



Article

Received
19 July 2025

Accepted
10 February 2026

Published online
30 April 2026

Author(s)
Corresponding Author
 Dwi Jati Marta
 0000-0021-9350-8773
 dwijati73@gmail.com
 Regional Secretariat of Bangka Regency

Keywords: Collective violence, gang activities, mass organizations, integrated task force, public policy

Formation of an Integrated Task Force on Gang Activity and Mass Organizations in Response to Escalating Domestic Threats in Jakarta

Dwi Jati Marta

Abstract: This study examines the transformation of mass organizations into actors of collective violence and evaluates the effectiveness of the Integrated Task Force on Gang Activity and Mass Organizations as a policy response to emerging non-traditional security threats in Jakarta. This study employed a descriptive qualitative case study. Data were collected through interviews, observation, and document analysis, then analyzed using NVivo 12 Plus to examine stakeholder perceptions. The findings indicate that this transformation is driven by symbolic conflict, competition over informal economic resources, and weak state oversight. In response, some mass organizations adopt quasi-militaristic characteristics and use violence to assert control over public spaces. The task force serves as a strategic intervention to address regulatory gaps and restore public order. However, its implementation faces challenges related to legitimacy, transparency, and the risk of political misuse. Divergent perceptions persist: government and business actors support stricter enforcement, while civil society groups express concern about potential abuse of authority. This study recommends strengthening the legal framework, increasing public participation, and applying evidence-based policy evaluation to improve accountability and support sustainable social integration.

About the Author(s)

Dwi Jati Marta is a national civil servant employed by the Bangka Regency Regional Government in the Governance Unit of the Bangka Regency Regional Secretariat. Since 2021, he has been working as a Junior Expert Policy Analyst. He obtained his undergraduate degree from the Faculty of Government, Politics, Community Development and Empowerment Study Program and a postgraduate degree in Master of Disaster Management from the Defense University of the Republic of Indonesia.

© 2026 The Author(s)



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/).



I. Introduction

Mass organizations, commonly known in Indonesia as ormas, are a form of civil society organizations (CSOs) established by citizens to channel aspirations and represent interests. Under Law No. 17 of 2013 on Mass Organizations, Article 1(1) defines a mass organization as a group established voluntarily based on shared aspirations, interests, and objectives to contribute to development. This framework has been reinforced by Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2 of 2017, later enacted as Law No. 16 of 2017.

Article 5 of Law No. 17 of 2013 states that mass organizations operate in sectors such as education, social welfare, culture, sports, the environment, and community empowerment. Previous study conducted by (Sulthan & Syafrina, 2022) identified key characteristics of community organizations, including voluntarism, social responsibility, independence, non-profit orientation, and democratic principles based on Pancasila. The structure and functions of community organizations are stipulated in Law No. 17 of 2013, Article 7, which requires organizations to define their objectives and activities in their Articles of Association and Bylaws, which must align with state ideology.

In practice, mass organizations function as platforms for capacity building for members, channels for public aspirations, and agents of community empowerment (Hidayat, 2019). They are also expected to strengthen national values, promote tolerance, and support social stability at the grassroots level. When properly managed and aligned with regulations, mass organizations contribute to inclusive national development. They also serve as civil institutions that promote public participation and democratization in Indonesia. Prominent examples, such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, illustrate their positive role in national development.

The right to association, assembly, and expression is constitutionally guaranteed under

Article 28E(3) of the 1945 Constitution. This right is further elaborated in Law No. 9 of 1998 on Freedom of Expression, which affirms citizens' rights to express opinions and receive legal protection, while requiring respect for others and public order. It is also reinforced by Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to assemble, associate, and organize peacefully. These regulations provide a legal basis for the formation of mass organizations as part of civil society.

However, in practice, this freedom often intersects with concerns over national stability. The history of mass organizations in Indonesia reflects complex political dynamics. During the Old Order era, several organizations were mobilized to support political interests, including Pemuda Rakyat, which aligned with the Indonesian Communist Party. During the New Order era, the government enacted Law No. 8 of 1985, requiring all mass organizations to adopt Pancasila as their foundation and placing their activities under strict state control (Doddy, 2022). Following the 1998 reforms, increased freedom of association led to rapid growth in civil society organizations. However, limited oversight allowed some organizations to deviate from their intended functions and national values (Pramono, 2015).

Mass organizations in Indonesia are closely linked to ongoing social, political, and cultural dynamics rooted in the pre-independence era. They serve as platforms for community participation across sectors, including religion, social issues, and political and economic advocacy. Over time, their number has increased significantly, particularly in areas with high population density and complex social dynamics. Recent data show that approximately 63% of legally registered mass organizations in Indonesia are concentrated in three provinces: East Java, West Java, and Central Java (Raka, 2025). This concentration indicates that these regions have become key centers of organizational activity, shaping the national policy environment and social stability.



Figure 1. Provinces with the highest number of mass organizations in Indonesia.

