, the government, regardless of its political orientation, must also be accountable for the legality, procedures, justification, and proportionality of its exercise of power. Therefore, rather than establishing a new institution, complaint and oversight mechanisms should be strengthened by optimizing existing institutions and expanding their mandates through amendments to, or the implementation of, provisions under the Law on Community Organizations. These mechanisms may include receiving complaints about violations committed by community organizations and abuses of power by the government, conducting independent audits, and publishing periodic performance reports.

Public complaint and transparency mechanisms for addressing violations by community organizations should be strengthened through an independent oversight body that receives complaints concerning violations committed by community organizations and alleged abuses of power by the government. Periodic performance reports are necessary to ensure transparency in the imposition of sanctions.

Thus, accountability serves not only as an instrument for controlling Ormas but also as a mechanism for ensuring that the state's authority to guide, supervise, and dissolve Ormas is exercised transparently, objectively, consistently, and accountably.

Furthermore, the government needs to restore the *due process of law* mechanism in the dissolution of Ormas. This should follow the framework established under the 2013 Law on Community Organizations, or, more comprehensively and effectively, strengthen judicial involvement through a requirement for registration with the district court. This is important to provide constitutional guarantees of legal certainty while restoring public trust in the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), thereby ensuring a balance between national security and civil liberties.

The existence of community organizations can strengthen society's bargaining position within the political system, enabling public aspirations to be more effectively expressed and advocated. Accordingly, Ormas have the potential to make a significant contribution to realizing more inclusive, transparent, and accountable governance.

IV. Conclusion

With reference to the three research questions addressed in this study, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the evolution of regulations governing community organizations in Indonesia reflects a shift from hegemonic control to a dual configuration of inducement and coercion, rather than a linear transition toward full democratization. Second, Indonesia's legal system has yet to establish a consistent balance between freedom of association and public order, as demonstrated by the failure of Law No. 16 of 2017 to satisfy the third principle of proportionality. Third, a proportionate regulatory model can be formulated around four principles: legal certainty, the primacy of substantive due process, active state support, and symmetrical accountability.

An ideal restructuring of the regulatory framework governing community organizations must not simply swing between extremes, from repression to unfettered freedom or from liberalization back to control. Instead, it requires a systematic approach to legal proportionality that balances three pillars: the protection of inviolable civil rights, the accountability of community organizations to the law and the public interest, and the active involvement of the state in fostering a healthy and productive civil society.

In the context of the Ministry of Home Affairs' regulatory reform agenda, this study recommends concrete measures, including reconstructing the regulatory framework governing the dissolution of community organizations and operationalizing measurable parameters for public order, so that Ormas can develop in a more constructive manner and in accordance with the applicable legal framework. Through this approach, the regulation of community organizations can establish a solid foundation for the growth of a critical and constructive civil society that makes a tangible contribution to strengthening Indonesian democracy.

Acknowledgment

We (Muhaimin and Novi Enjelina Putri) would like to express our mutual gratitude for the ideas that grew into this collaborative research and for our shared commitment to refining the manuscript until it was ready for publication. We also extend our appreciation to the colleagues who contributed to discussions on this issue.

Plagiarism Statement

The authors declare that this article was independently prepared and is free from plagiarism, and that all ideas, data, and quotations from other sources have been properly acknowledged in accordance with academic standards. The authors take full responsibility for the originality and integrity of this article.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) Use Statement

The authors used artificial intelligence (AI) technology in a limited capacity to assist with idea development, language editing, grammar checking, and structural refinement. AI was not used to replace research, source verification, substantive analysis, or academic decision-making.

Funding

This research and the preparation of this article received no specific funding from government institutions, organizations, or other external funding sources. The research was conducted independently by the authors.

Author Contributions

MH contributed to the investigation, data curation, formal analysis, and preparation of the original draft. NEP was responsible for conceptualization, methodology, validation, and writing-review and editing. All authors approved the final manuscript.

V. References

Adam, H. (2024). Kedudukan Hukum Organisasi Kemasyarakatan dalam Perspektif Siyasah. *Islamic Law: Jurnal Siyasah*, *9*(1), 59–73. https://doi.org/10.53429/iljs.v9i1.830

Chaudhry, S. (2022). The Assault on Civil Society: Explaining State Crackdown on NGOs. *International Organization*, *76*(3), 549–590. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000473

DPR RI. (2012). *Pansus RUU ORMAS, RDPU (Rapat Dengar Pendapat Umum) DPR RI* (pp. 167–186). DPR RI.

Ertanti, Indriana (2021). Konfigurasi Politik Pada Undang-Undang Nomor 16 Tahun 2007 Tentang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Sebagai Produk Hukum Di Indonesia. *Diversi Jurnal Hukum*, *7*(2), 129–150. https://ejournal.uniska-kediri.ac.id/index.php/Diversi/article/download/433/473

Fransen, L., & Dupuy, K. E. (2024). Death by Law: Restrictive Regulations and INGO Numbers. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, *37*(3), 433–445. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-024-09474-5

International Law Making. (2006). Dekiarasi Universal Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia. *Indonesian Journal of International Law*, *Iii*, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004

Jentera. (2013). *Sengkarut Hukum Pembubaran Ormas*. Sekolah Tinggi Hukum Indonesia Jentera. https://www.jentera.ac.id/publikasi/sengkarut-hukum-pembubaran-ormas

Khasanofa, A. (2017). Kedudukan Perppu Ormas Dalam Negara Hukum Indonesia. *Jurnal Hukum Replik*, *5*(2), 128. https://doi.org/10.31000/jhr.v5i2.922

Kurniawan, M. B. (2018). *Konstitusionalitas Perppu Nomor 2 Tahun 2017 tentang Ormas Ditinjau dari UUD 1945 The Constitutionality of Government 2017 on Social Organization Reviewed from the 1945 Constitution*. *15*(2).

Latifah, M. (2020). Pelindungan HAM dalam Mekanisme Pembubaran Ormas Berbadan Hukum Berdasarkan Undang-Undang No. 16 Tahun 2017 (Human Rights Protection on Dissolution Mechanism of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Based on Law No. 16 of 2007). *Negara Hukum: Membangun Hukum Untuk Keadilan Dan Kesejahteraan*, *11*(1). https://doi.org/10.22212/jnh.v11i1.1584

Nalle, V. I. (2017). Asas Contarius Actus pada Perpu Ormas: Kritik dalam Perspektif Hukum Administrasi Negara dan Hak Asasi Manusia. *PADJADJARAN Jurnal Ilmu Hukum (Journal of Law)*, *4*(2), 244–262. https://doi.org/10.22304/pjih.v4n2.a2

Popplewell, R. (2018). Civil Society, Legitimacy and Political Space: Why Some Organisations are More Vulnerable to Restrictions than Others in Violent and Divided Contexts. *Voluntas*, *29*(2), 388–403. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-018-9949-2

Pramono, G. E. (2003). Transformasi Organisasi Kemasyarakatan (Ormas) menjadi Kelompok Kekerasan. *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional*, *1*(2), 1167–1180.

Prayudi, W. Aryo, L. J., & Lindawaty, S. D. (2022). Peran Organisasi Masyarakat dalam Harmonisasi Sosial. In *Publica Indonesia Utama*.

Prayudi. (2018). Politik Pengendalian Rezim Terhadap Organisasi Masyarakat. *Kajian*, *3*(2), 75–94. https://jurnal.dpr.go.id/index.php/kajian/article/view/1875

Pradoto, Slamet W., & Umar, Budi Nursal S. (2025). Legal Review and Democratic Challenges of Community Organizations in Indonesia. *Indonesian Journal of Law and Justice*, *3*(1), 8. https://doi.org/10.47134/ijlj.v3i1.4774

Setiawan, A. R. (2020). Analisis Terhadap Pembubaran Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Dalam Perspektif Hak Asasi Manusia. *Res Publica*, *4*(3), 273–288. https://digilib.uin-suka.ac.id/id/eprint/31708/

Suci, A. I. (2022). *Peran Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Islam di Indonesia*. Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia. https://setkab.go.id/peran-organisasi-kemasyarakatan-islam-di-indonesia/2

Suteki, S., & Jalil, A. (2021). Dissolution of Islamic Community Organizations (Ormas) in the Context of a State of Law and a Democratic State. *Walisongo Law Review (Walrev)*, *3*(2), 223–242. https://doi.org/10.21580/walrev.2021.3.2.10848

Tampubolon, M., & Silaban, P. (2020). Juridical Analysis of the Enactment of Government Regulation on the Right of Assembly in Indonesia. *International Journal of Law and Society*, *3*(3), 123. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20200303.17

Wibowo, C., & Harefa, H. (2015). Urgensi Pengawasan Organisasi Kemasyarakatan oleh Pemerintah. *Jurnal Bina Praja*, *07*(01), 01–19. https://doi.org/10.21787/jbp.07.2015.01-19

Winata, M. R. (2018). Politik Hukum dan Konstitusionalitas Kewenangan Pembubaran Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Berbadan Hukum oleh Pemerintah. *Jurnal Penelitian Hukum De Jure*, *18*(4), 445–464. https://doi.org/10.30641/dejure.2018.v18.445-464

Zia Ul-Haq, M. A. (2023). Problematika Penerbitan PERPPU Di Indonesia: Studi Kasus PERPPU No 1 Tahun 2017 Tentang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan. *Japhtn-Han*, *2*(2), 291–304. https://doi.org/10.55292/japhtnhan.v2i2.39