(Source: Raka, 2025)

However, the high concentration of mass organizations in densely populated areas, particularly in Java, has also generated new challenges. In Jakarta and surrounding areas, incidents of violence involving mass organizations have been reported. Data from the Metro Jaya Regional Police recorded at least 187 cases involving eight organizations between 2008 and 2014 (Pramono, 2015). Notable cases include clashes between Pemuda Pancasila and Forum Betawi Rempug, as well as attacks on security posts by organized groups. These incidents have created public unrest, weakened trust in mass organizations, and increased perceptions of insecurity. They have also contributed to social polarization, disrupted public order, and reduced trust in state institutions.

Some organizations in Jakarta also have been linked to illegal practices, including illegal levies, extortion, control of parking areas, unregulated security services, and debt collection (Doddy, 2022). These practices indicate a

shift away from their original role in community empowerment toward coercive control of public spaces. As a result, business actors report increased insecurity and delay expansion due to high informal operating costs. The investment climate is affected by legal uncertainty and local security conditions.

In 2025, the Jakarta Metropolitan Police conducted enforcement actions against violence involving mass organizations. Official reports indicate that 142 cases were recorded between January and May 2025, with 135 individuals identified as suspects and detained for extortion, assault, forced land seizure, and damage to public facilities. In addition, some organizations were suspected of using their institutional status to operate illegal businesses in parking, security, and traditional market management (Merwyn, 2025).

These measures indicate a shift toward stricter state responses to violence associated with certain mass organizations. Public support for this approach has increased, reflecting long-standing concerns over intimidation and coercive control of public spaces by mass organizations. This situation highlights the need to clarify the role and limits of mass organizations in public spaces to prevent threats to public security and order.

This phenomenon can be classified as a non-traditional, non-military threat, as it undermines national stability through internal dynamics, including social violence and illegal activities by civilian groups. From a contemporary security perspective, such threats fall within the domain of non-conventional security and require targeted policy responses. Criminal activities associated with certain mass organizations pose a significant challenge to the state due to their social base, organized networks, and, in some cases, political protection. If not addressed effectively, these threats may weaken social integration and weaken public trust in the law.

In this context, the human security approach is important as a new paradigm for understanding security. This concept emphasizes the protection of individuals, not only the state. Human security encompasses economic, environmental, health, social, and political dimensions that guarantee citizens' freedom from fear and want (Acharya,

2020). When mass organizations act as perpetrators of violence, threats to human security become real, as such actions disrupt social order and oppress vulnerable groups. Therefore, addressing problematic mass organizations is not only a legal issue but also a humanitarian concern.

The government recognizes that a regulatory approach alone is insufficient to address the escalation of violence and functional deviations among some mass organizations. In response, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs initiated the establishment of the Integrated Task Force on Gang Activity and Mass Organizations (Satgas Terpadu Penanganan Premanisme dan Ormas Meresahkan), hereafter referred to as the Integrated Task Force, as a strategic effort to provide a rapid, coordinated, and measurable response to legal violations involving mass organizations (Daffa, 2025). This task force is designed as a form of inter-agency coordination, involving the Indonesian National Armed Forces, the Indonesian National Police, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Law, the Attorney General's Office, and local governments as the main implementing actors.

The main function of the Integrated Task Force is to carry out prevention, supervision, and enforcement against mass organizations that have been proven to violate the law, disturb public order, or misuse organizational attributes for illegal business activities. The Task Force is also intended to prevent practices such as intimidation, extortion, control of public spaces, and inter-group clashes carried out in the name of mass organizations.

It is expected to bridge the gap between long-term regulatory approaches and operational responses in the field. In addition, the Task Force is expected to play a mediating role between the government and mass organizations and to conduct periodic evaluations of organizations considered high risk to social stability. However, its effectiveness depends on the clarity of its institutional structure, standard operating procedures, and principles of public accountability. Oversight of the Task Force's performance is essential to prevent it from becoming a repressive instrument that may lead to human rights violations or abuse of authority.

Furthermore, the establishment of the Integrated Task Force aligns with the government's strategic agenda to revise Law No. 17 of 2013 on Mass Organizations. This revision is currently a priority in the National Legislation Program, reflecting the need to adapt to socio-political dynamics and strengthen substantive democracy in Indonesia. The aim is not merely to restrict the activities of mass organizations, but to create a balance between freedom of association and the protection of public order and national security.

The government considers strengthening the legal framework essential to ensure that the activities of mass organizations operate within clear legal boundaries. In this regard, the revision of the Mass Organization Law aims to clarify the limits of organizational activities, enhance financial transparency, and strengthen reporting mechanisms as a form of public accountability. The government also promotes the use of risk-based and legality-based indicators to assess mass organizations, enabling those that contribute to social development to be distinguished from those that are potentially harmful and deviate from their social functions.

Devi (2025) argues that this revision represents a strategic step toward a more mature democracy, with accountable and well-governed mass organizations. Fath (2025) similarly emphasizes that the revision is beneficial for democracy, provided that it does not arbitrarily restrict civic space.

However, this policy has also attracted critical responses from various civil society groups. As Ali (2025) highlights, the revision of the Mass Organization Law has the potential to be a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it can provide legal legitimacy to regulate deviant mass organizations, but on the other hand, it can also narrow the space for freedom of association and expression if it is not supported by human rights guarantees and the principle of checks and balances. Criticism becomes more intense in light of the inconsistent and selective enforcement of the law. Some mass organizations close to those in power appear to be immune to the law, while those opposed to the government are disbanded without adequate safeguards or due process.

Therefore, the Integrated Task Force for Gang Activity and Mass Organizations must

operate in accordance with the principles of transparency, accountability, and civil society participation. Public involvement in monitoring and evaluating policies is essential to ensure that this measure is not merely an instrument of control but also a momentum for institutional reform, enabling mass organizations to return to their original purpose as agents of community empowerment and social transformation. This reform can contribute to a healthy democratic ecosystem, in which mass organizations are not only protected from the risks of radicalization and violence but are also encouraged to actively contribute to national development in a legal, peaceful, and sustainable manner.

At the global level, recent studies on vigilantism, hybrid security governance, and non-state coercive actors indicate that urban collective violence is increasingly shaped by hybrid interactions among political elites, informal economic networks, and fragmented state authority (Villa et al., 2022; Ferreira, 2025). In many Global South democracies, coercive civilian groups operate within blurred boundaries between legality and illegality, often receiving indirect political protection while simultaneously filling gaps left by weak law enforcement. However, despite the growing body of literature on vigilantism and hybrid security, empirical studies that specifically examine the operational dynamics, governance structures, and accountability of state task force in managing violent mass organizations remain limited, particularly in the Indonesian context. Most existing studies focus on regulatory instruments or the ideological dimensions of mass organizations, while attention to day-to-day security governance mechanisms remains limited.

Against this background, the study addresses the role of the Integrated Task Force on Gang Activity and Mass Organizations as an instrument of hybrid security governance in responding to the transformation of mass organizations into coercive actors in Jakarta, and examines the implications for democratic accountability, human security, and civil liberties. This issue is significant given the dual role of the Task Force as both an instrument for restoring order and a potential source of new coercive authority in urban security governance.

This study offers a novel contribution by conceptualizing the Task Force not merely as an extension of law enforcement, but as a form of hybrid security governance that reshapes relations among the state, mass organizations, business actors, and civil society in an urban democratic setting. By combining empirical field data with contemporary theories of non-traditional security and hybrid governance, this study contributes to the broader scholarly debate on how modern states manage coercive non-state actors without undermining democratic principles and human rights.

This article is structured as follows. The first section presents the theoretical framework on mass organizations, vigilantism, non-traditional security, and hybrid security governance. The second section outlines the qualitative research design and data analysis procedures. The third section presents the empirical findings on the transformation of mass organizations and the operation of the Integrated Task Force. The final section discusses the broader implications of these findings for democratic governance, human security, and policy reform in Indonesia.

II. Methods

This study employed a descriptive qualitative approach to examine in depth the dynamics surrounding the formation of the Integrated Task Force on Gang Activity and Mass Organizations in Jakarta. This approach was appropriate as it enabled the exploration of complex social phenomena, including power relations, inter-actor dynamics, and public policy perceptions. Qualitative methods facilitated a contextual understanding of social realities based on the perspectives and experiences of relevant actors (Moleong, 2019).

A case study method was applied to focus on specific empirical phenomena, particularly the transformation of certain mass organizations into actors engaged in collective violence and the corresponding state response through the establishment of the Integrated Task Force. Previous studies have documented the involvement of specific mass organizations in violent conflicts in Jakarta, such as Pemuda Pancasila and Forum Betawi Rempug, particularly in relation to territorial disputes and collective

violence. However, this study did not focus on a single organization, but rather examined broader patterns of transformation among selected mass organizations that exhibited similar coercive practices, based on empirical field findings and institutional reports. This delimitation was intended to avoid over generalization and to ensure analytical precision.

Data were collected through in-depth interviews, participant observation, and document analysis. Participants were selected using purposive sampling, involving key institutional actors such as the Head of the Jakarta Capital City Government's National Unity and Politics Agency, the Head of the Public Order Police Unit, and the Head of Public Relations of the Jakarta Metropolitan Police. Observations were conducted in conflict-prone areas, including Tanah Abang, Cengkareng, and Palmerah, which are known for the presence of competing mass organizations and informal territorial control. Documents included regulatory frameworks, academic literature, media reports, and official police records.

Data were analyzed using thematic analysis supported by NVivo 12 Plus software. The analytical process involved data reduction, the development of categories and themes, coding tree construction, and mapping relationships among actors through matrix coding, word frequency, and network analysis features. The use of NVivo was supported by Woods et al. (2016) and Jackson and Bazeley (2019), which highlight its capacity to enhance analytical rigor, transparency, and consistency in qualitative research.

The phenomenon of mass organizations transforming into coercive actors, as well as the state's response through the establishment of the Integrated Task Force, has rarely been examined using systematic qualitative approaches supported by digital analytical tools. Most previous studies have been normative or historical. Therefore, this methodological approach was appropriate for examining the narratives, perceptions, and power relations that shaped the dynamics of the Integrated Task Force policy in Jakarta.

Conceptually, this study employed Social Conflict Theory (Gould, 2019) to explain conflicts arising from competing group interests, as well as

a social transformation framework to understand shifts in the roles of mass organizations in response to political and economic changes. In addition, the Human Security approach was used to analyze the broader implications of these transformations, particularly in relation to non-traditional threats such as coercive practices and violence, which affect public safety, freedom from fear, and overall social stability. Through this framework, the establishment of the Integrated Task Force was interpreted not only as a mechanism of state control, but also as a response to evolving challenges in state-society relations.

III. Results and Discussion

This section presents the study findings and discusses the dynamics of the transformation of mass organizations into actors engaged in collective violence, the effectiveness of the Integrated Task Force for Gang Activity and Mass Organizations as a state policy response to non-traditional security threats, and the range of stakeholder perceptions. The analysis is based on interviews, observations, documents, and NVivo 12 Plus data coding, which reveal the roles of symbolic conflict, informal economic interests, governance weaknesses, and policy implementation challenges in shaping social stability.

A. The Dynamics of Mass Organization Transformation: From Social Entities to Actors Engaged in Collective Violence

Mass organizations are an important pillar of democratic order and social life. With a legal basis, they are established as strategic partners of the government, channels for community aspirations, and agents of social change at the grassroots level. However, in practice, not all mass organizations operate in line with these ideals. Over time, some have evolved into coercive power structures, becoming actors engaged in collective violence that generate social unrest.

The transformation of mass organizations into violent groups is not instantaneous, but occurs through the accumulation of pressures across three main dimensions: group identity,

economic interests, and organizational structure. When these three elements are disrupted by internal or external actors, mass organizations are more likely to respond coercively. In a study conducted by (Pramono, 2015), explains that the transformation of mass organizations is often triggered by incidents such as the removal of organizational attributes, land disputes, and economic competition that affect the legitimacy of their territorial authority.

Recent studies on urban collective violence emphasize that contemporary vigilantism and organized coercion are increasingly shaped by hybrid interactions among informal groups, political elites, and fragmented state authority (Dierolf & Barnes, 2020). In this perspective, violence by mass organizations is no longer seen merely as spontaneous group aggression, but as a rational collective strategy embedded in political brokerage and informal economic governance. This theoretical framework supports the findings of this study, which show that symbolic conflict and economic territoriality function as instruments of power consolidation rather than purely ideological expressions.

Based on interviews with participants from the police and local government, conflicts between mass organizations in Jakarta often stem from territorial symbolism. Flags, command posts, and organizational attributes serve as symbols of honor that must not be challenged. Incidents such as flag removal or the destruction of organizational posts often trigger physical confrontations that escalate into open violence. This indicates that, in many cases, violence begins with symbolic triggers that escalate due to strong group identity and solidarity.

This dynamic is further reinforced by the use of military-style uniforms by some mass organizations, which create a visual impression of strength and discipline. Camouflage uniforms or attributes resembling those of state security forces, complete with ranks and command insignia, are used not only as markers of internal identity but also as a psychological strategy to project strength to outsiders. Several police participants noted that the use of these military attributes often confuses the public because they resemble official state apparatus, and in some

cases have led to misunderstandings or clashes with security personnel.

Furthermore, the use of military-style uniforms by mass organizations reinforces the perceived legitimacy of informal power, suggesting that these groups have the authority to enforce order, provide security, or control particular areas. This encourages the emergence of practices such as sweeping, intimidation, and control of public spaces by groups that present themselves as moral guardians or protectors of society. In this context, visual symbols such as uniforms are not only markers of identity, but also instruments of social and territorial domination.

From a sociological perspective, these militaristic attributes create a coercive image that widens the gap between mass organizations and civil society. When this symbolic power is combined with strong group solidarity and weak state oversight, the potential for collective violence increases. Therefore, the transformation of mass organizations into violent actors is driven not only by economic and political motivations, but also by systematically constructed symbolic practices, including the use of military-style uniforms that convey a sense of legality and authority.

Since 2020, this transformation has also been strongly influenced by digital platforms that enable rapid mobilization, propaganda, and intimidation beyond physical space (Pearson et al., 2023). Online narratives, militaristic visual symbolism, and viral confrontation content amplify group identity and escalate street-level conflicts into broader political spectacles. This development supports the empirical findings of this study, indicating that symbolic domination is not only constructed through physical attributes but is increasingly mediated through digital visibility and algorithmic amplification.

This transformation process is not static. Under stable socio-political conditions, and when mass organizations return to community empowerment, these groups can perform their social role effectively. However, when economic interests and collective identity are disrupted, mass organizations tend to use violence to maintain their existence and sphere of influence. For example, the conflict between the Gajah and Macan mass organizations between 2008 and

2014 involved more than 100 incidents of violence, driven not only by intergroup hostility but also by competition over resources and symbols of power.

Official data from the Metro Jaya Regional Police support these findings: between 2008 and 2014, there were at least 187 cases of violence involving eight major mass organizations in the Greater Jakarta area. This pattern of violence was systematic and repetitive rather than sporadic. In coded interview data analyzed using NVivo, dominant terms such as “territorial influence,” “flag,” “violence,” and “sweeping” emerged, indicating that territorial disputes and informal economic interests were the primary drivers of conflict.

Furthermore, many mass organizations perform informal economic functions such as security services, parking management, and area control, which do not always have formal legal status. In this context, violence is used to maintain economic dominance perceived as legitimate by the group. This situation positions mass organizations not only as social entities, but also as semi-criminal actors operating within a logic of power and intimidation. When competition between groups intensifies and is not balanced by effective state regulation and oversight, the shift toward coercive actions becomes more likely. Coercive practices by mass organizations in the industrial sector has systemic impacts, affecting not only local security but also investor confidence, and often becomes a significant barrier to industrial investment.

Post-pandemic security studies emphasize that non-traditional threats such as coercive mass organizations, economic intimidation, and informal territorial control directly affect investor confidence and urban economic resilience (Jones, 2023). This perspective supports the findings of this study, which show that such practices undermine social order and disrupt industrial activity and business certainty.

This finding aligns with (Gould, 2019) theory of collective violence, which explains that conflicts between groups are often triggered by competition over shared values such as authority,

economic resources, or social influence. When formal state structures weaken and effective regulatory mechanisms are absent, internal group solidarity is used to justify violent actions as a form of resistance or identity defense. As stated by (Sumpter, 2017), strategies for addressing collective violence should prioritize strengthening moderate civil society groups, as “non-kinetic instruments” are more effective in preventing radicalization than direct coercion. In this context, violence becomes a normalized instrument in interactions between mass organizations in urban public spaces.

In addition to field data and social theory, the dynamics of mass organization transformation can also be understood through public perception. A big data analysis conducted by Kawaldata on 20,000 online comments indicates that 71% of public sentiment toward mass organizations is negative, 22% is neutral, and only 7% is positive. This distribution suggests that public perception is predominantly critical, with a clear majority expressing concern over the behavior of mass organizations. As noted by Pinurba in Daffa (2025), negative sentiment is largely driven by intimidating actions, gang-related activities, and involvement in horizontal conflicts or extortion. Meanwhile, neutral and positive responses tend to reflect limited tolerance or conditional acceptance, particularly in relation to the social and philanthropic roles of some mass organizations. Rather than indicating a balanced duality, these findings suggest an asymmetrical perception structure in which negative views dominate, while neutral and positive attitudes represent a smaller and less decisive segment of public opinion.

Beyond public perception, the transformation of mass organizations into coercive actors is also shaped by structural factors, including weak verification mechanisms, regulatory gaps, political proximity, permissive tolerance, and the absence of systematic state guidance. These conditions create an enabling environment in which certain organizations can expand their influence beyond civic functions into coercive and informal power practices.




Figure 2. Netizens' Sentiment Toward Mass Organizations
(Source: Dafa, 2025)

Furthermore, public emotions toward mass organizations show a complex distribution. A total of 39% of netizens expressed anger, 27% disappointment, 13% anxiety, 11% happiness, and 10% neutrality. According to Pinurba in Daffa (2025), anger and disappointment are driven by the perception that mass organizations often disrupt economic activities or become involved in conflicts. Conversely, positive emotions such as happiness arise from the view that mass organizations create job opportunities and support marginalized communities.




Figure 3. Netizens' Emotions Toward Mass Organizations
(Source: Dafa, 2025)

This phenomenon reflects a clear duality in public perception. On the one hand, mass

organizations are perceived as a source of threat; on the other, they retain the potential to serve as inclusive social instruments. As suggested by Pinurba, the state, through relevant task forces, needs to manage public perception in a communicative and transparent manner. An inclusive, participatory, and dialogue-based approach is expected to reduce social tension and redirect mass organizations toward constructive social roles.

These findings show that the transformation of mass organizations into coercive actors, and in some cases involvement in gang-related activities, is not merely an ideological issue, but also a structural one. Weak verification mechanisms for the establishment of mass organizations, regulatory gaps, proximity to political elites, permissive social tolerance, and limited guidance from the Ministry of Home Affairs and local governments have created space for informal power practices to expand.

Thus, the transformation of mass organizations into violent groups is not merely a matter of legality, but reflects an imbalance in social control, weak state guidance, and intense symbolic and economic competition at the grassroots level. This complexity requires a multidimensional policy approach that addresses not only security concerns, but also social, economic, and institutional dimensions.



Figure 4. Word Frequency Query Using NVivo 12 Plus
(Source: Processed by researcher, 2025)

B. Effectiveness of the Integrated Task Force for Gang-Related Activities and Mass Organizations as a Policy Instrument for Responding to Non-Traditional Threats

The transformation of mass organizations into violent actors has serious implications for social order, domestic security, and the investment climate. In the context of non-traditional security, the presence of mass organizations engaging in coercive practices such as extortion, intimidation, sweeping, and control of informal economic sectors shares characteristics with organized criminal activity. Therefore, the response cannot rely solely on repressive measures, but should prioritize a holistic and sustainable approach that integrates law enforcement with social development strategies.

Capacity-building efforts for mass organizations should focus on strengthening social capacity, legal awareness, and limiting economic activities with the potential for abuse. In this regard, the state should act not only as an enforcer, but also as a facilitator in guiding mass organizations toward constructive and constitutional roles. This can be achieved through empowerment programs, legal incentives, and performance-based recognition systems that reward organizations contributing positively to society.

However, when mass organizations are consistently involved in violence, extortion, or intimidation, the state has an obligation to enforce firm and proportionate legal measures. A balanced approach combining incentives and sanctions is essential to safeguard freedom of association while maintaining the rule of law. Any form of dissolution or restriction must adhere to principles of justice, transparency, and public participation, in line with constitutional mandates and Law No. 17 of 2013.

To address the limitations of conventional governance mechanisms, the government, through the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, established the Integrated Task Force on Gang Activity and Mass Organizations. The Task Force operates as a cross-sectoral entity involving the National Police, the Indonesian Armed Forces, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Law and

Human Rights, with core functions including monitoring, mediation, and enforcement against organizations found to violate legal norms and threaten public order.

Empirical findings from interviews with government officials and business actors indicate that the Task Force has been positively received as a responsive instrument capable of addressing regulatory gaps and tackling coercive practices in a coordinated manner. Many stakeholders view it as an effective extension of the state that helps restore legal certainty and public trust, particularly in areas where informal power structures have dominated.

However, the effectiveness of this policy is subject to ongoing debate. Notably, civil society actors and representatives of mass organizations have raised concerns about the potential for political misuse of the Task Force, including its use as an instrument of repression. Limited transparency, weak oversight, and the potential for selective enforcement are seen as risks that may undermine democratic governance and civil liberties.

NVivo analysis reveals a clear divide in stakeholder perceptions. Government and business actors tend to frame the Task Force in terms of “firmness,” “security,” and “stabilization,” whereas civil society groups associate it with “repression,” “lack of transparency,” and “silencing.” These contrasting narratives suggest that the effectiveness of the Task Force depends not only on operational performance, but also on the extent to which governance principles are implemented in practice.

As an instrument for responding to non-traditional, non-military threats, the Integrated Task Force on Gang Activity and Mass Organizations has significant potential. However, without a clear social risk mapping framework, cross-sectoral data integration, and evidence-based policy evaluation, it risks becoming a source of new conflict. Strengthening legal legitimacy, conducting regular evaluations, and ensuring community participation in monitoring are therefore essential for the Task Force to function as a safeguard of social stability rather than merely an enforcement mechanism.

by social background, institutional interests, and direct experience in interactions with mass organizations and state officials.

NVivo analysis of interview data identifies three main positions. First, government and security actors—particularly the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, the National Police, and the Ministry of Home Affairs—view the Task Force as a strategic instrument for addressing weak enforcement against mass organizations that violate the law. They see it as complementing existing regulations in responding to non-traditional threats such as symbolic violence, gang-related activities, and sweeping operations that disrupt public order. Dominant keywords include “firmness,” “order,” and “restoring state control.”

The official narrative from the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs emphasizes that the Task Force was established under the direction of President Prabowo Subianto to maintain national stability and support a conducive investment climate. Between May and June 2025, the Task Force handled 10,771 cases and apprehended 13,585 suspects across multiple locations, including Cilegon, South Tangerang, and Depok.

The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Budi Gunawan, emphasized that the government will not hesitate to take firm action against gang-related activities and mass organization activities that disrupt public order and investment. Second, business actors and local economic communities, particularly in densely populated areas such as Tanah Abang, Palmerah, and Cengkareng, view the Task Force as a form of protection against pressure from mass organizations engaged in intimidation or extortion. Their accounts use terms such as “safe,” “protection,” and “operational effectiveness.” However, they emphasize the need for sustained and measurable implementation to ensure legal certainty and support the business climate.

Third, representatives of mass organizations, including those not involved in coercive practices, express concerns about the potential abuse of power by the Task Force. They raise concerns about repressive practices, the dissolution of organizations without due legal process, and the risk of broad stigmatization of mass organizations. Terms that emerged in the interviews include “discriminatory,” “excessive,” “lack of transparency,” and “restriction of civic space.” They call for accountability and transparency to ensure that the policy remains within constitutional limits.

The NVivo coding tree visualization reveals a clear divide between the narratives of “firmness” and “order” among government and business actors, and “repression” and “fear” among critical civil society groups. The word cloud supports this pattern: terms such as “fear,” “peace,” “safe,” and “firm” appear frequently in accounts from civilians and business actors, whereas “overacting,” “suspicious,” and “discriminatory” are more commonly associated with mass organizations and civil society actors.

Some stakeholders also emphasize the need to strengthen the Task Force’s legal framework, conduct regular policy evaluations, and involve civil society in oversight mechanisms as a form of checks and balances. They stress that the Task Force should not become a vehicle for unilateral action, but instead serve as a bridge between state control and civil society development through a collaborative, data-driven approach.

Overall, the spectrum of perceptions toward the Integrated Task Force on Gang Activity and Mass Organizations reflects both its potential and the risks associated with its implementation. When implemented in a participatory, transparent, and evidence-based manner, the Task Force has the potential to function as a credible and responsive safeguard of social stability. However, if implemented in a repressive and unilateral manner, it risks provoking resistance and eroding public trust in the state and the democratic system.

as agents of community empowerment and social integration.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank all those who contributed to this study, particularly Mr. Muhamad Matsani, Head of the Jakarta Provincial National Unity and Politics Agency, and Mr. Satriadi Gunawan, Head of the Jakarta Provincial Civil Service Police Unit, for their valuable contributions as resource persons. Their insights and support were instrumental in the development of this article, which may serve as a reference for other researchers interested in similar case studies.

References

- Acharya, A. (2020). *Human Security*. United States: American University.
- Ali, S. (2025). *Meninjau Ulang Undang-Undang Ormas: Antara Ketertiban Negara dan Ruang Ekspresi Masyarakat Sipil*. Fusilatnews.com. <https://fusilatnews.com/meninjau-ulang-undang-undang-ormas-antara-ketertiban-negara-dan-ruang-ekspresi-masyarakat-sipil/>.
- Bovens, M., & Wille, A. (2020). Indexing Watchdog Accountability Powers A Framework for Assessing the Accountability Capacity of Independent Oversight Institutions. *Regulation & Governance*, 15(3), 856-876. <https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12316>.
- Daffa, S. a. F (2025). *Realita Pembentukan Satgas Ormas: Menguntungkan atau Merugikan?* Goodstats.id. <https://goodstats.id/article/pembentukan-satgas-ormas-menguntungkan-atau-merugikan-13BUs>.
- Devi, H. (2025). *Rencana Revisi UU Ormas untuk Kemajuan Demokrasi*. mediaindonesia.com. <https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/765559/rencana-revisi-uu-ormas-untuk-kemajuan-demokrasi>.
- Dierolf, J. A., & Barnes, N. (2020). Criminal Violence in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review*, 55(2), 397-406. <https://doi.org/10.25222/larr.975>.
- Doddy, K. (2022). *Analisis dan Resolusi Konflik Antar Ormas di Tanah Abang Jakarta Pusat (Studi Kasus: Konflik Antara Ormas Sikumbang dan FKPT)*. Skripsi. Jakarta: UIN Syarif Hidayatullah. <https://repository.uinjkt.ac.id/dspace/handle/123456789/62921>.
- Elkady, S., Mehryar, S., Hernantes, J., & Labaka, L. (2024). *Prioritizing Stakeholder Interactions in Disaster Management: A TOPSIS-based Decision Support Tool for Enhancing Community Resilience*. Progress in Disaster Science, 22, 100320. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2024.100320>.
- Fath, P. M. (2025). *Menteri HAM: Revisi UU Ormas Positif Demi Kemajuan Demokrasi*. Antaranews.Com. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4799481/menteri-ham-revisi-uu-ormas-positif-demi-kemajuan-demokrasi>.
- Ferreira, M. a. (2025). Organized Crime and Hybrid Governance of Violence in the Brazilian Amazon. *Journal of Illicit Economics and Development*, 7(1), 54-71. <https://doi.org/10.31389/jied.291>.
- Gould, R. V. (2019). *Collision of Wills: How Ambiguity about Social Rank Breeds Conflict*. University of Chicago Press.
- Hardhantyo, M., Djasri, H., Nursetyo, A. A., Donna, B., Ariani, M., Pangaribuan, H., Yogadhita, G. Y., Yulianti, A., & Adipradipta, B. R (2023). Evidence-Based Policy Recommendations for Public Health Emergency Operation Centers in Regional Settings: A Case Study in Indonesia. *Public Health Reviews*, 44. <https://doi.org/10.3389/phrs.2023.1604899>.
- Herizal., Rasanjani, S., Afrijal, Mukhrijal., & Wance, M. (2024). Systematic Literature Review: The Evolution of Adaptive Governance and Practice in the Context of the Environmental Crisis. *Jurnal Ilmu Lingkungan*, 22(5), 1326-1337. <https://doi.org/10.14710/jil.22.5.1326-1337>.
- Hidayat, N. (2019). *Organisasi Masyarakat dan Ketertiban Umum (Studi tentang Keterlibatan Pemuda Pancasila dalam Bentrokan Massa di DKI Jakarta, Jawa barat dan Banten Tahun 2013-2018)*. Skripsi. Jakarta: UIN Syarif Hidayatullah. <https://repository.uinjkt.ac.id/dspace/bitstream/123456789/49309/1/>.
- Jackson, K., & Bazeley, P. (2019). *Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo*. SAGE publications.
- Jones, C. (2023) Enacting the Security Community: ASEAN's Never-Ending Story. *Politics & International relations Journals*, 98(6), 2191-2193. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iia246>.
- Konger, S. (2021). The Use of International Force to Prevent Atrocities through Responsibility to Protect and Provide Humanitarian Intervention. *International Journal of Law Management and Humanities*, 4(3), 33-41. <http://doi.org/10.1732/IJLMH.26696>.
- Martinsson, J. (2021). Combatting Institutional Corruption: The Policy-Centered Approach. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 75, 267-280. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-021-09934-5>.
- Merwyn, N. (2025). *Operasi Berantas Jaya 2025 Sapu Bersih Ormas Illegal, Ribuan Atribut Disita dan Ratusan Pelaku Diciduk*. Porosjakarta.com. https://www.porosjakarta.com/Metro/066065185/Operasi-Berantas-Jaya-2025-Sapu-Bersih-Ormas-Illegal-Ribuan-Atribut-Disita-Dan-Ratusan-Pelaku-Diciduk#google_vignette.
- Moleong, Lexy J. (2019). *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif*. Remaja Rosdakarya.
- Mulcahy, D. T. (2023). The Use of Task Forces Internationally: Mitigating Socio-Political Risks for Law Enforcement Agencies. *Socio-Political Risk Management*, 207-222. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110731217-012>.
- Pearson, E., Whittaker, J., Baaken, T., Zeiger, S., Atamuradova, F., & Conway, M. (2023). *Online Extremism and Terrorism Researchers' Security, Safety, Findings from the Field and Resilience*. VOX-Pol Network of Excellence.
- Pramono, G. E. (2015). Transformasi Organisasi Kemasyarakatan (Ormas) Menjadi Kelompok Kekekrasan (Studi Kekerasan Ormas di Jakarta). *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional*, 1(2), 251-277. <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.31599/jkn.v1i2.25>.

-
- Rasika, K. R. A., & Shyamali, W. M. W. (2025). Role of Community Participatory Approach in Community Development. *The Academic: International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research*, 3(1), 801-822. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14850894>.
- Raka, B. M (2025). *Provinsi dengan Ormas Terbanyak 2024*. Goodstats.Id. <https://goodstats.id/infographic/provinsi-dengan-ormas-terbanyak-2024-L5gvt>.
- Sangiovanni, M. E., & Westerwinter, O. (2022). The Global Governance Complexity Cube: Varieties of Institutional Complexity in Global Governance. *The Review of International Organizations*, 17, 233-262. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-021-09449-7>.
- Sulthan Alfaraby, M., & Syafrina Sari Lubis. (2022). Peran Organisasi Kemasyarakatan (Ormas) dalam Melakukan Pencegahan Dampak Covid-19 di Masyarakat. *Jurnal Riset Dan Pengabdian Masyarakat*, 2(2), 241-248. <https://doi.org/10.22373/jrpm.v2i2.894>.
- Sumpter, C. (2017). Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Priorities, Practice and the Role of Civil Society. *Journal for Deradicalization*, Summer (11), 112-147. <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd>.
- Villa, R. D., Braga, C. D. M., & Ferreira, M. a. S.V. Violent Nonstate Actors and the Emergence of Hybrid Governance in South America. *Latin American Research Review*, 56(1), 36-49. <https://doi.org/10.25222/larr.756>.
- Wang, X., & Huang, X. (2024). Strategic Participatory Communication and Development: Engagement and Empowerment, *Community Development Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cdj/bsaf034>.
- Woods, M., Paulus, T. M., Atkins., & Macklin, R. (2016). Advancing Qualitative Research Using Qualitative Data Analysis Software (QDAS)? Reviewing Potential Versus Practice in Published Studies using ATLAS.ti and NVivo, 1994-2013. *Social Science Computer Review*, 34(5), 597-617. https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439315596311?urlappend=%3Futm_source%3Dresearchgate.net%26utm_medium%3Darticle.
-